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Preface
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first, ”Paying for Payments”, examines the role of
interchange fees in payment card networks. The second, ”Bank Liquidity and the Interbank
Market” (co-authored with Mikael Reimer Jensen), investigates how banks’ liquidity holdings at
the central bank affect outcomes in the money market. The third, ”Collateralized Lending and
Central Bank Collateral Policy”, considers the emergence of credit constraints under collateralized
lending, and how central banks use collateral policy to mitigate these constraints. While the
chapters can be read independently, they share common themes. Each chapter is concerned with
payments in one way or another, each is concerned with the efficiency of market outcomes, and,
to the extent that there is scope for improving these outcomes, each discusses the appropriate role
for policy, in particular central bank policy.
I would like to acknowledge the support of Danmarks Nationalbank which has provided funding
for my PhD studies at Copenhagen Business School. I am grateful to my supervisors Lasse Heje
Pedersen and David Lando for advise and feedback and for creating an excellent research envi-
ronment at the Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC). A number of other people deserve special
thanks. These include Kristian Kjeldsen from Danmarks Nationalbank, who encouraged me to
pursue the degree, Javier Suarez, who hosted me at CEMFI in the autumn of 2014, Peter Norman
Sørensen, who took part in my closing seminar, my good colleagues at Danmarks Nationalbank,
other faculty and fellow PhD students for helpful discussions and, not least, my family.
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Chapter summaries in English and
Danish
This section contains summaries of the three chapters of the dissertation in English and Danish.
Chapter 1
English summary. When a consumer pays using a payment card, an interchange fee is typically
transferred from the merchant’s bank to the consumer’s bank. Even though interchange fees are
commonly agreed upon collectively by banks, they do not function as ordinary monopoly prices.
Interchange fees can enhance welfare, and in conventional models of interchange fees it is unclear
whether the interchange fee set by banks is too high or too low relative to the social optimum.
Even if it were biased, the optimal fee would depend on unobservable quantities such as consumer
preferences, rendering it of little practical value to a regulator. Taken together, these findings
suggest that the case for regulating interchange fees is weak.
I examine a model of interchange fees in which the above conclusions are reversed. This occurs
in the special, but empirically relevant case in which banks do not charge consumers transaction
fees. In that case privately set interchange fees exceed the social optimum, resulting in too few
card payments. Moreover, the socially optimal fee depends only on the difference in marginal cost
of producing card and cash payments. Given adequate data on the cost of producing payments,
it can therefore be calculated by a regulator and used as a benchmark. I also analyze a number
of related policy issues, for example the effects of surcharging. In my model, surcharging does not
”neutralize” the effect of interchange fees, as is often found in the related literature.
Dansk resume´. N˚ar en forbruger betaler med et betalingskort, overføres et interbankgebyr
typisk fra forretningens bank til forbrugerens bank. Selv om interbankgebyrer ofte fastsættes
kollektivt af banker, fungerer de ikke som ordinære monopol-priser. Interbankgebyrer kan forøge
velfærd, og i konventionelle modeller af interbankgebyrer er det uklart, om det interbankgebyr,
5
som bankerne fastsætter, er for højt eller for lavt i forhold til det socialt optimale gebyr. Det
optimale gebyr afhænger endvidere af forbrugerpræferencer, som ikke er observerbare. Det vil
derfor være vanskeligt at regulere interbankgebyrer, selv hvis de systematisk afveg fra det socialt
optimale. Samlet set gør disse betragtninger, at der er ikke noget klart belæg for at regulere
interbankgebyrer.
Jeg beskriver en model af interbankgebyrer, hvor ovenst˚aende konklusioner ikke gælder, snarere
det modsatte. Det sker i det særlige, men empirisk relevante tilfælde, hvor banker ikke afkræver
forbrugerne transaktionsgebyrer i forbindelse med kortbetalinger. I det tilfælde overstiger inter-
bankgebyrerne det socialt optimale niveau, hvilket resulterer i for f˚a kortbetalinger. Det socialt
optimale gebyr afhænger alene af forskellen i de marginale omkostninger ved at producere kort- and
kontantbetalinger. Givet tilstrækkelige omkostningsdata vil en myndighed s˚aledes kunne beregne
det optimale interbankgebyr og benytte det som et benchmark. Jeg undersøger endvidere en række
andre forhold, herunder effekterne af overvæltning. I min model ”neutraliserer” overvæltning ikke
interbankgebyrer, som det ofte ses i den relaterede litteratur.
Chapter 2
English summary. Banks turn to the overnight interbank market to absorb payment shocks.
We address whether banks with less central bank liquidity pay higher rates in the money market.
While liquidity-constrained banks may be willing to pay higher rates, competition among lenders
with surplus liquidity should push down rates in a functioning money market.
The analysis couples data on overnight loans with a measure of bank liquidity. On average,
banks in need of liquidity pay only a small premium relative to those with ample liquidity. While
the premium is statistically significant, it is trivial from an economic perspective. The liquidity
premium is larger when aggregate liquidity is scarce, when liquidity is needed more urgently, and
when payment activity is large, but overall the results point to a well-functioning money market.
The link between credit risk and liquidity is examined in some detail. One concern is that our
estimates are biased because riskier banks choose to hold more liquidity. We attempt to control
for this through various strategies, including the use of fixed effects, differencing, and instrumental
variables, and in most cases still find low liquidity premia. Our analysis further suggests that
riskier banks are less likely to participate in the money market, but that credit risk seems to play
a negligible role for those banks which can access the market. Finally, the analysis sheds light on
the role of central banks in shaping money market outcomes. The money market is less active, for
example, when central bank facilities are available.
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Dansk resume´. Banker benytter interbankmarkedet til at h˚andtere uventede betalingsstrømme.
Vi undersøger, hvorvidt banker med begrænset centralbanklikviditet betaler højere renter i penge-
markedet. Selv om banker i likviditetsnød formentlig er villige til at betale højere renter, burde
konkurrence mellem potentielle l˚angivere med overskudslikviditet presse renterne ned i et velfun-
gerende pengemarked.
Analysen knytter l˚anedata med et m˚al for bankers likviditet. Banker med begrænset likviditet
betaler kun en mindre præmie i forhold til banker med rigelig likviditet. Likviditetspræmien
er statistisk signifikant, men økonomisk set ubetydelig. Likviditetspræmien er større, n˚ar den
samlede likviditet er mindre, n˚ar banker har mindre tid til at skaffe likviditet og n˚ar den samlede
betalingsaktivitet er større. Samlet indikerer resultaterne, at pengemarkedet er velfungerende.
Vi undersøger ogs˚a sammenhængen mellem kreditrisiko og likviditet. Et potentielt problem er,
at risikable banker vælger at holde mere likviditet, hvilket kan p˚avirke vores estimater. Vi forsøger
at kontrollere for dette gennem forskellige metoder, herunder estimation ved brug af s˚akaldte ”fixed
effects”, ved ”differencing” og ved brug af instrumenter. I de fleste tilfælde finder vi fortsat be-
grænsede likviditetspræmier. Resultaterne tyder endvidere p˚a, at mere risikable banker sjældnere
deltager i pengemarkedet, men at kreditrisiko spiller en begrænset rolle for banker med adgang til
markedet. Endelig viser analysen, at centralbanker har stor indflydelse p˚a pengemarkedet. Som
eksempel er pengemarkedet mindre aktivt, n˚ar centralbankfaciliteter er tilgængelige.
Chapter 3
English summary. The chapter has two parts. The first part examines when credit constraints
arise under collateralized lending. In the model, banks can either acquire information about
the collateral quality of firms prior to lending or lend uninformed based on the expectation of
the collateral being adequate. When collateral quality is more uncertain, banks have a strong
incentive to acquire information. Firms prefer to avoid this and may seek smaller loans. They use
less capital than is feasible given the technology and collateral at hand. They are, in a sense, credit
constrained. I show that credit constraints especially aﬄict firms with less profitable investment
projects, even though project and collateral quality are unrelated.
In the second part of the chapter, a central bank is introduced. If few banks verify the actual
collateral quality, the economy is more prone to informational shocks which lead to funding with-
drawals. However, uninformed lending generally allows firms to use more capital. The central bank
uses collateral policy to manage this trade-off by affecting banks’ incentives to gather information.
When collateral quality is high, firms have access to ample capital, and central banks use collat-
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eral policy to induce more information acquisition. If credit constraints arise due to changes in
beliefs about collateral quality, on the other hand, central banks allow agents to post lower quality
collateral. These findings resemble actual policy in normal times and times of crisis respectively.
Dansk resume´. Kapitlet best˚ar af to dele. I den første del undersøges, hvorn˚ar kreditklemmer
opst˚ar ved l˚angivning mod sikkerhed. I modellen kan banker enten verificere kvaliteten af virk-
somheders sikkerheder forud for l˚angivningen eller l˚ane mod en forventning om, at sikkerhederne
er tilstrækkelige. N˚ar der er mere usikkerhed omkring kvaliteten af sikkerheden, har banker et
stærkt incitament til at verificere dens egentlige kvalitet. Virksomheder ønsker at undg˚a dette og
kan reagere ved at ansøge om mindre l˚an og benytte mindre kapital, end de reelt har mulighed for.
De er i den forstand ramt af en slags kreditklemme. Jeg viser, at mindre profitable virksomheder
rammes særligt h˚ardt, selv om deres profitabilitet og kvaliteten af deres sikkerheder er urelaterede.
I den anden del af kapitlet introduceres en centralbank. Hvis f˚a banker verificerer den reelle
kvalitet af sikkerhederne, er der større risiko for, at nye informationer f˚ar bankerne til at trække
kredit tilbage. Omvendt indebærer uinformeret l˚angivning, at virksomheder generelt kan f˚a mere
kredit. Centralbanken afvejer disse effekter, og benytter dens sikkerhedsstillelsespolitik til p˚avirke
bankernes incitamenter til at indsamle information. N˚ar den generelle kvalitet af sikkerhederne i
økonomien er høj, har virksomheder adgang til rigelig kredit, og centralbanken tilskynder mere ind-
samling af information. Omvendt tilskynder centralbanken uninformeret l˚angivning, n˚ar kreditk-
lemmer opst˚ar, fordi kvaliteten af sikkerhederne skønnes at være ringere. Disse resultater afspejler
centralbankers faktiske adfærd i normale og krisetider respektivt.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three chapters, dealing with interchange fees, the money market, and central
bank collateral policy respectively. While seemingly disparate, these topics share some common-
ality, at least in the minds of central bankers who have traditionally grouped them together in
their payment systems or financial stability departments. Logically, the most obvious common
denominator is that each topic deals with payments in one way or another. Interchange fees are
perhaps the most important prices in the market for retail payment, and the overnight money
market is used by banks to absorb payments shocks. Collateral policy is likewise important to the
flow of payments, not least because banks occasionally accumulate large intraday payment deficits
and borrow from central bank against collateral to fund these (Martin, 2004).
Another shared feature is that policy, not least central bank policy, can have welfare impli-
cations in each of these areas. Interchange fees affect whether merchants accept payment cards
and whether consumers pay using cash or cards. Since there can be non-trivial differences in the
social costs of using certain payment instruments (Schmiedel et al., 2012), the choice of interchange
fee has real implications. Central bank actions also influence outcomes in the money market, as
evidenced by the experiments with large-scale asset purchases (Bech and Monnet, 2013). Finally,
collateral policy has proven a potent monetary tool in its own right (Ashcraft et al., 2010), and
central banks have on more occasions used it to affect e.g. the design of securities (Zorn and
Garcia, 2011).
The first chapter of the thesis examines the role of interchange fees in payment card networks.
When a consumer pays a merchant using a payment card, an interchange fee is transferred from the
merchant’s bank to the consumer’s bank. Interchange fees are typically agreed upon collectively
by banks, yet they do not function as traditional monopoly prices due to the two-sided nature
of the market for payment instruments (e.g. Evans and Schmalensee, 2005; Rochet and Tirole,
2006; Rysman, 2009). In fact, interchange fees can remedy a problem of costs and benefits being
asymmetrically distributed across the consumer and merchant sides of the market. A common
argument is that consumers’ banks bear the bulk of the cost of producing card payments whereas
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merchants enjoy most of the benefits by not having to handle cash. A transfer from merchants to
consumers, e.g. in the form of an interchange fee, is one way of dealing with this asymmetry.
The existing literature highlights this potential efficiency. It also points out that there is no a
priori reason to believe that fees are either too high or too low relative to the social optimum; and
even if privately set interchange fees were systemically biased, it would be difficult for a regulator
to identify an optimal fee since such a fee will generally depend on the distribution of agents’
preferences, which is unobservable.
The seminal paper in the literature is Rochet and Tirole (2002). They consider a model in
which privately set interchange fees are, in fact, biased, either equaling or exceeding the social
optimum. In their model, this leads to too many card payments being produced. While their
model is useful for thinking about the effects of interchange fees, it is also seemingly at odds
with country-level data on card usage, which has become available since they wrote their paper.
Statistics from the European Central Bank, for example, show card usage to be highest in exactly
the countries where interchange fees, due to regulation, have not been applied historically.
In the chapter I consider a model of interchange fees, based on Rochet and Tirole (2002),
which may explain this finding. The model is predicated on a simple empirical observation: It is
often the case that banks do not charge consumers transaction fees. In practice, payment services
are often provided either for free or against fixed, periodical fees. I show that in this special
case, the key conclusions from the earlier literature are not only different, but sometimes entirely
reversed. Higher interchange fees are associated with less card usage, and banks set interchange
fees at or above the social optimum. The upshot is that there will be fewer card payments than is
socially optimal. Finally, the socially optimal fee depends only on the difference in marginal cost
of producing card and cash payments. Given adequate data on the cost of producing payments, it
can therefore be calculated. The paper therefore not only shows that interchange fees are biased,
but provides a potential method for regulating fees.
The chapter speaks to an important political discussion. Merchants have long argued that
banks set excessively high fees (Wright, 2012), and various countries have introduced caps on
interchange fees. In the US, for example, the Federal Reserve has been assigned the task of setting
standards for interchange fees, and the European Commission has capped interchange fees at
low levels. The chapter also includes analyses of related policy issues, for example the effects of
surcharging. Surcharging is sometimes claimed to ”neutralize” the effect of interchange fees, but
that is not the case in my model. Permitting merchants to surcharge is therefore not a viable
substitute to regulating interchange fees.
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In the second chapter, we conduct an empirical study of the overnight interbank market prior
to, during, and after the financial crisis. Earlier studies of the money market (Furfine, 2001, 2002)
generally found the money market to be robust during periods of stress, a conclusion which was
tempered somewhat following the crisis (Afonso et al., 2011).
We address whether banks with less central bank liquidity pay higher rates in the money
market. While liquidity-constrained banks are willing to pay higher rates, as documented by Fecht
et al. (2011) in the context of ECB refinancing auctions, competition among lenders with surplus
liquidity should push down rates in a functioning money market. To the extent that banks in need
of liquidity pay substantial premia, it could be a sign of market dysfunction.
The analysis couples data on overnight loans, derived from an algorithm akin to that in Furfine
(1999), with a novel measure of bank liquidity. Controlling for other factors which are likely to
affect money market rates, notably credit risk, we test whether banks with less liquidity pay higher
rates. On average, banks in need of liquidity pay only a small premium relative to those with ample
liquidity. While this premium is statistically significant, it is trivial from an economic perspective,
on the order of less than a single basis point. The liquidity premium is larger when aggregate
liquidity is scarce, when liquidity is needed more urgently, and when payment activity is large, but
overall the results point to a well-functioning money market.
The link between credit risk and liquidity is examined in some detail. One concern is that
riskier banks choose to hold more liquidity, thereby biasing estimates. We attempt to control for
this through the use of fixed effects, a differencing strategy, and an instrumental variables approach,
and in most cases still find low liquidity premia. There is also a part of the sample period during
which money market loans were covered by an explicit government guarantee, effectively removing
credit risk, and liquidity premia are also negligible during that period. Overall, our results indicate
that riskier banks are less likely to participate in the money market, but credit risk does not appear
to have large effects for those banks which are of adequate quality to participate in the market.
Finally, the analysis sheds light on the role of central banks in shaping money market outcomes.
The money market is less active when central bank facilities are available, and interest rates also
depend on factors such as aggregate payment flows and whether banks can borrow from the central
bank.
The third chapter has two parts. The first part examines a model of collateralized lending
which based on Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014). It addresses the question of when credit constraints,
the use of less capital than is feasible given the technology and collateral at hand, arise. I show that
credit constraints arise when collateral quality is more uncertain. Interestingly, credit constraints
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are more pronounced for firms with less profitable investment projects, even though 1) firms are
only able to lend because they can post collateral and 2) profitability and collateral quality are
completely unrelated.
Banks can either acquire information about the collateral quality of firms prior to lending or
lend uninformed. The assumption is that if little information is being gathered in aggregate, the
economy is more prone to shocks which lead to funding withdrawals. Uninformed lending, however,
also has benefits. There is pooling of firms with good and bad collateral which allows agents with
good projects, but bad collateral to obtain credit. In general, uninformed lending allows agents to
use more capital than informed lending.
A central bank is introduced in the second part of the paper. Discussions of the appropriate role
for central bank collateral policy date back to Bagehot (1873) who discusses how a central bank
should respond to a panic. The setting in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) is a useful starting point
for thinking about collateral policy both because it involves collateralized lending and because it
features credit constraints whose effects resemble ”panics”. In the model, the central bank uses
collateral policy to affect banks’ incentives to gather information. The central bank exploits the
fact that banks may have to borrow from the central bank, or alternative hoard liquidity, to be
able to make payments. Specifically, it can make a certain degree of information acquisition a
prerequisite for collateral eligibility with the central bank.
When collateral quality is high, uninformed lending dominates informed lending, and firms
have access to ample capital. In this case, central banks use collateral policy to more induce
information acquisition so as to lower the probability of shocks. If credit constraints arise due to
changes in beliefs about collateral quality, on the other hand, central banks allow agents to post
lower quality collateral. These findings resemble patterns in actual policy. More central banks
have used collateral policy to foster transparency in order to limit systemic risks, but during crises
collateral policy has effectively encouraged less information-intensive lending.
The model also speaks to other features of collateral policy. For example, it suggests that central
banks should give preferential treatment to collateral characterized by high information costs, i.e.
information-insensitive assets such as safe debt securities. It also highlights some limitations of
collateral policy as a tool, or at least the particular channel of collateral policy under consideration.
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Paying for Payments
Abstract
This paper examines the role of interchange fees, transfers from merchants’ banks to
consumers’ banks when card payments take place, when consumers do not face card
transaction fees. Without transaction fees, interchange fees work differently than is
conventionally assumed. Banks always set interchange fees at or above the social opti-
mum, resulting in too few card payments. There exists an optimal fee which depends
only on the cost of producing payments. Finally, surcharging does not neutralize inter-
change fees. The findings may help explain card usage patterns across countries and
have implications for the regulation of interchange fees.
Keywords: Financial regulation; Interchange fees; Payments
JEL-classification: E42; G21; G28
1.1. Introduction
A key role of banks is to provide payment services. The cost of producing these services is non-
negligible. Based on a joint study conducted by central banks in 13 European countries, the
European Central Bank estimates the real cost of producing payments to be about 1.0 per cent of
GDP on average (Schmiedel et al., 2012). More than 70% of the cost relates to the production of
cash or card payments, and about half is incurred by banks. In spite of high costs, bank fees often
provide weak incentives for consumers to choose efficient payment methods. Consumers often do
not pay any fees, or pay flat periodical fees, and then get access to the use of debit cards, online
banking, and other payment services. Borzekowski et al. (2008) cite evidence that only 15% of US
banks charge consumers for debit card transactions.1 A similar pattern is found in many European
countries.2
1The number is based on data from 2004 and covers only PIN-based debit card transactions from which banks,
according to the authors, derive less interchange fee revenue than for signature-based transactions. Banks would
therefore seem to have an incentive to charge consumers fees for exactly these transactions.
2As an example, Jonker (2013) describes the typical fee structure in the Netherlands as follows: ”[...] banks call
these fees payment package fees. The fees are linked to a payment package including the use of a current account,
access to online banking and a debit card which consumers can use for making debit card payments or to use ATMs.
Credit cards are provided optionally at extra cost. Consumers do not pay any transaction fees for card payments,
15
The most important price in the market for card payments is the interchange fee. An inter-
change fee is a fee paid (normally) from the merchant’s bank to the consumer’s bank when a card
transaction take place. In principle, interchange fees can improve welfare, and a simple example
illustrates how: Suppose a consumer values the ability to pay by card at 0.5 while a merchant
enjoys savings of 1.0 when payment is made by card. If the consumer bank’s cost is 0.75, and the
merchant bank’s cost is 0.25, it is beneficial for the transaction to take place since the total benefit
of 1.5 exceeds the total cost of 1.0. However, in the absence of a transfer from merchants or their
banks to consumers or their banks, a card transaction may not be feasible since the consumer’s
bank cannot cover its costs from the consumer.
While interchange fees are potentially beneficial, they have come under scrutiny. Merchants
argue that banks set excessive fees (Vickers, 2005; Wright, 2012), and regulators too have grown
concerned. Fee levels are typically agreed upon collectively by banks and thus set a lower bound
for a merchant’s cost of receiving payment by card. In the US, the Durbin Amendment to the
Dodd-Frank Act introduced caps on fees, with the Federal Reserve being assigned responsibility
for setting regulatory standards; Shy (2014) assesses some effects of the regulation. In 2015, the
European Union agreed to a regulation of interchange fees which will cap fees at 0.2% for debit
cards and 0.3% in the case of credit cards.3
I examine a number of questions of concern to interchange fee regulation: What is the effect of
interchange fees on cash and card usage? What is the socially optimal fee, and what information
would a regulator need to calculate it? Is there scope for regulation, that is, are privately set
fees systematically biased relative to the social optimum? The conventional view has been that
interchange fees foster card adoption and so lead to increased card usage, that the socially optimal
fee depends on unobservable quantities such as the distribution of consumer preferences for cards
relative to cash, making it hard if not impossible for a regulator to identify such a fee, and that
there is little basis for regulation of interchange fees. A clear exposition of this view is found in
Evans and Schmalensee (2005) who note that ”[...] there is a consensus among economists that,
as a matter of theory, it is not possible to arrive, except by happenstance, at the socially optimal
interchange fee through any regulatory system that considers only costs.” These conclusions follow
because the market for payment instrument is ”two-sided” (Rochet and Tirole, 2006; Rysman, 2009;
Weyl, 2010): The benefits enjoyed by consumers depends on the fraction of merchants accepting
cash withdrawals or cash depositions at the ATM [...] [banks] tend not to make consumers directly aware of the
costs associated with their payment behaviour or to provide any incentives towards more cost efficient payment
behaviour.”
3Interchange fees were already capped in 2003 in Australia when The Reserve Bank of Australia mandated a
reduction in interchange fees, see e.g. Chang et al. (2005).
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cards, and the benefits enjoyed by merchants depends on the fraction of consumers using cards.
This sets pricing apart from in one-sided markets. Even if fees are set collectively by banks, the
outcome is not monopoly pricing (Schmalensee, 2002; Wright, 2004).
Models of interchange fees generally assume that fees are passed on to consumers in the form
of a lower marginal cost of card payments. I consider the case in which consumers do not face
transaction fees and show that (1) banks always set an interchange fee which exceeds or equals the
socially optimal fee4, and (2) that total card usage in the economy is declining in interchange fees.
Combined, these facts imply that there are too few card payments. (3) I also find a purely cost-
based optimal interchange fee, thus providing a means for a regulator to evaluate fee levels. (4) I
consider the role of alternatives to interchange fee regulation, for instance permitting merchants
to pass on (surcharge) fees to consumers. (5) I discuss conditions under which no transaction
fees may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. (6) I illustrate the model using data on the cost of
payments.
The model is based on an analytical framework similar to that in Rochet and Tirole (2002,
2011) and Wright (2004, 2012) who extend the original analysis of Baxter (1983). It involves
three types of agents: consumers, merchants and banks. Consumers and merchants derive benefits
from using cards instead of cash. Consumers choose which merchants to purchase from based on
their prices and whether they accept cards. Merchants decide whether to accept payment cards
based on the benefits they enjoy, the fees they must pay, and the fraction of consumers preferring
to pay by card. Banks face costs related to the production of card and cash payments, and set
interchange fees in order to maximize their joint profits which depend on the fraction of consumers
and merchants respectively using and accepting cards. The key difference relative to earlier papers
is that assumption that consumers do not pay their banks when making payments. An obvious
critique of this assumption is that transaction fees are endogenous. In particular, if interchange
fees are adequately high, it is in the interest of banks to ensure that their customers pay using cards
rather than cash, e.g. by applying negative fees. I therefore devote a section to discussing when
zero transaction fees emerge in equilibrium under the weaker condition that card transaction fees
must be non-positive. Specifically, it must be the case that (a) interchange fees are relatively low
given zero transaction fees and (b) that zero transaction fees are optimal given those interchange
low fees. Whether these conditions are satisfied turn out to depend on banks’ market power in
both consumer and merchant markets.
While data on interchange fee levels is scarce, the existing evidence suggests that the results
4A similar result can be found in other papers (e.g. Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013); Rochet and Tirole (2002);
Wright (2012)).
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of the paper are practically relevant, at least in Europe. Bo¨restam and Schmiedel (2011) report
that in 2006 four European countries had national card schemes which operated entirely without
interchange fees, namely those in Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. If high
interchange fees were critical to the adoption of payment cards, one might expect weak card
adoption in these countries. Consistent with the model, however, Figure 1.1 show that the countries
which have historically had payment card schemes without interchange fees also happen to be those
in which card usage is greatest.5 Further supportive evidence can be found in e.g. Arango et al.
(2015), who find that weak merchant acceptance play a large role in the use of cash and that
changes in consumer rewards have small effects on card usage by consumers, and in Valverde et al.
(2016) who find positive effects on card usage and welfare from reductions in interchange fees.
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Figure 1.1: Card usage in selected European countries
The figure shows the number of card payments per capita per year in the European countries which were part of the Eurosystem
in 2006, plus Denmark. Countries which historically have not had interchange fees are highlighted in black. Source: ECB
Statistical Data Warehouse.
I also examine some extensions to the model, most importantly what happens when merchants
are permitted to surcharge. In some models, surcharging can ”neutralize” the effect of interchange
fees (Gans and King, 2003; Zenger, 2011). In my model, surcharging does not neutralize interchange
fees. Interchange fee regulation becomes more complicated when surcharging is permitted for at
5There are also examples of countries with interchange fees with relatively high card usage, e.g. England and
Sweden, though interchange fees are not particularly high in these countries. In Sweden, moreover, interchange fees
are not agreed multilaterally between banks, but bilaterally.
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least two reasons. First, it is not straightforward to establish the conditions under which merchants
surcharge and, second, there may be multiple equilibria when surcharging is permitted. Empirical
studies confirm that surcharging, where permitted, is not uniformly practiced (Bolt et al., 2010;
Jonker, 2011). Second, if merchants surcharge, the optimal fee changes. I also conduct a simple
numerical illustration of the model based on data from the Danish part of the European Central
Bank cost of payment study (Schmiedel et al., 2012). The optimal interchange fee slightly negative.
It can be compared to fees obtained by other methods such as the so-called merchant indifference
test (Rochet and Tirole, 2011). The fee implied by this test is about 0.2% which, interestingly, is
the same figure as in the recent EU regulation.
The model best describes the market for debit cards. Credit card holders commonly receive
benefits or bonuses, and optimal interchange fees are also different for credit cards (Rochet and
Wright, 2010). As for price structure, interchange fees tend to be proportional fees rather than per
transaction fees (e.g. Shy and Wang, 2011). The model assumes a linear city model of merchant
competition as in Rochet and Tirole (2002). Other types of competition are considered in Wright
(2003) while competition between payment networks are discussed by Guthrie and Wright (2007)
and Chakravorti and Roson (2006). In the model, the assumption about competition results in a
threshold: Those merchants whose benefit exceed the threshold accept cards, and others do not.
However, under certain assumptions the same threshold can be shown to hold under other types
of competition, including perfect competition (Rochet and Tirole, 2011). Further references to
the literature on interchange fees can be found in the surveys by Chakravorti (2003) and Verdier
(2011). Bo¨restam and Schmiedel (2011) provides a good overview of the institutional details in
the market for payments cards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The baseline model is presented in Section 1.2.
Results are in Section 1.3. A numerical illustration of the model is presented in Section 1.4. Section
1.5 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
1.2. Model
The model features three types of agents: consumers, merchants, and banks. Consumers have a
unit demand for a good which is sold by merchants, and consumers choose which merchant to buy
from depending on prices and their card acceptance policies. Banks set merchant fees collectively.
Merchant fees are the same as interchange fees in the model. Consumers and merchants also
respectively decide whether to use payment cards and accept card payments.
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Merchants
Merchants are organized in pairs. For each merchant pair, the two merchants (or sellers, ”S”,
following the notation in the reference literature) enjoy identical benefits bS from accepting cards.
These benefits can be interpreted as the cost savings of receiving payment by card rather than cash.
The two merchants are located at opposite ends of a line segment (”linear city”) of unit length
and compete for consumers who are uniformly distributed across the segment. Merchants produce
a good which costs γ to produce and set prices pi (i = 1, 2) to maximize profits. In addition,
merchants choose whether to accept card payments. If they accept payment by card, they must
pay a merchant fee of m when consumers use cards. Merchants may also face a fixed cost K if
they choose to accept cards; in the results section, I discuss both the cases with and without such
fixed costs. Merchants are heterogeneous across pairs, with benefits distributed according to a
cumulative distribution function G(bS) with full support on the interval [bS,min, bS,max]. I initially
assume that merchants are prohibited from surcharging, but relax this assumption in an extension
to the model.
Consumers
For each merchant pair there is a unit mass of consumers (or buyers, ”B”). Each consumer is
randomly matched with a merchant pair and demands a single good. A consumer is described
by a location x ∈ [0, 1] in the unit interval between the two merchants. The consumer must pay
a distance cost xt if purchasing from merchant 1 or a distance cost (1 − x)t if purchasing from
merchant 2.
Consumers are heterogeneous in the benefits they derive from paying by card. The assumption
is that all consumers have a payment card and do not face any adoption costs. In the first part of
the results section, however, I address the question of existence of equilibria in the more general
case where consumer adoption costs are present. The consumer benefits are denoted bB and are
distributed according to cumulative distribution function H(bB) with full support on the interval
[bB,min, bB,max]. One can interpret the consumer benefit as consumers’ willingness-to-pay for being
able to pay by card rather than cash. When choosing which merchant to frequent, a consumer
who enjoys benefits bB compares the total cost of purchasing the good at each merchant. For
example, if merchant 1 accepts cards and merchant 2 does not, a consumer who prefers card to
cash payment (i.e. bB > 0), shop at merchant 1 when: p1 + xt− bB ≤ p2 + (1− x)t.
The cumulative distribution functions of the consumer and the merchant are assumed to be
twice continuously differentiable. To illustrate results in a simple setting, I occasionally consider
the case where merchant and consumer benefits are uniformly distributed to facilitate a simple
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interpretation of the results. A sufficient condition for guaranteeing concavity of the optimization
problems faced by agents is that the hazard rate g(bS)1−G(bS) be increasing, a property satisfied by
many widely-used distributions (e.g. uniform, normal, logistic, etc.).6
Banks and welfare
Banks produce payment services and set merchant fees m collectively in order to maximize joint
profits. No distinction is made between consumers’ and merchants’ banks. This can be motivated
by an assumption of perfectly competitive merchant banks. In that case the merchant fee can be
written as the sum of the interchange fee and the merchant banks’ marginal cost of producing
card payments: Distinguishing between consumer and merchant banks is thus of no economic
consequence. To keep notation simple, I will therefore treat consumers’ and merchants’ banks as
one with the implicit understanding that there is a one-to-one relationship between the interchange
fee and the merchant fee - the merchant fee equals the interchange fee plus a constant (the merchant
bank’s cost) which I normalize to zero. Banks face variable costs of cC which are proportional to
the fraction of card payments in the economy. Banks obtain card revenue from merchants, and
this revenue is equal to the product of the merchant fee m and the fraction of card payments in
the economy. In addition, banks face costs related to the production of cash payment services,
denoted cD, and these are proportional to the fraction of cash payments in the economy.
7
The banks’ joint objective is then to maximize:
Π = (1−H(b?B))(1−G(b?S))(m− cC)− (1− (1−H(b?B))(1−G(b?S)))cD (1.1)
where b?B and b
?
S denote the thresholds above which consumers and merchants use and accept
cards. The first part of the expression is the profits due to card payments, and the last part is
the cost associated with cash payment services. For much of the paper the assumption is that
b?B = 0, as consumers do not pay for the use of payment instruments, though this assumption
must be altered when consumers are subject to surcharging. Note also that b?S is a function of the
merchant fee, but that this dependence has been suppressed to simplify notation. I denote to the
total fraction of card payments as:
µ(m) ≡ (1−H(b?B))(1−G(b?S)) (1.2)
6Such a condition is generally applied in the reference literature. In fact, this condition is sometimes more than
sufficient as a weaker condition could be imposed.
7In the model I assume for simplicity that the social costs of producing payments, cC and cD, are the same
as banks’ private costs. More realistically, banks may have some cost recovery from consumers. In the numerical
analysis of the model I discuss the difference in private and social cost.
21
The presence of cash is taken for granted, that is, banks cannot choose not to provide cash
payment services. The rationality constraint facing banks is therefore that they must be no worse
off providing card payment service than they would be in a pure cash economy, i.e.:
µ(m)(m− cC)− cD(1− µ(m)) ≥ −cD (1.3)
The social planner maximizes the total benefits resulting from the use of payment cards less
the costs associated with the production of payments. The social planner’s objective function is:
W = (1−G(b?S))
bB,max∫
b?B
bBdH(bB) + (1−H(b?B))
bS,max∫
b?S
bSdG(bS)
−µ(m)cC − (1− µ(m))cD − (1−G(b?S))K
(1.4)
In derivations I assume that bB,min < 0 < bB,max and that bS,min < b
?
S < bS,max in order to
avoid having to deal with ”corner solutions” in which either all merchants or consumers use cards.8
1.3. Results
I first examine the question of card adoption in the economy. In particular, when is an equilibrium
guaranteed to exist in the most general case where both consumers and merchants face adoption
costs? This represent a departure from the assumption made in the baseline model described
above and in much of the related literature where neither merchants nor consumers face adoption
costs.9 The introduction of consumer adoption costs adds extra generality - it makes the market
truly two-sided in the sense that consumers’ adoption decision will then depend on the fraction
of merchants accepting cards, while merchants’ acceptance decision depends on the fraction of
consumers with cards - but comes at the expense of weaker results. It turns out that one can
specify the conditions under which an equilibrium exists, but a unique equilibrium cannot be
guaranteed. For the remainder of the analysis I therefore dispense with the assumption that
consumers face adoption costs. This simplification can be justified if consumer adoption costs are
negligible in practice as, for most individuals, they seem to be: It is common for consumers to
automatically be provided with a payment card as part of the basic banking services to which they
have access, and so the critical decision is the usage decision, which depends on the marginal cost
8This issue will be taken into account when I examine the model numerically; in that case, it will become apparent
that the last assumption is not satisfied for low values of m at which all merchants accept cards.
9A notable exception is McAndrews and Wang (2012), who employ a model of quite different style than is the
standard in the literature.
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of paying with different payment instruments, and not the adoption decision.10
When consumers face fixed adoption costs, which I denote k, their decision to get a card will
depend not only on the price of paying by card, which is zero by assumption, but also on the
fraction of merchants accepting cards. Merchants’ decision, in turn, depends on the fraction on
consumers using cards; this is the case independently of whether merchants face a fixed adoption
cost. The effect of introducing consumer adoption costs is to make the market truly two-sided
in the sense that each side of the market, consumer and merchant, makes a participation choice
which depends directly on the participation choice of the other side.
To show the existence of equilibria it is necessary to analyze the participation choices of mer-
chants and consumers. In the case of consumers this is straightforward. If one thinks of the
consumer as choosing whether to have a payment card prior to being matched with the merchant,
a consumer will adopt a payment card whenever the expected benefits exceed the adoption cost:
bB(1−G(b?S)) ≥ k (1.5)
I let b?B denote the adoption threshold for consumers, with b
?
B =
k
1−G(b?S) . Here b
?
S denotes
the threshold above which merchants accept cards. For merchants the problem is slightly more
involved. Merchants’ acceptance threshold is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A pair of merchants accepts payment by card when the following condition is satisfied:
bS ≥ b?S = m− E[bB|bB ≥ b?B] +
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H(b?B)
(1.6)
This condition has several implications. If there are no fixed costs, i.e. K = 0, the condition
reduces to
bS ≥ m− E[bB|bB ≥ b?B] (1.7)
This is the same card adoption condition as in Rochet and Tirole (2002); and while the deriva-
tion in the appendix relies on the linear city model of competition among merchants, exactly the
same condition can under in some circumstances be shown to hold under perfect competition or
local monopoly (Rochet and Tirole, 2011). The condition implies that merchants might accept
cards even if it increases their costs. If there is no fixed cost, though, the result has a some-
what counterintuitive implication: As the card adoption threshold for consumers increases, and
10The discussion about the issue of ”financial inclusion” shows that this assumption may not be satisfied for the
most disadvantaged individuals in society who sometimes have difficulties getting access to basic banking services.
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fewer consumers use cards, more merchants will accept cards. This conclusion no longer follows
automatically with a fixed cost, since the cost must be spread among fewer card users. While
E[bB | bB ≥ b?B] is increasing in b?B, 1 − H(b?B) is decreasing with opposite effect on card accep-
tance. Differentiation of the expression with respect to t shows the expression to be declining in t,
meaning that more merchants will accept cards. In fact, the acceptance threshold is only defined
for K ≤ 1/(2t). This makes sense since for any higher K, merchant profits would be negative if
merchants accepted cards.
An equilibrium requires that the fractions of consumers and merchants desiring to adopt and
accept cards must agree with each other as the fraction of consumers adopting cards depend on
the fraction of merchants accepting cards and vice versa. In equilibrium, if a certain fraction of
consumers find it optimal to adopt cards given the fraction of merchants accepting cards, it must
be the case that exactly that fraction of merchants do, in fact, accept cards given the choice of the
consumers. This can be formulated as a fixed-point problem, here viewed from the perspective of
the merchants. There is a trivial fixed point, namely that in which cards are neither adopted by
consumers nor accepted by merchants. In looking for non-trivial fixed points, I focus on benefit
intervals of the form S = [bS,min, bS,max − ], where  > 0. One can then formulate the problem as
one of finding a fixed point of the function:
f(bS) = m− E
[
bB | bB ≥ k
1−G(bS)
]
+
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H
(
k
1−G(bS)
) (1.8)
Proposition 1. The existence of an equilibrium with card adoption can be formulated as a fixed
point problem. A non-trivial fixed point is represent if there exists some  such that the following
condition is satisfied for all bS in S:
bS,min ≤ m− E
[
bB | bB ≥ k
1−G(bS)
]
+
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H
(
k
1−G(bS)
) ≤ bS,max −  (1.9)
An equilibrium is also guaranteed to exist if f(bS,min) < bS,min.
The first part of the above proposition provides a sufficient condition, guaranteeing the existence
of an equilibrium. A proof is in the appendix. The case of f(bS,min) < bS,min corresponds to an
equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards, and consumers for whom bB ≥ k use cards.
The expression for f(bS) highlights that two economic effects are present as bS is varied. If bS
decreases, i.e. more merchants are willing to accept cards, more consumers will also be induced
24
to get a card. The first effect is then that the average consumer who prefers cards to cash has
a weaker preference for cards than before since the marginal card users are those with a weak
preference for cards. This means that fewer merchants will want to accept cards. The second
effect is that as more consumers wish to pay by cards, merchants can spread their fixed cost across
more consumers, making them more likely to accept cards. These offsetting effects suggest that
there might be two equilibria, one in which cards are widely used and one in which they are less
widely used. When I analyze the model quantitatively based on cost of payments data, I show
that two equilibria do indeed result for various values of m; however, if one were to think of the
model in dynamic terms, only the high card usage equilibrium would be a stable equilibrium.
It is also possible to say something about the effect of changing other parameter values. An
increase in k, for instance, has the immediate effect of reducing the fraction of consumers using
cards. Following the same logic as before this has two effects: Only those consumers with the
strongest preferences cards remain, making it more attractive for merchants to accept cards, but
the fixed cost element increases. Indeed, there is a limit to how high k can become as the fixed
cost term will tend to infinity as k increases and bB approaches bB,max. For the same reason, 
cannot be chosen arbitrarily small since f(bS) tends to infinity for bS too close to bS,max. In plain
terms, if cards are to adopted it must not be too expensive for consumers to obtain a card. It is
likewise clear that merchant fixed costs cannot be too high. Finally, equilibria are more likely to
be guaranteed to exist when the maximum benefits enjoyed by consumers or merchants are high.
For the remainder of the analysis it is assumed that consumer adoption costs (k) are zero.
The above was intended to highlight the economic mechanisms which are at work in the general
case. Stronger and much more interesting results obtain when entertaining the assumption of no
consumer adoption costs. As noted earlier, this assumption does not seem too unreasonable as
a payment card is often automatically provided as part of a package of basic banking services.
When k = 0 there is a unique equilibrium with a number of noteworthy properties and policy
implications.
Turning to the baseline model without consumer adoption costs, it is possible make an unam-
biguous statement about the effect of interchange fees on card usage, as detailed in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Card usage and interchange fees). When consumers do not face adoption costs,
i.e. k = 0, card usage is declining in interchange fees.
The intuition underlying this result is straightforward. When consumers’ marginal cost of
paying is zero, the interchange fee does not affect their incentive to pay by card. Those who prefer
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to pay by card will do so when they can, independent of the interchange fee. On the other hand,
fewer merchants accept cards, and so a number of individuals who would have liked to pay by
card are no longer able to. The result is fewer card payments. This contrasts with the results of
Rochet and Tirole (2002) who find that excessive interchange fees are associated with too many
card payments.
This establishes that card usage is decreasing in merchant fees or, equivalently, in interchange
fees, thus providing a possible explanation of why countries without interchange fees also exhibit
a high fraction of card payments. While the result does not have a direct bearing on the issue of
whether privately set interchange fees are optimal, it does show that if privately set interchange
fees exceed the social optimum, then the resulting outcome will be too few card payments.
As an empirical matter, it is difficult to verify a link between interchange fees and card usage for
at least two reasons. The first is absence of data; frequently, interchange fee levels are not publicly
disclosed. The second reason is that the observed interchange fees are endogenous. In a number
of countries, however, fee levels have been imposed by regulation. This has often been the case in
countries where national card schemes have been in existence, such as in the European countries
discussed in the introduction. Empirical evidence on the link between interchange fees and card
usage, while scarce, is consistent with the model’s predictions. As described in the introduction,
Bo¨restam and Schmiedel (2011) report that in 2006, four European countries had national card
schemes, which operated without interchange fees, namely Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands. These were also among the countries with the most card payments. Other countries
with relatively many card payments were France and Portugal. Bo¨restam and Schmiedel (2011)
also mention that interchange fees are regulated in France, and report fairly low interchange fee
levels in Portugal compared to these in neighboring Spain where card payments are much rarer.11
These findings are by no means conclusive, but they certainly are suggestive.
A natural follow-up question is whether interchange fees as set by banks are biased relative to
the social optimum? The answer is yes: Privately set fees exceed those set by the social planner,
except in special cases. In order to arrive this conclusion, it is necessary to compare the optimal
choices for the banks and the social planner. This is the content of the next lemma and proposition.
11Data on card usage across countries can be found in chart 3 in the cited paper while interchange fee levels for
Spain and Portugal are reported in charts 6 and 7.
26
Lemma 2. Banks’ profit-maximizing merchant fee is indirectly defined by:
m = cC − cD +
1−G
m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2K
t
)
1−H(0)

g
m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2K
t
)
1−H(0)
 (1.10)
The expression from banks’ equating marginal revenue and costs. It is the price formula of a
monopolist, and g1−G , the absolute mark-up, can be thought of as reflecting merchants’ demand
elasticity, with a high value representing a low demand elasticity and high market power.
An interesting, testable implication relates to the connection between the degree of merchant
profitability and the fees paid by merchants to banks. In the linear city model, profitability is a
linear function of the transport cost, t, which can e.g. be interpreted as the degree of competition
or product differentiation. As summarized in the following corollary, one can show that merchant
fees will be higher when t is higher. In other words, banks will charge higher fees from merchant
which themselves are more profitable.
Corollary 1. The more profitable merchants are (the higher t), the higher merchant fees banks
charge.
To help build further intuition about the profit-maximizing fee, it is interesting to consider how
the expression looks under specific distribution assumptions. With uniformly distributed benefits,
the expected benefits of card users are:
E[bB|bB ≥ 0] = 1
2
bB,max (1.11)
Ignoring merchant fixed costs, this means that the optimal privately set merchant fee can be shown
to be:
m =
1
2
(
cC − cD + bS,max + 1
2
bB,max
)
(1.12)
This tells us that banks will increase fees both when consumer and merchant preferences for cards
strengthen.
As will be shown in the following, neither terms involving consumer nor merchants benefits
appear in the expression for the socially optimal fee. This is because banks are effectively acting
as monopolists. If consumer prices for payment services are fixed, the market becomes one-sided
as an increase in merchant fees is not counterbalanced by a reduction in consumer marginal costs.
Banks set a fee that exceeds their marginal cost, resulting in too few card payments. The expression
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furthermore indicates that merchant fees are more responsive to changes in merchant benefits than
to changes in consumer benefits. It also shows that merchant or interchange fees should be falling
as the costs of producing card payments decline. However, privately set fees increase if consumers’
or merchants preferences’ change in favor of card payments. Such an argument could perhaps
explain why merchant fees have not declined over time in the US in spite of falling technology
costs (McAndrews and Wang, 2012).
Banks’ optimal merchant fee can be compared to the corresponding first-order condition for
the social planner, again ignoring merchant fixed costs.
Proposition 3 (Socially optimal interchange fee). When merchant fixed costs are zero, the so-
cially optimal interchange equals the difference in banks’ marginal cost of producing card and cash
payments, i.e.
m = cC − cD (1.13)
The expression for socially optimal merchant fee is remarkably simple, and the optimal fee
can be determined solely based on costs. At first glance, the optimization problem facing the
social planner seems rather complicated and more so than that facing the banks, yet the resulting
expressions are relatively similar, except for a mark-up term. Intuitively, what the social planner
is attempting to do is to put cards and cash on an equal footing by setting merchant fees to reflect
the difference in marginal cost between the two. To the extent that card payments are cheaper
to produce than cash payments, merchants should be induced to accept cards via negative fees.
This is essentially the same as the standard socially optimal pricing strategy of setting price equal
to marginal cost, except that now both the cost of card and cash payments must be considered.
Comparing the planner’s problem with the banks also points to the sources of bias in banks’ fee.
A key source is that the total consumer benefits depend on the fraction of merchants accepting
cards, and this loss to consumers from too few merchants accepting cards is not internalized by
banks.
It is straightforward to verify that the banks’ rationality constraint is satisfied with equality
at the socially optimal fee. An immediate consequence of the preceding results is therefore that
the profit-maximizing merchant fee always exceeds or equals (for equality, see the later discussion
of the special case of homogeneous merchants) the welfare-maximizing fee.
Proposition 4 (Profit-maximizing versus socially optimal interchange fees). Banks always set
interchange fees that exceed or equal those preferred by a social planner.
A corollary, which is interesting from a regulatory perspective, is that the model suggests a
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different path for interchange fees than does the merchant indifference test, which is favored by
some regulators. As pointed out by Bolt et al. (2013), the merchant indifference test methodology
would logically lead to increasing interchange fees over time as the technological evolution would
presumably lead to lower card costs (cC) whereas the cash handling costs (cD) might not decrease
correspondingly as cash handling is more labor-intensive and thus becomes more expensive as
wages rise. In contrast, the model tells us that (optimal) interchange fees should fall over time as
cC decreases or cD increases. A direct comparison between the level of the optimal interchange
fee and the fee implied by the merchant indifference test is not possible for the simple reason that
merchants are heterogeneous; exactly which merchant is supposed to be indifferent?
In the preceding it was assumed that there were no merchant fixed costs, i.e. K = 0, but an
identical logic applies in the case of positive fixed costs for merchants. The formula for privately
optimal interchange fee is unchanged, though the fee itself will change due to the effect of K on
the merchant acceptance threshold. The formula changes, however, in the case for the socially
optimal fee. It can be shown to be:
m = cC − cD +
K − 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H(0) (1.14)
The resulting expression is no longer purely cost-based as 1−H(0) depends on the distribution
of consumer benefits. That in itself does not pose too rigorous an informational requirement for
a social planner since 1 − H(0) is just the fraction of card users in the economy, which is likely
to be observable. It is rather the presence of a variable such as the distance cost, t, which makes
the expression impractical. Aside from added simplicity, at least four arguments can be made for
ignoring the fixed cost term, and using m = cC − cD as the benchmark when evaluating merchant
fees. First, K might be small in practice and therefore of little consequence. Second, including
the fixed cost term implies an even lower socially optimal merchant fee. Third, at m = cC − cD
it might be the case that the merchant threshold is actually lower than bS,min, in which case a
further reduction in fees is of no consequence. Fourth, the first part of the expression merchant
acceptance threshold, i.e. m − E[bB | bB ≥ 0], also holds under alternative assumptions about
merchant competition (such as perfect competition), whereas the fixed cost component depends
on the degree of competition which may differs across industries and would therefore suggest a
need for differentiated optimal fees.
To see that the inclusion of merchant fixed cost produces a lower socially optimal merchant
fee, one needs to determine the sign of K − 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
. This expression must be negative
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since
K − 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2K
t
)
≤ 0⇔ 3t
√
1− 2K
t
≤ 3t−K (1.15)
Both sides of the last expression must be positive if cards are accepted by merchants. In an
equilibrium where merchants accept cards, it must be the case that 12 t ≥ K, since otherwise
merchants would be making negative profits. That means that 3t −K > 0. Squaring both sides
and simplifying the expression, results in the expression −12t ≤ K which is obviously true.
There is a special circumstance in which the privately set interchange fee is also socially optimal,
namely when merchants are homogeneous, that is, they enjoy the same bS across all merchant pairs.
Proposition 5. When merchants are homogeneous, i.e. enjoy the same bS across all merchant
pairs, there is an interval of socially optimal interchange fees. Banks’ choose the highest among
these.
An interpretation is that to the extent that merchants are relatively homogeneous, the exact
level of the interchange fee may not matter too much from a welfare perspective, as long as it
is within certain bounds. In that case the consequences of changing the interchange fee level are
mainly distributional, and the real question is whether banks or merchants reap the benefits.
The preceding results may also shed light on the public debate about interchange fee regulation.
Banks have been highly critical of such regulation whereas especially merchants, but also consumer
organizations, have been favorable to it.12 This is perfectly consistent with the model since caps
on interchange fees would benefit consumers and merchants, but eliminate bank profits. If the
more traditional view of the functioning of interchange fees were true, it is hard to rationalize
why consumer representatives would support such regulation (and potentially also hard to see why
banks would oppose it so strongly if interchange fee revenue were passed on to consumers).
Finally, why exactly is it that these results differ from those in the reference literature? In that
literature, consumers’ banks are assumed to charge transaction fee equaling their cost of producing
payment services, perhaps with markups to reflect imperfect competition. Higher interchange fees
therefore translate into lower consumer transaction fees and a greater willingness to use cards
among consumers. If merchants are homogeneous (Rochet and Tirole, 2002), the effect is that
card usage is increasing in interchange fees, at least up to a point where merchants refuse to
accept cards. If merchant heterogeneity is taken into account (Wright, 2004), fewer merchants
accept cards as interchange fees increase, and there will no longer be a monotone relationship
12For a flavor of the debate in Europe one can look at the responses by different groups to the public consultations
held by the European Commission.
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between interchange fees and card usage. When consumers do not pay transaction fees, the first of
these mechanisms breaks down: Lower fees no longer induce consumers to pay by card instead of
using cash. The only effect is to limit merchant acceptance which implies that card usage decreases
in interchange fees.
The unconventional results of the model emerge because banks’ pricing structure makes the
market essentially one-sided. Banks then effectively act as monopolists towards merchants and
set interchange fees in excess of the social optimum, which equals the difference in marginal costs
between card and cash payments. A corollary is that the optimal fee is likely to be close to zero,
unless one believes that the marginal cost of paying by card or cash is very high relative to the
other. To rationalize a high positive fee, one would have to argue that card costs are high relative
to cash costs. Also, while the existence of a cost-based optimal fee hinges on a number of model
assumptions, it remains a useful benchmark when those are violated. For instance, when merchants
pay fixed costs to be able to receive card payments, the optimal fee is no longer purely cost-based,
but the cost-based fee then provides an upper bound for the optimal fee.
The special case of homogeneous merchants is of some interest. If all merchants enjoy the
same cost-savings from card payments, the effects of interchange fee regulation are then purely
distributional, a matter of whether merchants or banks pay for payments. In fact, much of the
debate on the effects of interchange regulation is couched in terms of the distributional consequences
(Wang, 2012).13
I next consider some extensions to the model, but first discuss why zero transaction fees are
so common. Then I examine the consequences of permitting merchants to surcharge merchant
fees. I also consider a variant of the model where banks must pay a fixed cost to operate the card
payment system. Related to this, I discuss the incentives for banks to invest in innovations that
either enhance benefits for consumers and merchants or reduce costs.
1.3.1. Pricing card payments
The key assumption of this paper is that transaction fees are zero. While this is an empirical
regulatory, it clearly is not always the case. There are plenty of counterexamples in the form
fees which are effectively negative (either directly in the form of cashbacks or indirectly in the
form of other ”benefits” such as loyalty bonuses). On the other hand, strictly positive fees are
rare. Tirole (2015) attributes low and perhaps negative consumer fees in two-sided markets to
13The European cost of payment studies also provide an illustration that this may be the case. Comparing
Denmark and Sweden is a case in point. These countries show roughly the same outcomes in terms of the proportion
of cash and card usage, and while there is no interchange fee in Denmark, interchange fees (low by international
standards) are applied in Sweden. A key difference between these countries is that Swedish banks have much more
profitable payment operations than do Danish banks.
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consumers having highly elastic demand, though that does not quite explain why a fee of exactly
zero is so commonly observed, especially for debit cards.14 It is difficult to write down a model
which produces a fee of exactly zero.
One possible explanation of this phenomenon is cross-subsidization. Banks appear to set prices
differently depending on the type of banking product, with some products being bargains and
others ”rip-offs” (Heffernan, 2002). Indeed, many of the national cost of payment studies - on
which the European Central Bank study (Schmiedel et al., 2012) is based - show that banks not
only do not charge transaction fees, but frequently fail to even cover their costs when providing
payment services. One possible explanation of this is that banks use free payment services as a
means to attract retail consumers who provide inexpensive funding in the form of the deposits.
The Danish cost study (Danmarks Nationalbank, 2011), for example, shows that banks fail to
recover their costs for practically all of the payment services they provide. However, the authors
of the study also point out that banks’ deficit all but vanishes when taking into account the low
interest rates paid on current account balances. The Economist puts it succinctly: ”To consumers,
most payments appear to be free because they are given away by banks as part of a bundle of
banking services that some customers subsidise through low interest rates on deposits.”15
Behavioral factors may also help explain the predominance of ”zero”. People, it seems, dislike
paying for payments. One reason might be that when payment cards were introduced, they typi-
cally did not feature any transaction fees so as to make them competitive with the readily available
alternative in the form of cash, whose use did not entail a direct monetary cost. The behavioral
literature suggests that people can have a strong aversion to paying for something which used to be
free: This is experienced as a loss and is costly to loss-averse individuals.16 When interchange fee
regulation was introduced in the US, some banks began charging fees, but soon reversed course due
to strong consumer reactions.17 It could also reflect a social norm against ”paying for payments”.
One also does pay when going for dinner at a friend’s place: It is not that this experience is not
valuable, but simply that being asked to pay would violate a norm.
Even though the reasons for this phenomenon are not entirely understood, therefore, it seems
reasonable to consider models in which banks do not charge positive fees. To consider more
14This is certainly the case in many European countries. A cursory glance at their websites of large European
retail banks show that these typically offer a choice of relatively few cards to consumers. There seems to be more
variety in the US. Klein et al. (2006) report that J.P. Morgan Chase, a large issuer of Visa cards, was offering no
less than 57 co-branded cards (and 122 affinity cards) on its website in 2005.
15The Economist, 19 May 2012.
16A curious tale of this phenomenon is provided in the radio episode ”The Cost of Free Doughnuts: 70 Years of
Regret”, available at NPR, which explains why US soldiers to this day hold a grudge against the Red Cross, because
the Red Cross started charging them for doughnuts in 1942!
17See, for example, the articles ”BofA Retreats on Debit Fee, Citing Uproar” and ”Retreat From Debit-Card Fees
Continues” in the Wall Street Journal, both from 1 November 2011.
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formally the fee decision facing banks, suppose then that individual banks sets a fee (f), which we
restrict to be non-positive. Suppose further that any individual bank takes as given the interchange
(merchant) fee (m) and the fraction of merchants accepting card (1−G(b?S)). Finally, assume that
a bank faces some net costs (c) when consumers make card payments18, reflecting the difference
in costs relating to dealing with card and cash payments respectively, that are proportional to the
use of cards by the bank’s customers.
If the bank is perfectly competitive, it will set a fee of f = c − m. If interchange fees are
positive and card payments no more expensive than cash payments to produce (at least, no more
than the size of the interchange fee), one should expect consumers to pay negative fees, i.e. receive
cash-backs when paying by card. It follows that a binding constraint in the form of zero transaction
fees are unlikely to be observed when banks are perfectly competitive.
At the other extreme, consider the case in which banks have monopoly power towards their
consumers. In that case banks maximize:
(f +m− c)(1−G(b?S))(1−H(f)) (1.16)
Now, if we assume that each bank is small, a change in f by any individual bank will not affect
b?S . In that case the resulting optimal fee is implicitly defined by the following equation:
f = c−m+ 1−H(f)
h(f)
(1.17)
This implies that banks will charge higher fees when the elasticity of demand is low. Inserting
the expression for the optimal merchant fee (here I write it simply as a function of m, but it also
depends on other parameters), we find:
f = −1−G(m)
g(m)
+
1−H(f)
h(f)
(1.18)
Hence, the non-positivity constraint binds if:
1−H(f)
h(f)
≥ 1−G(m)
g(m)
(1.19)
The expressions on either side reflect the absolute mark-ups in the consumer and merchant
market respectively. One can therefore think of them as representing measures of market power.
18For simplicity, I assume that c = cC − cD, i.e. that the individual bank’s net costs are identical to those of the
banking sector more broadly; it is straightforward to generalize to the case where the individual card issuing bank’s
costs differ from the aggregate costs.
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One can explicitly express the above as a function of preferences and costs under the assumption
of uniformly distributed benefits. In that case the optimal consumer fee is f = 12 (c−m+ bB,max).
Inserting the expression for the optimal m under the assumption of zero transaction fees, one can
show the non-positivity constraint to bind when:
3
2
bB,max − bS,max + c ≥ 0 (1.20)
This suggests that zero transaction fees are an equilibrium outcome when consumers have a
strong preference for cards relative to merchants. Intuitively, if consumers have strong preferences
for card payments, they do not need to be ”bribed” with e.g. cash-backs to use cards.19 As for
merchants, the optimal transaction fee does not directly depend on merchant preferences. However,
it does so directly through the interchange fee. If merchants have strong preferences for cards, the
optimal interchange fee is higher, and the lower the optimal interchange fee, the lower the optimal
transaction fee.
As an intermediate case where we are able to vary the degree of market power parametrically,
we can consider applying a linear city model of competition to banks (competing for consumers
by setting card fees). In that case the optimal fee is:
f = c−m+ t (1.21)
The optimal merchant fee, as before, is m = c+ 1−Gg , with
1−G
g reflecting merchants’ demand
elasticity for card payments at the optimal fee. An equilibrium with a binding constraint, i.e.
transaction fees set at zero, then results if:
t >
1−G
g
(1.22)
One can think of this as characterizing a relationship between market power in the consumer
and merchant markets respectively. Under that interpretation, we can then summarize the above
findings as follows:
Proposition 6. Zero transaction fees can emerge as an equilibrium outcome when banks have
strong market power in the market for consumers and weak market power in the market for mer-
chants.
The above discussion only scratches the surface of how payment cards are priced, and other
19Note that this could be also help explain why card payments are especially prevalent in countries with low
interchange fees: A preference for card payments may explain both high card usage and low interchange fees.
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considerations, for example the apparent tendency of banks to price some financial services cheaply
(for example, payment services) while making money on others (for example, earning high spreads
due to low deposit rates), seem likely to be important factors. Some of the salient features of typical
bank contracts indicate that such cross-subsidization takes place. For instance, bank contracts
typically specify that payment services are only free provided that customers provided that certain
conditions are met, for instance that consumers maintain their salary accounts with the bank,
or that customers have a certain volume of business with the bank. An exception from such
requirements is typically made for younger customers, likely reflecting asymmetric information
about the value of such consumers to the banks.20
1.3.2. Surcharging
Where permitted and applied, surcharging has the potential to neutralize the effect of interchange
fees. Two questions arise in the context of surcharging. First, will merchants surcharge if per-
mitted? Second, what are the welfare consequences of surcharging? Both questions, it turns out,
defy simple analytical answers, but the analysis (including the subsequent numerical illustration)
nevertheless provides valuable insights into the effects of surcharging.
In practice, surcharging can be applied in more ways. In Europe, for example, companies such
as airlines have been criticized for surcharging amounts in excess of their merchant fees. In the
following I look at the case where merchants are permitted to surcharge only the amount of the
merchant fee or not surcharge at all. Such a requirement is typically stipulated in regulations of
surcharging.
Admitting the possibility of surcharging complicates the strategic options for merchants. Where
before they faced a choice between accepting cards (and not surcharging) and not accepting cards,
the presence of surcharging introduces a third option which is to accept cards and surcharge the
amount of the merchant fee. To check whether or when a surcharging equilibrium exists, it is
therefore necessary to compare merchant profits when both merchants surcharge with their profits
when deviating by either not accepting cards or accepting cards and not surcharging. As in the
no-surcharging case, this problem can be tackled by finding the values for bS for which deviating
to either not accepting cards at all or accepting cards and not surcharging is not profitable.
It can be shown that when both merchants accept cards and surcharge, each merchant earns
profits of pi = 12 t−K. This is the same as when both merchants accept cards and do no surcharge,
20As a more general point, it could be the case that banks do not charge transaction fees because consumers for
some reason prefer flat fee contracts. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) contains an interesting discussion of the
possible reason why flat-fee contracts are so commonplace. Their application is gym membership - why people pay
not to go to the gym - so some of the possible arguments may not be too relevant in a financial services context.
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and a proof proceeds along the same lines as in the no-surcharging case. The next lemma identifies
the values of bS for which deviating by not accepting cards is not profitable.
Lemma 3. If both merchants accept cards and surcharge, neither merchant is better off not ac-
cepting cards provided that:
bS ≥ m− E[bB|bB ≥ m] +
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−G(m) (1.23)
The acceptance threshold is nearly identical to that in the no-surcharging case, even though
the problem facing merchants is different in the two cases. There are two differences. First,
E[bB|bB ≥ m] appears instead of E[bB|bB ≥ 0]. Since this term is increasing in m, this tends to
lower the benefit threshold above which merchants accept cards. Second, as m increases, 1−H(m)
decreases, and average fixed costs increase, thus reducing merchants’ inclination to accept cards.
It is somewhat surprising, though, that the first term survives unaltered. Intuitively, it might seem
merchants should be indifferent to the level of the merchant fee, since they can choose to pass it
on to consumers, but the model shows this intuition to be faulty.
Establishing the conditions under which a merchant will not want to deviate by accepting cards
and not surcharging is more involved, and it does not result in a simple closed-form expression.
A derivation of the no-deviation condition in this case can be found in the appendix. I examine
merchant’s choice problem more closely as part of the numerical analysis of the model. The
numerical analysis shows that there might be multiple, even asymmetric, equilibria depending on
the values of m and bS . This makes it complicated to derive optimal merchant fees is in the same
fashion as in the no surcharging case.
A simpler problem is to examine what were to happen if the only alternatives were not accepting
cards or accepting cards and surcharging. In the following I abstract from merchant fixed costs
in order to simplify the analysis. If merchant fixed costs were included, it would entail a negative
effect on card usage, at least assuming that merchant fees are positive. That would be the case
because the fixed cost element in merchants’ decision problem increases as the fraction of card
using consumers shifts from 1−H(0) to 1−H(m), contributing to making merchants less willing
to accept cards. Thus, ignoring fixed costs understates any negative effects surcharging might have
on card usage.
With surcharging the banks and the social planner must take into account the fact that higher
merchant fees reduce consumers’ willingness to use cards, a feature of the problem which was
absent in the no-surcharging case. If one solves the banks’ optimization problem, the optimal
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merchant fee is indirectly defined by:
m = cC − cD − µ(m)
µ′(m)
(1.24)
At first glance, this looks like the corresponding condition when surcharging is prohibited.
However, where µ(m) = (1 − H(0)) (1−G(m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0])) in the no-surcharging case, the
corresponding expression with surcharging is (again, ignoring merchant fixed costs).
µ(m) = (1−H(m)) (1−G(m− E[bB | bB ≥ m])) (1.25)
This highlights some of the mechanisms at work when surcharging is applied. In that case, a
higher merchant fee leads fewer consumers to use cards. As discussed above, the consequences are
unclear for merchants as there are two effects of opposite sign. The higher fee has the effect of
leading fewer merchants to accept cards via the direct effect of m on the acceptance threshold, but
also makes it somewhat more attractive to accept cards due to the indirect effect (via E[bB | bB ≥
m]) that the remaining card users are individuals with a very strong preference for using cards.
As for solving the social planner’s problem, this likewise produces a more complicated expression
for the optimal merchant fee, and it is no longer a simple function of costs.
It is also interesting to consider the effect of surcharging on card usage. It turns out that,
for a given merchant fee, one can express the conditions for decreased (or increased) card usage
relatively simply, as detailed in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. For a given (positive) merchant fee, fewer consumers use cards while more mer-
chants accept cards. Surcharging reduces total card usage whenever the percentage decrease in the
fraction of card users exceeds the percentage decrease in the fraction of merchants accepting cards
that would occur if surcharging were prohibited.
To the extent that consumers are more responsive to an increase in the price of using cards
than are merchants to the disadvantage of not being able to surcharge, card usage will decrease.
The general assumption seems to be that consumers are quite responsive to surcharging whereas
merchants do not drastically alter card acceptance policies depending on whether surcharging is
permitted or not. In fact, it mainly appears to be large merchants that surcharge, and they
generally accept payment cards.
The above, as stated, is true with the important proviso ”for a given merchant fee”. It does
not to take into account the behavioral changes that surcharging will have on the merchant fee
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which itself is endogenous. Banks are likely to charge a lower merchant fee in the first place if
surcharging is permitted.
The above discussion highlights another feature of surcharging: It does not neutralize the effect
of interchange fees. The ordinary logic that surcharging might neutralize interchange fees can be
illustrated by considering what would happen if, say, interchange fees were increased. In that
case consumers would face lower fees from their banks, but that would be offset by having to
pay the surcharged fee itself. Hence, consumer behavior would not change. Also, since merchants
can surcharge the additional cost, their profits would be unchanged by any change in interchange
and thereby merchant fees. This leads to the conclusion that interchange fees are irrelevant when
surcharging is applied.
Such a conclusion does not hold for this model. As discussed above, a higher interchange or
merchant fee leads fewer consumers to use cards, and this also affects merchants’ incentives to
accept cards. Only by pure accident would the effects involved cancel out. This is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Non-neutrality of surcharging). Surcharging does not neutralize the effect of in-
terchange fees.
1.3.3. Fixed costs, merchant fees, and incentives for innovation
In the preceding, I assumed that the costs of processing and handling cash and card payments
were proportional to the usage of cards and cash in the economy. A more realistic assumption
might be that there are some fixed costs involved in operating a card payment system. This would
be consistent with the evidence of decreasing average variable costs of card payments, which are
documented in Schmiedel et al. (2012).
Assume now that banks must pay a fixed cost F associated with producing card payments.
This alters their rationality constraint which now reads:
µ(m)(m− cC)− cD(1− µ(m))− F ≥ −cD (1.26)
It is straightforward to verify that this constraint is no longer satisfied at the socially optimal fee.
Inserting the unconstrained optimal fee into banks’ objective function, it evaluates to Π = −cD−F ,
which is less than the banks’ profits in a pure cash economy, which are −cD. Instead, the social
planner must impose a constrained optimal fee, given in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The socially optimal merchant fee equals to difference in marginal cost between card
38
and cash payments plus the average fixed cost of card payments given that merchant fee. It is:
m = cC − cD + F
µ(m)
(1.27)
The addition is that banks must be compensated to cover their average fixed costs. Note that
the equation only defines the merchant fee indirectly as it appears on both sides of question. To
establish the conditions under which there exists an m that satisfies the equation, one can appeal
to a number of fixed point theorems in order to identify the restrictions which must be satisfied.
The banks’ profit-maximizing fee does not depend on the presence of a fixed cost; I assume that
banks’ rationality constraint is satisfied at this fee, since otherwise there would exist no fee at which
banks would be willing to produce card payments. Glancing at the expression for the privately
and socially optimal fees and comparing them, it is not immediately obvious that the privately set
fee must exceed that of the social planner. Some consideration shows that this must be the case.
At the privately optimal fee, banks’ profits exceed those earned in a pure cash economy (otherwise
it would never make sense to produce card payments). The unconstrained socially optimal fee is
less than the privately optimal fee, and the social objective function is decreasing for m greater
than the unconstrained social optimum. That implies that fees can be reduced below the privately
optimal fee and still satisfy banks’ rationality constraint, whereas any fee higher than the privately
optimal fee would be associated with lower welfare.
From a regulator’s perspective, the expression for the constrained socially optimal fee is less
satisfactory. Identifying the optimal fee imposes a greater informational demand as the optimal
fee depends on knowledge of the distribution of merchant benefits (as well as the parameters t
and K if merchant fixed costs are taken into account). The analysis, however, points to a superior
solution from a welfare perspective, namely to impose the unconstrained optimal fee reimburse
the banks the fixed costs of operating the card payment system (e.g. financed via less distorting
taxes), since doing so would not involve a welfare loss from reduced card usage.21 There is also a
parallel to the case of cash where the fixed production cost is borne by the central bank.
A policy issue, which is somewhat related to the fees that banks charge or are permitted to
charge, is innovation. Innovation is inherently difficult in payment schemes as multiple parties are
involved in the production of a payment and must therefore adapt simultaneously. For instance,
an improvement in card security might require consumers to get obtain new cards and merchants
to invest in improved card terminals. The problem is exacerbated in the case of entry to the
21The national debit card in Denmark is actually financed in a manner which somewhat deals with this issue.
Merchants do not pay transaction fees, but rather an annual subscription that is calculated ex post, i.e. once the
total number of transactions is known, and is set to cover half the costs of producing the payments.
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market where potential entrants confront a hen-and-the-egg problem in persuading consumers and
merchants to use a payment innovation - and, in addition, may face resistance from banks who
control the payment infrastructure. Setting aside such difficulties, there is the problem of financing
innovation and whether banks face the correct incentives to invest.
In the context of the model, a distinction can be made between innovations that reduce costs,
and those which increase benefits of either consumers of merchants. It would seem that banks
should agree with a social planner on the value of reducing costs, as banks fully bear this cost. It
is less obvious that this is the case for the benefits enjoyed by consumers and merchants.
This claim about costs can be verified by comparing the objective functions of banks’ and
the social planner. To find the value of a cost reduction, one can differentiate the respective
objective functions of the banks and the social planner. Differentiation with respect to cC affects
the profit function (or social planner’s objective function) directly, an effect of magnitude −µ(m),
and indirectly, since the optimal merchant fee is itself a function of costs. However, the latter
effect is zero by the envelope theorem. A real concern, however, is that banks’ incentive to reduce
transaction costs vanishes when the socially optimal fee is applied since any cost saving will also
lead to lower fee income. This suggests a potential conflict between ensuring optimal fees and
providing incentives for innovation.
To illustrate the point that banks might invest insufficiently in innovations that enhance ben-
efits, consider for example a investment that would increase bS,max. The marginal value of this
increase, again applying the envelope theorem, is:
∂Π
∂bS,max
= g(bS,max)(1−H(0))(mopt − cC + cD) (1.28)
If the unconstrained socially optimal fee were imposed, this would evaluate to zero. If the social
planner were to ensure that the banks’ individual rationality constraint remain satisfied, the social
planner should allow the banks to additionally charge the average fixed cost of the cost of the
innovation, in exactly the same manner as the constrained socially optimal merchant fee includes
an average fixed cost component. The above expression can be contrasted with the marginal value
that the social planner would assign to an increase in bS,max :
∂W
∂bS,max
= g(bS,max)(1−H(0) (E[bB|bB ≥ 0] + bS,max − cC + cD) (1.29)
To give an example of the difference in incentives facing banks and the social planner, the
case of uniformly distributed benefits can again be considered. We found earlier that mopt =
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1
2
(
cC − cD + bS,max + 12bB,max
)
and E[bB|bB ≥ 0] = 12bB,max. Inserting these into the above
expressions and rearranging, one sees that:
∂W
∂bS,max
= 2
∂Π
∂bS,max
(1.30)
That is, the social planner values an increase in merchant benefits twice as much as do banks.
More generally, comparing the objective functions of banks’ and the social planner points the
sources of bias in banks’ incentives. In the case of increases in merchant benefits, there are
two sources of bias. As bS,max increases, more merchants accept cards. This benefits all of the
consumers, which prefer to use cards, a positive externality which banks do not take into account in
their decision making. The second source of bias is that banks’ marginal revenue from the increase
in card transactions is proportional to mopt, whereas the corresponding value in the merchant’s
expression is bS,max.
Similar considerations hold for increases in consumer benefits. The calculations are essentially
the same in the case of the banks, only with the roles of the distribution functions reversed. For
the social planner the problem is slightly more complicated as a third effect must also be taken
into account. As bB,max increases, so does the average benefit to card holders E[bB|bB ≥ 0]. This
means that more merchants will accept cards as well. This is likely to reduce welfare, since the
marginal merchant might enjoy negative benefits.
As a final note, though, regulators may not need to be too concerned about violating banks’
participation constraint in practice: One finding in many of the cost of payment studies carried
out in European countries is that banks are generally willing to make a loss on providing payment
services, perhaps because cheap or free payment services help attract customers who purchase other
profitable services from banks. In addition, as discussed in the introduction, banks increasingly
seem to charge consumers fixed periodic fees and therefore do obtain income to cover costs.
1.4. Numerical Illustration
In this section I first discuss how studies on the cost of payments can be used to match the param-
eters of the model with data on payments. As an application, I compare the optimal interchange
fee produced by the model with fees determined by alternative methods. Finally, I analyze the
model when surcharging is permitted. When surcharging is introduced, it is necessary to make
assumptions about the distribution of consumer and merchant benefits. I examine the case of
uniformly distributed benefits.
The data used for identifying the model parameters is from a study of the cost of producing
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payments undertaken by the Danish central bank (Danmarks Nationalbank 2011). The study was
conducted as part of a larger European Central Bank project involving 13 national central banks.
A summary of the results can be found in Schmiedel et al. (2012). The Danish data are well-suited
for matching the model with data for two reasons. First, the published data are detailed enough to
perform a mapping of the data to the model parameters; the ECB data (Schmiedel et al., 2012), in
contrast, is published at a higher level of aggregation. Second, the assumptions of the models, for
example the assumption that consumers do not pay transaction fees, are satisfied in the market.
From the cost study I draw on 2009 data relating to the use and cost of producing of cash
and debit card payments. The cost data have further been split into fixed and variable costs
in a related analysis by Jacobsen and Pedersen (2012). I focus on the national debit card, the
Dankort22. More than 90% of all card payments in Denmark involve this card. Its fee structure
is unusual by international standards. Merchants do not pay regular merchant fees, nor is there
an interchange fee. Instead, merchants pay an annual subscription fee which is set such that
merchants’ collective subscription payment covers half of banks’ production costs. Roughly 95%
of all merchants accept Dankort payments (the acceptance rate for other cards is substantially
lower), and consumers generally do not pay for the use of the Dankort. Even though list prices
often include an annual fee, these fees are typically waived if e.g. consumers have their current
account with the bank or a certain amount of other business with the bank. Indeed, the cost study
shows that banks’ total Dankort income from consumers is negligible.
The intention of the analysis is to illustrate an application of the model. The actual figures
will not necessarily be generalizable to other markets. As an example, Danish labor costs are
high whereas card payments are produced at low cost. The result is a low, even negative optimal
interchange fee. A similarly low fee is an unlikely outcome in a number of other countries where,
for example, cash handling costs are lower due to lower labor costs. In fact, the ECB data suggests
that cash payments are cheaper than card payments in a number of countries. Still, unless one
is willing to argue that card payments are substantially more expensive to produce than cash
payments - and those who favor higher interchange fees tend to make the opposite argument - the
model will produce low optimal interchange fees across markets.
1.4.1. Choice of parameters
The key parameters of the model for the purpose of calculating optimal interchange fees are cC and
cD. These reflect banks’ costs as the fraction of card and cash transactions in the economy change.
In the model, these figures refer to social costs, and for simplicity I assumed that banks’ private
22I also include the co-branded Visa/Dankort in this category.
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costs were equal to these when, in fact, the private costs may be different as banks do obtain
some income, e.g. in the form of periodical fees, from consumers. This income is rather limited,
however, and the cost study corrects for transfers in an attempt to measure the social cost.23
Other model parameters that appear in derivations or results include merchant’s production cost
(γ), distance costs (t), the fixed costs involved in accepting (K) and (k) adopting cards, and finally
the distributions of consumer (bB) and merchant benefits (bS). Some of these parameters, notably
the cost parameters, can be estimated from the cost study data. Others such as the distribution
of consumer benefits require ad hoc assumptions. The key model parameters are summarized in
Table I.
Table I: Estimates of model parameters
Parameter Estimate
γ 31.0
t 3.6
K 0.044
cC 0.043
cD 0.206
bS,max 0.498
bS,min -0.341
bB,max 0.999
bB,min -0.515
The parameter values are obtained from the data as follows. Thinking of the model as describing
a single transaction, the choice of γ is essentially a choice of transaction size while the choice of
t determines the profit margin. According to the cost study, the average transaction size is 34.6
euros24. Since the merchant price is close to γ + t, I choose estimates of γ = 31.0 and t = 3.6,
corresponding to a markup of about 10%. In the model, K corresponds to the total fixed cost,
but the model describes a situation in which there is a unit mass of transactions. The logical
counterpart when thinking of a single transaction is to compare the merchant fixed costs to the
total value of cash and card payments and the multiply the average transaction size. The total
value of cash (20.3 billion) and Dankort payments (34.1 billion) is 54.4 billion according to table 1
in the cost study, while merchant fixed costs are 101.9 million according to (Jacobsen and Pedersen,
2012). Part of this cost, however, is fees of 33.1 million paid to banks, which must be subtracted.
For a payment of average size, this produces a value of K = 0.044.
The parameters cC and cD reflect banks’ marginal costs of cash and card payments. Since
23In this sense, social cost is narrowly defined to mean real production cost. There are other social costs related
to the use of cash, for example its use in criminal activity, which are not taken into account.
24Costs are stated in euros since this is presumably a more familiar unit than the Danish krone. The Danish
krone is pegged to the euro at an exchange rate of about EUR 1 = DKK 7.43 the average transaction size in Danish
currency is 257 kroner. Minor rounding errors may appear as calculations were initially done in kroner.
43
banks’ production functions are not observable, the most obvious proxy for these figures is the
average variable cost. The use of this proxy is correct in the case of constant marginal costs. The
empirical evidence presented in Schmiedel et al. (2012) suggest that this may not be an unrealistic
assumption.25 According to Jacobsen and Pedersen (2012), issuing banks’ variable cash-related
costs are 120.3 million. The total variable costs for issuing and acquiring banks are somewhat
harder to obtain as one cannot simply add their individual costs. This is because there are fee
payments among issuers (i.e. consumer banks) and acquirers (i.e. merchant banks) so adding costs
would entail some double-counting. If one corrects for such fees, the total variable cost of issuers
and acquirers is 42.6 million.26 Dividing the total average variable cost by the total value of card
and cash transactions respectively and then multiplying by the average transaction size, I arrive
at average variable costs of 0.032 in the case of cards and 0.206 in the case of cash.
It is also instructive to look at the actual fee income that banks earn in order to ascertain
whether the assumption that banks do not charge consumers for payment services is satisfied in
the data. Note that the critical assumption is that consumers do not pay transaction fees. The
data does not reveal the source of banks fee income (whether transaction fees, periodic fees, or fees
initially paid to obtain a card), but in any case the total fee income is so low as to be negligible.
Banks’ total fee income from households for the national debit card was 11.0 million in 2009. To
put this number in perspective, there were 4.2 million issued cards of this type, implying that
average annual fee income per card was about 2.5 euros. More generally, banks did not make
much revenue on payment services. As an example, their income from providing cash services was
50.2 million, much less than their cost of providing these services.
The distributions of benefits are more difficult to parametrize. Merchant benefits bS can be
interpreted as the marginal savings (or cost) from a card payment relative to a cash payment. I
estimate the average value of bS at 0.078. I arrive at this number by calculating the difference in
merchants’ marginal cost of receiving cash and cards for a payment of average size.27 I treat the
estimate as the midpoint of a uniform distribution and thus let bS,min = 0.078 − x and bS,max =
0.078 + x. A distribution for bB can be determined in the same way. The cost study also makes
a calculation of the costs a consumer has (e.g. time spent) making cash and card transactions
25See, for instance, chart 2 in the paper, which depicts the relationship between average unit costs and payments
per capita. The lines are downward sloping at a decreasing rate which is consistent with how unit costs would evolve
if marginal costs were constant.
26This figure cannot be directly found the cost study or related papers. I have obtained the underlying data from
one of the authors to calculate the figure.
27Figures for merchant’s variable costs are provided in (Jacobsen and Pedersen, 2012), which itself is based largely
on a working paper (only published in Danish) by Jacobsen. From that one can derive merchants’ marginal cost
functions for cash and Dankort payments can be written as mcD = 0.094 + 0.0027V and mcC = 0.102 + 0.0002V ,
where V is the transaction value. The estimate is found by inserting the average transaction size in the place of V ,
and taking the difference between the marginal cost estimates for cash and cards.
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respectively. For a transaction of average size, a consumer’s cost consumers has costs of 0.104
when paying by card and euros for cash and 0.242 when paying with cash. For a transaction of
average size this means that consumers enjoy benefits of 0.138 by paying with Dankort. I therefore
set bB,min = 0.138− y and bB,max = 0.138 + y.
The values of x and y are chosen such that the fraction of merchants accepting Dankort and the
fraction of consumers preferring to pay by Dankort match real figures. About 95% of all merchants
accept payments by Dankort. Since the total fraction of card payments (by value) is 62.7%, the
fraction of consumers preferring to pay using Dankort is set at 66% (= 0.627/0.95). y can then be
found first by solving the following equation for y:
1−H(0) = bB,max
bB,max − bB,min =
bB,mid + y
2y
= 0.66 (1.31)
Since m = 0 in the case of the Dankort, the merchant threshold is
bS ≥ b?S = −E[bB|bB ≥ 0] +
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H(0) (1.32)
This can be calculated based on the found parameter estimates, and x is then set so as to satisfy
1−H(b?S) =
bS,max − b?S
bB,max − bB,min =
bS,mid + x− b?S
2x
= 0.95 (1.33)
The obtained parameter estimates indicate that there is more heterogeneity in consumer bene-
fits than merchant benefits. Another point of interest is the merchant acceptance threshold implied
by the model, which evaluates to -0.30, implying that a merchant would accept card payments
even if it increased costs relative to receiving payment pay cash by 0.30 for an average payment or
by 0.86% in percentage terms.
1.4.2. Optimal interchange fees
The unconstrained optimal merchant fee follows directly from the parameter estimates. It is:
mopt = cC − cD = 0.043− 0.206 = −0.163 (1.34)
In proportional terms this corresponds to an optimal merchant fee of -0.47%. Total acquiring
costs for the Dankort, corrected for (i.e. not including) fees by paid acquirers to issuers, are
estimated at 11.7 million28, which corresponds to acquiring costs of just 0.03%. Hence, the implied
28This estimate is based on data collected as part of the Danish cost study, but which cannot be directly found in
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optimal interchange fee is -0.50%. What informs such a low, even negative fee? Recall that
mopt = cC − cD. The main explanation for the low fee is to be found in banks’ high net costs
of providing cash services, cD. Banks’ revenues from cash services are negligible, but their costs
are substantial. This effectively means that banks are subsidizing the use of cash, and it is this
tendency that a social planner seeks to counteract by imposing a negative interchange fee. Some
further analysis, however, shows that the optimal fee is not the only optimal fee; in derivations,
I assumed an interior solution, but in practice all merchants accept cards at the optimal fee, and
at higher fees as well (see Figure 1.2). Imposing such a low fee is therefore not the only way of
reaching the optimal fee: A whole interval of fees would accomplish this task.
It is also possible to calculate the privately optimal interchange fee as predicted by the model
given the parameter choices. In the case of no fixed costs, for instance, the privately optimal
merchant fee is 1.21%. While this figure relies on the arbitrary assumption of uniformly distributed
benefits, it is not unrealistic when compared to the actual fee levels observed in countries where
fee levels are not regulated.
This fee can be contrasted with fees obtained by alternative methods. While it is not transpar-
ent how banks or card networks set interchange fees, a common method appears to be that issuers
must be compensated for bearing certain costs that are considered to benefit the merchant side of
the market (Bo¨restam and Schmiedel, 2011). These costs include, as a minimum, operating costs
related to processing payments, guaranteeing payments, and other security costs. An alternative,
which some regulators use as a benchmark, is to apply the merchant indifference test. Based on
the cost study data estimates of interchange fees based on each of these methods can be obtained.
The resulting interchange fee depends on which issuer costs are assigned to the merchant side
of the market. The total cost of issuer services for the Dankort is estimated to be 79.6 million29.
Of these, 15.8 million are purely related to transactions processing and guaranteeing payments. If
these costs were to be covered, an interchange fee of 0.05% would be required. If all issuer costs
were to be covered via the interchange fee, the implied fee would equal 0.23%, still a very low
figure compared to actual interchange fees. Note that these calculation assume the total value
of Dankort payments to be fixed. The model predicts that fewer payments would take place so
presumably a somewhat higher interchange fee would be required.
The low interchange fee implied by the cost-based method is due mainly to two factors. First,
the number of Dankort payments is large. Card usage per capita is high in Denmark, and the
the publication. I have obtained the more granular data from the authors.
29Some of these costs are actually borne by the acquirer (there is only one acquirer of the Dankort), which in the
Danish market also performs some services that are traditionally performed by issuers
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vast majority of card payments are made using the Dankort. Second, the cost of producing
Dankort payments is low. For instance, issuing banks’ cost of producing Dankort payments is
about 2.3 times their cost of producing payments with international debit cards even though the
number of Dankort payments is roughly 20 times greater. If a similar cost-based analysis were
to be performed for international debit cards, the implied interchange fee would be in the range
0.4%-0.7% depending on which issuer costs are passed on to the merchant side of the market.
The merchant indifference test calls for an interchange fee that makes the merchant no worse
off by receiving payment by card. A practical challenge confronting this test is that merchant’s
marginal cost depends on the transaction value, and so a unit or percentage fee cannot on its own
achieve indifference. However, the following marginal cost functions for cash and Dankort can be
derived from the cost data in Jacobsen and Pedersen (2012):
mcD = 0.094 + 0.0027V (1.35)
mcC = 0.102 + 0.0002V (1.36)
It follows that that way to make a merchant indifferent is to impose a fee of:
aid = −0.008 + 0.0025V (1.37)
This implies an interchange fee of 0.25% less a small unit payment. Since the cost study also
contains data on other, less widely-used cards, similar calculations can be performed for these. For
example, for international debit cards the marginal cost equation is:
aid = 0.101 + 0.0051V (1.38)
In this instance, the variable part of the marginal cost includes the existing interchange fee,
the level of which is not publicly known. However, an upper bound estimate can be obtained
by assuming that all of merchants’ fees paid on international debit cards (4.24 million according
to table 5.7 in Danmarks Nationalbank (2011)) are interchange fee payments. Since the value of
international debit card payments was 915 million, an the average interchange fee is at most 0.46%.
This would imply a marginal cost function, exclusive of interchange fees, of aid = 0.101 + 0.0006V .
It follows that the optimal interchange fee according to the merchant indifference test should
therefore be on the order of:
aid = −0.007 + 0.0021V (1.39)
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Interestingly, this implied interchange fee level is close to the interchange fee of 0.20%, which
the European Commission has agreed upon with the large card networks in Europe and the fee
level ceiling for debit cards in the proposed regulation of interchange fees.
When calculating the value of the social planner’s objective function, it turns out that the
choice between different benchmarks for interchange fees may not make much of a difference. The
reason is that for low enough merchant fees, the merchant acceptance threshold may lie below the
numerical estimate for bS,min. In that case all merchants accept cards, and reducing the merchant
fee further has no welfare consequences. When fixed costs are included, the value of m at which
this occurs is -0.32 (-0.12%), but if fixed costs are excluded the value is 1.17 (0.46%). Below these
values the social planner’s objective function takes on a constant value. Merchant profits and the
value of the social objective function as a function of the merchant fee are depicted in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Welfare and profits (without surcharging)
The figure shows welfare and profits as a function of the merchant fee, under the assumption that merchants do not surcharge
the fees. Welfare is defined as the total benefits accruing to consumers and merchants from card payments (relative to cash
payments) less the total costs of producing all payments. It is measured here as a fraction of transaction value. The upper
lines represent welfare, the lower lines profits. Welfare and profits are shown under both the assumption of no merchant fixed
costs and merchant fixed costs. The flat portions of the lines represent areas where either all (to the left) or no (to the right)
consumers use cards.
1.4.3. Surcharging
When surcharging is permitted, the model does not provide simple answers to whether merchants
will, in fact, surcharge. The numerical analysis highlights this difficulty. To illustrate this with
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an example, the equilibrium outcome for a pair of average merchants (bS = 0.5825) is to accept
cards and not surcharge if m = −1, to accept cards and surcharge if m = 2, not to accept cards if
m = 5. This might indicate a natural progression from not surcharging at low fees, to surcharging
at higher fees, and then to not accept cards when fees reach a certain limit. Such a conclusion does
not hold for all combinations of m and bS . When (m, bS) = (−0.2,−2.3), for instance all three
symmetric outcomes are equilibria. If (m, bS) = (4.7, 2.6), there are two asymmetric equilibria in
which one merchant accepts cards and surcharges and the other does not accept cards. Increase
bS slightly, say to 2.66, and there are no equilibria, whereas both merchants surcharge if bS = 2.7.
At the socially optimal fee derived under the assumption of surcharging being prohibited, the
equilibrium is for all merchants with bS ≤ 0.70 is to accept cards and not surcharge. However, for
merchants who enjoy greater benefits the equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric one in which one
merchant surcharges and the other does not. The implication is that at that fee, all merchants
accept cards, and some merchants surcharge whereas others do not. At somewhat higher fees such
as 0.20% (0.54 in absolute value), which is close to the fee according to the merchant indifference
test, most merchants (bS > −1.83) accept cards and surcharge. Merchants who enjoy lower benefits
do not accept cards at all. At the privately optimal fee (i.e. the optimal fee when surcharging is
not permitted), merchants do not accept cards for bS ≤ 0.63, but accept cards and surcharge when
bS > 0.72. In a small interval in between there are two equilibria in which one merchant does not
accept cards, and the other accepts cards and surcharges.
An overview of the equilibria of the model is provided in Figure 1.3. It depicts the regions
of (m, bS)-combinations for which different types of equilibria in the merchant acceptance game
occur. Shaded regions indicate the presence of equilibria.
Merchants do not accept cards if merchant fees are high and they enjoy low benefits. When
merchant fees are positive, merchants will generally surcharge if permitted, though there are also
cases with no or asymmetric equilibria. When merchant fees are slightly negative, merchant who
enjoy the lowest benefits will still surcharge. The predominant equilibria when merchant fees are
negative, though, is to accept cards and not surcharge in the case of low merchant benefits or for
one merchant to surcharge and for the other not to surcharge.
Actual fees will typically be in, say, the 0%-2%-region, and so the model suggests that one
mainly should observe two types - cash acceptance or card acceptance with surcharging - with the
degree of card acceptance falling as fees increase. The point about surcharging is to some extent
counterfactual since, even when surcharging is permitted, many retailers choose not to surcharge.
Empirical studies of surcharging behavior do, though, indicate that large retailers surcharge so
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Figure 1.3: Equilibria in model with surcharging
The shaded area of each figure represents the combinations of merchant fees (x-axis) and merchant benefits (y-axis), both
expressed as a percentage of average transaction value, for which the response profile in question (see figure titles) is a Nash
equilibrium. As an example, the uppermost panel to the left shows that the optimal response of merchants is to only accept
cash when merchants benefits are low and/or when merchant fees are high.
even if the fraction of retailers surcharging is limited, the fraction of all sales on which surcharging
is applied can be relatively large.
To gauge welfare in the surcharging case against welfare in the no-surcharging case, one can
evaluate the value of the social planner’s objective function under the assumption that merchants
face only a choice between not accepting cards and accepting cards and surcharging. The presence
of e.g. situations without any equilibria makes it impossible to evaluate the objective function
when all of merchants’ three options are available.
If one compares welfare under surcharging and no surcharging, the welfare effects of surcharging
depend on the merchant fee applied. For negative merchant fees welfare is greater when surcharging
is applied. This is because surcharging of negative fees, which is equivalent to giving rebates for
card usage, induces more consumers to use cards which benefits card-accepting merchants who,
on average, are better off with greater card usage. It may not be obvious from visual inspection
of Figures 1.2 and 1.4, but the opposite is the case for positive merchant fees for which welfare is
higher when surcharging does not take place.
Comparing Figure 4 to Figure 2 also shows that banks’ privately optimal fee is lower when
surcharging takes place than when it does not, as are bank profits. An interesting issue is how
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Figure 1.4: Welfare and profits (with surcharging)
The figure shows welfare and profits as a function of the merchant fee, under the assumption that merchants surcharge the fees.
Welfare is defined as the total benefits accruing to consumers and merchants from card payments (relative to cash payments)
less the total costs of producing all payments. It is measured here as a fraction of transaction value. The upper lines represent
welfare, the lower lines profits. Welfare and profits are shown under both the assumption of no merchant fixed costs and
merchant fixed costs. The flat portions of the lines represent areas where either all (to the left) or no (to the right) consumers
use cards.
the socially optimal fee compares to the privately optimal fees with and without surcharging. On
the one hand, we know that surcharging lowers welfare for a given (positive) merchant fee, but, on
the other hand, the privately optimal merchant fee is lower when surcharging is permitted. It is
at least plausible, therefore, that surcharging will increase welfare. This turns out to be the case,
though the improvement in welfare is numerically very small.
The implication is that surcharging might improve welfare if merchant or interchange fees
are not regulated. However, at low fees or close to the optimal fee, the analysis suggests that
surcharging would reduce welfare. At low interchange fees, welfare would be greater in the absence
of surcharging, and while welfare would in principle be higher with surcharging for negative fees,
Figure 1.3 illustrates that merchants would, in fact, not surcharge at such fees.
1.4.4. Consumer adoption costs
When both consumers and merchants face adoption costs there are two card usage equilibria,
one with a high degree of card acceptance among merchants and consumers and one with low
acceptance. The first step in identifying these equilibria is to select a value for consumer adoption
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costs k. I use an estimate is k = 0.067.30 Given that value it is possible to find equilibria for
different values of m. For reasonable values of m there will be two equilibria. The numerical
analysis shows that both bank profits and the value of the social planner’s objective function are
always highest in the equilibrium where card usage is high. The merchant fee that maximizes
profits in that equilibrium is 1.04% as a percentage of the transaction value. The fixed points of
the function f(bS) are depicted in Figure 1.5 for three different values of the merchant fee.
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Figure 1.5: Fixed points with consumer and merchant fixed costs
The figure depicts, for three different merchant fees, values of the threshold of the merchant benefits (stated in percentages of
transaction value) for which the fraction of merchants accepting cards is consistent with the fraction of consumers using cards
(and vice versa). There are two fixed points for each merchant fee, the leftmost corresponding to an equilibrium with high
card usage and acceptance and the rightmost corresponding to an equilibrium with low card usage and acceptance.
This figure is typical of how the two fixed points are located. To understand the figure, consider
first the case of bS being lower than at the first equilibrium point. A low value of the merchant
threshold bS corresponds to many merchants accepting cards. In that case, many users would also
like to use cards. The marginal card user therefore attaches a low value to using cards relative
to cash, but in that case merchants are less inclined to compete for card users. So for the value
of the consumer threshold, i.e. the value of bB that is consistent with the particular value of bS ,
f(bS) > bS , which means that fewer merchants will accept cards. As bS increases in value, two
30According to survey data, a typical consumer makes about 400 transactions per year. Supposing that banks did
charge consumers their official list prices of 26.9 euros (=200) kroner, that would correspond to a value of k = 0.067
if such prices were charged, since k can be viewed as a consumer’s average fixed cost.
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effects are at play. First, the marginal card user attaches more value to being able to pay by card,
and merchants compete more vigorously for these with a resulting decrease in f(bS). This effect
dominates initially. As there are fewer card users, however, merchants’ fixed cost must be spread
across fewer users, and ultimately this effect dominates.
In the high card usage (low bS) equilibrium, 58.0% of consumers use cards and 55.9% of
merchants accept cards. If merchants and consumers were to find themselves in the low card usage
equilibrium, the fraction of merchants and consumers accepting and using cards would just be
8.5% and 13.8%. These figures contrast with merchant acceptance at the fee, which maximizes
the social planner’s welfare function assuming that consumers and merchants end up in the high
card usage equilibrium. That fee is -0.17, and is associated with 61.6% of consumers using cards
and all merchants accepting cards.
The model is static, but if one were to think of the model in dynamic terms, only the equilibrium
with high card usage would be a stable equilibrium. If, initially, the merchant acceptance threshold
were less than at the first equilibrium point, the number of merchants accepting cards would
decrease due to the mechanics described above: Many consumers would use cards, and this would
actually make it less attractive for merchants to accept cards, corresponding to an increase in the
merchant threshold. The opposite would happen for values of bS between the two equilibrium
points. Few consumers would be using cards, but since these consumers would be those enjoying
high card benefits, more merchants would accept cards in order to attract them and the merchant
acceptance threshold would decline. To the right of the second equilibrium point the situation
would diverge towards an outcome without any card usage.
1.5. Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model of interchange fees for a particular, but empirically relevant price
structure for payment services. In doing so, I show that that a number of conclusions in the earlier
literature are altered, sometimes entirely reversed, when banks do not charge transaction fees.
Among the key results are the following: (1) lower interchange fees will lead to greater card usage;
(2) banks, if unregulated, choose a fee which exceeds the social optimum, and the outcome is an
excessive use of cash; and (3) a cost-based optimal fee can be calculated and provides a useful
benchmark for evaluating actual interchange fees.
The paper suggests some avenues for further research. An interesting question is how payment
services are priced in the first place. I discuss why a price structure without transaction fees might
be an equilibrium outcome, but the question is clearly deserving of a more thorough examination.
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For example, might banks alter their pricing behavior if interest rates are low for an extended
period of time? Recall that one argument why payment services might be free is that these are
used to attract deposits which provide cheap funding for banks.
The model does not focus on the case where consumers face negative fees, e.g. in the form of
rewards or cash-backs, though that is also a possible outcome when interchange fees are sufficiently
large. Many cards, especially credit cards, have higher interchange fees and offer certain ”benefits”
(e.g. insurance, frequent flyer points, etc.) to consumers. However, that raises another question:
Why do these card ”benefits” in many cases not come in the form of negative fees, but rather
in the form of other goods, which would seem to be less valuable than an equivalent amount of
cash? I would tentatively suggest that card benefits are used as a screening device. In particular,
the benefits promised by credit cards often appear to be relatively more valuable to wealthier
individuals. It seems plausible that card networks specifically seek to attract such individuals in
order to be able to charge merchants higher card fees (as losing business from these individuals is
particularly costly). It would be interesting to develop a model of interchange fees which considers
such a screening mechanism. This may also help explain why there is a plethora of card types
(e.g. a single card brand having different ”qualities” of cards such as e.g. ”platinum” cards) even
though all cards basically perform the same payment function.
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1.6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof mirrors that in Rochet and Tirole (2002), except for the fact that fixed adoption costs
are included in this derivation. The inclusion of the proof is useful for an additional reason,
namely that the derivation of surcharging equilibria follows a similar structure, but a number of
intermediate calculation steps are not shown in that derivation.
Assume initially that both merchants accept cards, and set prices p1 and p2 in order to maximize
profits. For a merchant pair, let x denote the market share of one of the merchants, say merchant
1. In that case, the market share is found by solving:
p1 + xt = p2 + (1− x)t⇔ x = 1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
(1.40)
The resulting merchant profits are:
pi1 =
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(p1 − γ − (m− bS)(1−H(b?B))−K (1.41)
pi2 =
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
(p2 − γ − (m− bS)(1−H(b?B))−K (1.42)
In words, profits are the product of market share times profit margin, less fixed costs. Note that
merchant fees and card benefits are only paid and received for the fraction 1−H(b?B) of consumers,
which prefer to pay by card. Recall that b?B denotes the threshold above which consumers prefer
the use of payment cards to cash. This is assumed to be zero throughout most of the paper, but
here the general case is considered.
The next step is to find the profit maximizing prices. Solving for the first-order condition w.r.t.
price results in the following price for merchant 1:
p1 =
1
2
[t+ p2 + γ + (1−H(b?B))(m− bS)] (1.43)
Since merchant 2 solves a symmetrical problem, the expression for p2 is identical, only with sub-
scripts interchanged. One can therefore solve for p1 and p2:
p1 = p2 = t+ γ + (1−H(b?B))(m− bS) (1.44)
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Inserting the price expressions into the profit function produces:
pi1 = pi2 =
1
2
t−K (1.45)
To ensure that both merchants accepting cards is an equilibrium, it must be the case that neither
has an incentive to deviate and accept cash only. To establish the conditions under which this will
be the case, suppose therefore that merchant 2 only accepts cash. Letting xC and xD denote the
market shares among cash and card users respectively, merchant 2 will obtain market shares of:
(1− xD) = 1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
(1.46)
(1− xC) = 1
2
+
p1 − p2 − E[bB|b?B]
2t
(1.47)
where the market share among card users is found by comparing the consumers’ cost of trading
with merchant 1 and paying by card, which is p1 +txC−bB, with the cost of trading with merchant
2, which is P2 + (1− xC)t, and finally integrating over the interval [b?B, bB,max].
Profits are:
pi1 = H(b
?
B)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(p1 − γ)
+(1−H(b?B))
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1 + E[bB|bB ≥ b?B]
2t
)
(p1 − γ −m+ bS)−K
(1.48)
pi2 =
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2 + (1−H(b?B))(−E[bB|bB ≥ b?B])
2t
)
(p2 − γ) (1.49)
The associated first-order conditions are:
p1 =
1
2
(t+ γ + p2 + (1−H(b?B))(m− bS + E[bB|bB ≥ b?B]) (1.50)
p2 =
1
2
(t+ γ + p1 + (1−H(b?B))E[bB|bB ≥ b?B]) (1.51)
Solving for prices:
p1 = t+ γ +
1
3
(1−H(b?B)) (2(m− bS) + E[bB|bB ≥ b?B]) (1.52)
p2 = t+ γ +
1
3
(1−H(b?B)) (m− bS − E[bB|bB ≥ b?B]) (1.53)
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This implies profits for merchant 2 of:
pi2 =
(
1
2
+
1
3(1−H(b?B))(m− bS − E[bB|bB ≥ b?B])
2t
)
×
(
t+
1
3
(1−H(b?B))(m− bS − E[bB|bB ≥ b?B])
) (1.54)
Hence, the condition required for a card acceptance equilibrium is that the above is less than
or equal to 12 t−K. Examining this inequality and solving for bS gives:
bS ≥ m− E[bB|bB ≥ b?B] +
3t(1−
√
1− 2Kt
1−H(b?B)
(1.55)
Proof of Proposition 1
To show the existence of equilibria, one can appeal to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem which requires
a continuous function f : S → S on a non-empty, convex, compact subset of a finite-dimensional
normed linear space. Continuity of f follows from the continuity of G(bS) and H(bB) which is
assumed. The set S = [bS,min, bS,max − ] is clearly convex, closed and bounded. Being a subset
of the set of real numbers, the set is therefore compact. Hence, the only remaining requirement of
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem is that f(bS) maps S into itself, and imposing the condition stated
in the proposition ensures exactly that.
Proof of Proposition 2
With k = 0 there is only one equilibrium in which cards are used. The fraction of individuals using
payment cards is 1 − H(0). Applying the result from Proposition 1, the fraction of merchants
accepting cards is:
1−G
m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H (0)
 (1.56)
The fraction of card payments is consequently
µ(m) = (1−H(0))
1−G
m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H (0)

 (1.57)
Since G
m− E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + 3t
(
1−
√
1− 2K
t
)
1−H(0)
 is increasing in m, it follows that card usage is
decreasing in m.
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Proof of Lemma 2
The expression, which simply says that banks in optimum equate marginal revenues and marginal
costs, follows from solving for the banks’ first-order condition and rearranging terms.
The second-order condition requires that
2g(m)− g′(m)(m− cC + cD) < 0 (1.58)
Inserting the expression for m, one can verify that an increasing hazard rate g(bS)1−G(bS) or, equiva-
lently, that a decreasing inverse hazard rate is sufficient condition for this inequality to be satisfied.
Proof of Corollary 1
The transportation cost appears in the expression for the merchant fee as part of the following
term
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2K
t
)
(1.59)
To prove the assertion that the m is increasing in t, we first observe that the above expression
is decreasing in t. To see this, one can differentiate w.r.t. to t and rearrange terms. Assuming the
derivative to be negative can then be shown to be equivalent to the condition −2t ≤ 3K which
clearly is true.
Next, we have assumed the hazard rate g(·)1−G(·) to be increasing. Now, as t increases, it follows
that the hazard rate decreases which implies that the term found in the expression for the merchant
fee increases.
Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiation of the social objective function w.r.t. m and rearranging slightly results in the
following expression
bB,max∫
0
bBdH(bB) + (1−H(0)) (m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0]− cC + cD) = 0 (1.60)
Dividing by 1−H(0) and −g(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0]) and solving for m gives
m = cC − cD (1.61)
The second-order condition is automatically satisfied at this value of m, independent of any dis-
tributional assumptions. To see this, note that the second derivative of the objective function can
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be written as
g′(b?s)(E[bB | bB ≥ 0] + b?S − cC + cD)− g(b?S) (1.62)
At the socially optimal fee b?S = cC − cD +E[bB | bB ≥ 0]. Hence, the second derivative reduces to
−g(b?S) which is negative.
Proof of Proposition 4
This is an immediate consequence of comparing the expressions found in Lemma 2 and Proposition
3.
Proof of Proposition 5
If m is set such that bS > m−E[bB|bB ≥ 0] +
3t(1−
√
1− 2K
t
1−H(0) , no merchant accepts card and no card
payments take place. For any merchant fee that satisfies bS ≤ m − E[bB|bB ≥ 0] +
3t(1−
√
1− 2K
t
1−H(0) ,
all merchants accept cards, and the fraction of card payments is 1 − G(0), which is independent
of the merchant fee. The merchant acceptance threshold thus determines an upper bound for the
interval of optimal merchant fees; this fee is also the profit maximizing fee for banks.
Reducing the merchant fee leaves the social objective function unchanged, at least until a point
is reached at which banks’ rationality constraint is no longer satisfied. That point determines the
lower bound of the interval.
Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that merchant 1 accepts cards and surcharges. If both merchants accept cards and sur-
charge, they earn profits of 12 t−K. This can be shown by setting the adoption threshold at b?B = m,
removing the −m-term from the merchant profit functions, and then redoing the derivations. We
must therefore establish the conditions under which merchant 2 is no better off by not accepting
cards.
With surcharging, the fraction of consumers who always pay using cash when they can is G(m).
Among these, merchant 2 enjoys a market share of:
1− xD = 1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
(1.63)
Consumers in the remaining part of the population are indifferent between the two merchants
whenever:
p1 − bB +m+ txC = p2 + t(1− xD) (1.64)
Integrating over all consumers with benefits in the interval [m, bB,max] gives a market share
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among card users (i.e. those who use cards when possible) of:
1− xC = 1
2
+
p1 − p2 − E[bB|bB ≥ m] +m
2t
(1.65)
This implies profit functions of:
pi1 = H(m)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(p1 − γ)
+(1−H(m))
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1 + E[bB|bB ≥ m]−m
2t
)
(p1 − γ + bS)−K
(1.66)
pi2 =
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2 + (1−H(m))(−E[bB|bB ≥ m] +m)
2t
)
(p2 − γ) (1.67)
Deriving the two merchants’ first-order conditions and solving for p1 and p2 gives:
p1 = t+ γ + (1−H(m))
(
−2
3
bS +
1
3
E[bB|bB ≥ m]− 1
3
m
)
(1.68)
p2 = t+ γ + (1−H(m))(−1
3
bS − 1
3
E[bB|bB ≥ m] + 1
3
m) (1.69)
Inserting these expressions into the second merchant’s profit function and simplifying produces:
pi2 =
1
2t
[
t+ (1−H(m))(−1
3
bS − 1
3
E[bB|bB ≥ m] + 1
3
m)
]2
(1.70)
Comparing this to the profit when both merchants accept cards and surcharge, one can show
the no deviation condition to be:
bS ≥ m− E[bB|bB ≥ m] +
3t
(
1−
√
1− 2Kt
)
1−H(m) (1.71)
Proof of Proposition 7
For a given positive merchant fee, the fraction of payments made by cards is then greater under
no surcharging if the following condition is satisfied
(1−H(0))(1−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0])) ≥ (1−H(m))(1−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ m])) (1.72)
It is evident from these expressions that more consumers use cards when surcharging is prohib-
ited while more mercants accept cards when it is allowed. The latter follows from the fact that
E[bB|bB ≥ m] ≥ E[bB|bB ≥ 0].
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Adding and subtraction terms on the right-hand side gives
(1−H(0))(1−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0])) ≥ [(1−H(0)) + (H(0)−H(m))]
×[(1−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0])) + (G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0])−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ m]))]
(1.73)
Simplifying and rearranging
G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ m])−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ 0])
1−G(m− E[bB|bB ≥ m]) ≥
H(0)−H(m)
1−H(0) (1.74)
The expression on the left-hand side is the percentage decrease in the fraction of merchants ac-
cepting cards that would occur if surcharging were prohibited. The expression on the right-hand
side equals the percentage decrease in the fraction of consumers using cards when surcharging is
permitted.
Proof of Lemma 4
The expression is found by solving the banks’ profit-maximization problem subject to the new
rationality constraint.
Equilibria with surcharging
In this section I discuss merchants’ choice of whether to accept cards and surcharge or whether
to accept cards and not surcharge. The expressions found here are only used in the numerical
analysis for identifying equilibria when surcharging is permitted.
As noted in the discussion of surcharging in the results section, merchants have three options at
their disposal: (1) they can choose to accept only cash; (2) they can choose to accept cards without
surcharging; and (3) they can accept cards and surcharge the merchant fee. The profits resulting
from most of the strategies have already been discussed in lemma 1 and lemma 4. One case,
however, has not been considered: When one merchant (say, merchant 1) accepts cards without
surcharging while the other merchant also accepts cards, but surcharges. This case is discussed in
this section, and the results are used to establish the type of equilibria which exist when each of
the three options are available to merchants.
In this case there are three distinct classes of consumers for whom market shares must be
calculated for each merchant. Assuming that m > 0, for consumers with a strict preference for
cash, i.e. bB < 0, merchant 1’s market share is:
x =
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
(1.75)
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Then there are consumers who will by card if transacting with merchant 1, but not with merchant
2. These are the ones who enjoy card benefits in the interval [0,m). These consumers are indifferent
between the two merchants when:
p1 + tx− bB = p2 + (1− x)t (1.76)
Solving for x, and integrating over the relevant interval, one finds that merchant 1 enjoys a market
share of:
1
2
+
p2 − p1 + E[bB|0 ≤ bB < m]
2t
(1.77)
Finally, there are those consumers who will pay by card at either merchant, whether surcharging is
applied or note. These enjoy card benefits bB ≥ m, and are indifferent between the two merchants
at
p1 + tx− bB = p2 + (1− x)t+m− bB (1.78)
The calculations could also be done under the assumption that m < 0. In that case the
three relevant intervals of consumers would be [bB,min,m) (cash users), [m, 0) (cash users when
transacting with merchant 1, and card users when transacting with merchant 2) and [0, bB,max
(card users). Among these types, merchant 1 has market share:
x =
1
2
+
p2 − p1 +m
2t
(1.79)
Multiplying the market shares by profit margins for each class and weighing by the classes’ pro-
portion in the consumer population, one arrives at profits:
pi1 = H(0)(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)(p1 − γ)
+(H(m)−H(0))(1
2
+
p2 − p1 + E[bB—0 ≤ bB < m]
2t
)(p1 − γ + bS −m)
+(1−H(m))(1
2
+
p2 − p1 +m
2t
)(p1 − γ + bS −m)−K
(1.80)
pi2 = H(0)(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)(p2 − γ)
+(H(m)−H(0))(1
2
+
p1 − p2 − E[bB—0 ≤ bB < m]
2t
)(p2 − γ)
+(1−H(m))(1
2
+
p1 − p2 −m
2t
)(p2 − γ + bS)−K
(1.81)
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Finding for the first-order conditions and solving for p1 and p2 produces:
p1 = t+ γ+ (H(m)−H(0))(−2
3
bS +
2
3
m+
1
3
E[bB—0 ≤ bB < m]) + (1−H(m))(−bS +m) (1.82)
p2 = t+ γ + (H(m)−H(0))(−1
3
bS +
1
3
m− 1
3
E[bB—0 ≤ bB < m]) + (1−H(m))(−bS) (1.83)
These expressions can be inserted into the profit function for merchant 2, the value of which
must then be compared to 12 t−K. Doing this, one can find a expression which gives the values of
of bS , for which it does not pay off to deviate, but these are too complicated to gain much intuition
from. Using derivations that parallel the ones above, one can similarly find merchant profits and
prices under the assumption of negative merchant fees.
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Bank Liquidity and the Interbank
Market
ABSTRACT
Banks exchange liquidity in the money market to absorb payment shocks. In a well-
functioning market, banks in need of liquidity should not pay a premium when borrow-
ing. We combine data on bank reserves at the central bank and interest rates paid in the
money market to study how bank liquidity affects interbank rates. Banks with scarce
liquidity pay only marginally higher rates than do those with ample liquidity. However,
during times of financial stress and when the need for liquidity is more pronounced,
those short of liquidity pay a higher cost.
Keywords: Financial regulation; Interchange fees; Payments
JEL-classification: E42; G21; G28
2.1. Introduction
The financial crisis has spawned a considerable literature on the functioning of interbank markets.
A common theme in this literature is whether the market allows banks to absorb liquidity shocks
and allocate liquidity efficiently amongst themselves. Prior to the crisis, the view seems to have
been that the money market functioned well. Analyzing the interbank money market during the
crisis in the autumn of 1998, when Russia effectively defaulted on its sovereign debt and a rescue
of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management took place, Furfine (2001, 2002) concludes
that the market was robust. Rates did not stray from target or increased in variability, market
volume actually increased, and there was little evidence of greater credit spreads due to heightened
financial uncertainty. The crisis of 1998, however, was minor compared to the financial crisis which
unfolded in 2007. In the 2007-2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, interest rate volatility spiked,
and many banks resorted to using central bank facilities. The market, while not completely frozen,
was stressed (Afonso et al., 2011).
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This paper examines the functioning of the money market in a novel way. Now, there is a
certain vagueness about what it means for a market to ”function well”. The nature of the interbank
market, however, suggests a natural benchmark, namely whether a bank in need of liquidity pays
a premium for liquidity when borrowing. To use an analogy from basic microeconomics, if there
is no price discrimination, all individuals pay the same amount independent of their willingness to
pay. The analogy is imperfect, however, because a loan is not standardized good: prices (interest
rates) should differ across borrowers to reflect their credit risk. When trying to assess whether
banks in need of liquidity pay higher rates, one must therefore control for credit risk.
The total amount of liquidity to be distributed in the interbank market is essentially fixed, at
least in the absence of central bank intervention. A positive liquidity flow for one bank is a negative
flow for another. Liquidity shocks thus affect the liquidity of individual banks, i.e. the distribution
of liquidity, but not the total amount of liquidity available to banks. Hence, in the absence of
frictions, banks faced with liquidity shocks should be able to absorb these by borrowing from those
with surplus liquidity. Competition among the latter should push down interest rates until they
equal the opportunity cost of lending funds. A bank faced with a liquidity shock therefore should
not, controlling for other characteristics, pay a premium.
Our analysis couples transaction-level data on day-to-day interbank loans in the period from
2005 to 2013 with information on Danish banks’ liquidity holdings with the central bank. A key
element in our analysis is that, due to lower and upper bounds on bank liquidity holdings set by
the central bank, we are able to define a meaningful measure of a bank’s need for liquidity. We
call this measure a bank’s liquidity position and analyze whether it affects the rate a bank pays in
the money market. To the extent that a bank’s liquidity position affects rates, it is indicative of
frictions in the money market. These could be related to e.g. imperfect competition or search.
A cursory glance at the data shows that banks with ample liquidity pay lower rates than do
those with less liquidity, see Figure 2.1. At the end of each day, all banks must maintain a positive
liquidity position, equivalent to a positive account balance at the central bank. A negative liquidity
position indicates that a bank strictly needed a loan to satisfy this requirement. A liquidity position
of one corresponds to the maximal amount of liquidity which a bank is permitted to hold at the
end of the day. Most borrowing banks typically have much less liquidity; otherwise they would
not be borrowing. Figure 2.1 shows that a bank with sufficient liquidity, say a liquidity position
greater than 0.4, on average pays 6 to 7 basis points [bps] more than does a bank which requires
liquidity. In comparison, the average daily standard deviation of rates is about 15 bps. However,
the rate differential could be due to other factors that affect the liquidity position. Perhaps banks
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are individually liquidity constrained when aggregate liquidity is scarce, in which case the average
effect overstates the true effect of a bank’s liquidity position on rates. Or perhaps riskier banks
choose to hold more liquidity for precautionary reasons, in which case the averages underestimate
the effect of liquidity imbalances.
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Figure 2.1: Average money market rate less the central bank current account rate, by liquidity position.
The table shows the average interest rate paid by borrowers less the central bank current account rate. Banks are grouped by
their liquidity position at the time of borrowing. A bank’s liquidity position is defined as its pre-loan current account balance
divided by its current account limit, which is a limit on how much liquidity the bank is permitted to hold at the end of the
day. The table is based on observations of money market loans (N = 40,103) during the period 2005 to June 2013. Loans
between the two largest money market participants have been excluded.
Overall, our analysis indicates that the money market functions well. Banks in need of liquidity
pay only marginally higher rates than other banks. On average, a one standard deviation decrease
in a bank’s liquidity position ”costs” less than a single basis point. In some circumstances, though,
the liquidity premium is larger. Many money market loans are agreed upon a day in advance of
the exchange of liquidity, and so banks have time to find counterparties and need not scramble
for liquidity. Since such loans are typically settled early in the day, we look at whether loans for
which liquidity is exchanged later in the day are different. These are more likely to reflect a sudden
liquidity need due to unexpected payments, and the distribution of liquidity matters more for such
loans. The price of liquidity likewise rises when aggregate payment volumes are large. Interbank
markets are also characterized by tiering, with most loans involving at least one top tier bank. We
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find that the liquidity position matters more for rates when a top tier bank is involved in a loan
than when two lower tier banks agree on a loan, though the difference is economically small. A
possible explanation in our setting is that large banks face tighter limits on their liquidity holdings
than small banks relative to their payment volume.
There are notable differences in estimates across subsamples. The liquidity position is insignif-
icant in the pre-crisis period, but significant in the period encompassing the early stages of the
financial crisis and culminating in the default of Lehman Brothers. Following Lehman there is
a period in which all interbank loans were explicitly covered by a government guarantee, essen-
tially removing credit risk, and in that period the liquidity position is again insignificant. It again
becomes significant after the expiration of the government guarantee, suggesting a link between
credit risk and the role of bank liquidity.
We address the role of credit risk and its relationship to bank liquidity in some detail. There
is no clear, discernible link between regulatory measures of credit risk such as the capital ratio
and observed interest rates. One possibility is that banks participating in the money market are
of such quality that credit risk is of secondary importance. Another is that credit risk affects the
interest rate indirectly via the liquidity position as riskier banks choose to hold more liquidity. In
that case, the liquidity position would be a bad control and removing it should alter the estimates
of credit risk variables. We do not find any evidence that this is the case. Finally, capital ratios
and other ratios based on balance-sheet information may fail to measure time variation in credit
risk (we control for time-invariant risk through bank fixed effects).
Endogeneity is a concern if unobserved variation in credit risk affects the liquidity position.
We take multiple approaches to deal with this issue. First, we estimate the model interacting bank
and month fixed effects. This does not substantially alter our estimates. To control for higher-
frequency changes in credit risk, we first apply a differencing strategy. If a bank has a target level
of liquidity, the credit risk component of the liquidity position might be removed by identifying
a proxy for the target (such as the bank’s typical end-of-day liquidity level) and subtracting it
from the actual amount of liquidity the bank holds at the end of the day. Implementation of this
strategy produces estimates that are quantitatively similar to those obtained by simply including
the liquidity position directly. The differenced liquidity position is statistically significant, and the
estimates remain economically small, less than a single basis point. An alternative approach is to
use an instrument which is correlated with the liquidity position, but not credit risk.
Since many bank payment flows are initiated by customers rather than banks themselves,
certain payment flows might have these characteristics, and we find larger parameter estimates
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using an instrumental variables approach. In subsamples such as the crisis period the cost of having
a liquidity position of zero (the required end-of-day position) rather than one (a bank’s upper end-
of-day limit) exceeds 10 basis points. Instrument validity is a concern, however. Moreover, while
this approach yields larger estimates than the other estimates in the paper, it does not alter the
conclusion that the money market functions in a relatively efficient manner. It should still be
low enough to ensure that banks prefer to use the money market rather than e.g. resorting to
borrowing from the central bank against collateral.
Finally, we examine the decision to borrow or lend. Among the key determinants of banks’
decision to borrow and lend are past behavior - today’s decision is strongly affected by yesterday’s
- and access to central bank facilities. When banks can borrow from or lend to the central bank,
the money market is less active. Unlike in the case of the interest rate regressions, credit risk (or
regulatory measures thereof) affect outcomes. As a bank’s capital ratio increases, it is more likely
to borrow and less likely to lend. The effect is amplified if the liquidity position is excluded from
the model, suggesting that safer banks choose to hold less liquidity and then turn to the money
market to absorb liquidity shocks. Riskier banks, in contrast, hold more liquidity and provide
short-term funds to the better-capitalized banks.
Our main contribution is to address the functioning of the money market in a novel way.
Our paper also pertains to the question of whether the distribution of liquidity among agents
affects outcomes (Allen and Gale, 2000; Bindseil et al., 2009). The idea of analyzing the effects
of the distribution of liquidity on interest rates is not unique to our paper. Fecht et al. (2011),
the paper most closely related to ours, address a related issue by looking at data from ECB
refinancing auctions. Their focus is therefore on how the distribution of liquidity affects the
demand, or willingness-to-pay, for liquidity. Our focus is different, since we are examining a
market characterized by competition among lenders. To get a sense of the magnitudes involved,
the average difference between the highest and the lowest rate paid on a given day is about 80
basis points in our data set, and these are overnight loans.1 This compares to a difference of 11.5
bps between the highest and lowest paying banks in the auctions studied by Fecht et al. (2011).
Nevertheless, we find that in spite of the large differences in interest rates paid by different banks
on a given day, only a negligible part of those differences can be attributed to the distribution of
liquidity.
While not the primary object of our analysis, we also touch upon the issue of liquidity hoarding
(Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Ashcraft et al., 2011) and the role of
1This average is based on a longer data sample from 2 January 2003 to 17 January 2014.
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credit risk in the money market (Afonso et al., 2011; Heider et al., 2015; Bruche and Suarez, 2010).
Specifically, our results indicate that riskier banks choose to hold more liquidity, presumably to
avoid having to resort to money market borrowing. We do not directly examine the role of banking
relationships (Cocco et al., 2009; Afonso et al., 2013), but do find that the decision to borrow or lend
is closely related to whether a bank participated in the market the previous day, likely reflecting
rollover behavior.2 Finally, there are a number of network analyses of the money market (e.g.
Bech et al. (2010); Craig and von Peter (2014); Iori et al. (2008)). Our focus is not on network
structure, but from these we take the observation that the money market is tiered and may function
differently depending on which type of bank is involved in a transaction. Another recent strand
of literature attempts to build structural models of the money market (Afonso and Lagos, 2015;
Blasques et al., 2014). Such models might prove useful for e.g. studying the effects of alternative
central bank policies.
The money market is also of interest in its own right due to its role in the sharing of liquidity
among banks. Indeed, the inability to access liquidity from other banks is a potential cause of
bank failures. In addition, the overnight rate (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Hamilton, 1996) and
stress in the money market (von Hagen and Ho, 2007) are viewed as important indicators of the
stance of monetary policy and financial stability. The inability of market participants to access
money market funding could adversely affect asset prices (Pedersen and Brunnermeier, 2009).
Perhaps most importantly, the risk of being rationed could affect banks’ ability or willingness to
extend credit to individuals and corporations (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Puri et al., 2011),
with possible consequences for the real economy. Finally, the money market is an interesting
example of an over-the-counter market characterized by bargaining and search frictions (Ashcraft
and Duffie, 2007).
Our analysis has potential implications for policy. We document that central bank policy and
payment flows affect interest rates and money market participation. On days with large payment
flows, for example, money market rates are more volatile, and banks in need of liquidity pay more
dearly for it. Payment activity, moreover, is affected by policy. The days with greatest payment
activity tend to those where the government concentrates certain types of payment, e.g. taxes
such as VAT. Likewise, bond issues and interest payments are typically made around the end and
beginning of the quarter, and so money market activity is particularly pronounced on such days.
This exposes banks to liquidity risk on those days, and banks may find themselves forced to rely
2In an earlier version of the paper we computed a number of relationship variables and included in our regressions,
but found that these variables had little explanatory power. Indeed, their sign often disagreed among measures and
across sub-samples, and they were rarely statistically significant.
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on e.g. collateralized borrowing in such times, even though collateral may be in scarce supply.
Finally, some words on data. Our study relies on data from the Danish interbank market. A
natural concern is that the results are particular to this market. To mitigate this concern we look
at whether patterns in the money market found in other countries are also evident in our data
set. Bech and Monnet (2013) document a set of stylized money market facts that hold across six
important currencies in the period from 2006-2013, and we observe that these stylized facts are
mostly also observed in the Danish market. Moreover, a simple comparison of the money market
volumes in Denmark and the US (Afonso and Lagos, 2012) shows a similar time series pattern.3
There are, in fact, features of the institutional setup which make the data useful, especially
the fact that banks face strong incentives to use the money market due to the institutional setup.
Over the period from January 2003 to January 2014, the algorithm used to identify loans finds
on average 56 loans per day. This is more than the daily number of loans found in the German
market (Bra¨uning and Fecht, 2012). We also examine a much longer period than other studies of
the money market, which have tended to focus solely on the crisis period. Our analysis, which
covers the period from April 2005 to June 2013, includes the pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis and
even forays into negative interest rate territory. Also of interest is the fact that we can include
sub-period in which interbank loans were guaranteed by the Danish state and a sub-period with
negative interest rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains a description of the data and
the institutional setting. In Section 2.3 we provide an overview of the activity in the money market
during the sample period. Section 2.4 analyzes the determinants of the interest rate. Section 2.5
studies the decision of individual pairs of banks to borrow from and lend to each other, and Section
2.6 considers some event study evidence. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2. Data and Institutional Setting
The interest rate data is derived from a proprietary transaction-level data set consisting of all
payments made by institutions in Kronos, the real-time gross settlement system operated by the
Danish central bank. Information on loans between pairs of banks, i.e. loan sizes, rates, counter-
parties, timing, etc., has been obtained using an algorithm akin to that used by Furfine (1999).
The algorithm seeks to identify interbank loans based on payments data. It searches for payments
from one bank to another which exceed 1 million in amount and are divisible by 100 thousand, and
then pairs these with payments in the opposite direction of the same amount plus a likely interest
3To see this, compare Figure 4 in that paper to our figure 2.4.
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rate. For instance, if the interest rate is 5%, and there is a payment from Bank A to Bank B of
100 million on day t, then the algorithm will identify an interbank loan if there is a payment of
close to 100.0139 (with 0.0139 = 5/360) on date t+1 from Bank B to Bank A.
The interest rate used by the algorithm is obtained as follows: Each day a panel of banks4
report on their activity in the interbank market, including the rates at which they lend overnight
and tomorrow-next. The algorithm first selects the minimum and maximum among the rates
reported.5 It then searches for loans within a band of the minimum reported rate minus 100 bps
and the maximum reported rate plus 100 bps. It makes little difference if a narrower band such
as e.g. +/- 50 bps is used instead, as the majority of loans fall within a narrow rate band. This
method risks both identifying non-loans as loans and failing to identify loans. Arceiro et al. (2014)
perform a detailed analysis of the errors associated with using the Furfine (1999) algorithm based
on data from TARGET2, the real-time gross settlement payment system used by banks in the
Euro Area, and their analysis suggests that the errors involved in the procedure are negligible.6
While we have data on loans from January 2003, the data set we analyze runs from April 2005 to
the end of June 2013 as quarterly balance sheet data for the banks is only available for that period.
In order to have comparable financial information on banks, loans involving foreign counterparties
are excluded. We also remove loans between related parties (e.g. banks and associated mortgage
lenders). We also exclude failed banks. This is partly motivated by our question of interest. In
attempting to determine whether the money market functions, the key issue is whether relatively
healthy banks can obtain loans at reasonable rates, not whether any bank can do so. A more
practical reason is that the failed banks cannot be correctly identified backwards in time.7
In regressions we use as dependent variable the interest on a loan less a reference rate. We
discuss the merits of various candidate reference rates at the beginning of Section 2.4. In subsequent
analyses, the decision to borrow or lend is the dependent variable. We include three types of
controls: (1) bank liquidity variables, (2) bank balance sheet data, and (3) time-series variables.
In tables, we report t-statistics based on robust standard errors. However, we have also performed
the same inferences using cluster-robust errors and arrive at the same conclusions. For example,
in what may be considered the our baseline regression specification (see Table IV, column 1),
4The composition of the panel changes over time. At the time of writing it consists of eight banks, which are
among the most active in the money market.
5More specifically, it looks at the rates reported on the day in question in the case of overnight rates and the
previous business day in the case of the tomorrow-next rates.
6A different perspective is provided by Armantier and Copeland (2012) who, based on US (Fedwire) data, argue
that the errors can be quite large.
7A number of failed banks have been taken over by a government entity that liquidates failed banks. Upon this
takeover, the names of the failed banks have been changed backwards in time in the database from which our data is
drawn. This implies that the failed banks cannot be distinguished from each other; we can only tell that they were
banks which were subsequently taken over.
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using cluster-robust standard errors, clustered at the level of borrower-lender pairs, reduces to the
t-statistic to 3.07 from 3.32.
The liquidity variables are specific to each bank and are observed at a daily frequency. The
most important variable in our analysis is the bank’s liquidity position. Each bank must have a
positive current account balance by the end of the day, and it should not have a balance exceeding
a limit set by the central bank. The positive account balance is a hard limit whereas the upper
limit can in principle be exceeded (as explained more fully in the following section on institutional
details). For the same reason, we emphasize the borrower’s liquidity position more than that of
lenders since a bank in need liquidity faces a more pressing problem than does a bank with too
much liquidity.
The liquidity position is computed as follows: For each loan in the sample we first calculate the
bank’s end-of-day balance minus/plus the loan amount (for the borrower/lender), and then divide
this by the bank’s current account limit. To illustrate with a simple example, consider a borrower
which has borrowed 50 and has an end-of-day current account balance of 70. If the bank’s current
account limit is 100, the liquidity position is then 0.2 (= (70 − 50)/100). This is intended to
convey how the bank’s end-of-day liquidity would have been in the absence of the loan. We make
a slight alteration to this definition when analyzing the decision to borrow or lend. In that case
we subtract a bank’s daily net borrowing from its end-of-day liquidity position.
We also define a broader measure of liquidity, a bank’s net position, which is defined as the
bank’s net claim on the central bank scaled by its current account limit. For example, a bank may
have large holdings of certificates-of-deposits, an asset of the bank and a liability of the central
bank. These are not immediately available as a means of making payment, but will become
current account holdings at the end of a week. In that sense, a large, positive net position is close
to immediately available liquidity. Conversely, a negative net position means that banks are net
borrowers with the central bank. To borrow they must post collateral, and so obtaining extra
liquidity will be costly when the net position is negative.
In order to control for credit risk, or at least examine whether regulatory measures thereof help
explain money market rates and market participation, we use quarterly data for each bank’s tier
1 and tier 2 capital ratios as well as information on the bank’s profits, writedowns, and ratio of
deposits to assets. We assign the past quarter’s values of these variables to the loan counterparties.
One could argue that it is the relative rather than absolute strength of banks that matters in the
money market. A bank with a liquidity surplus may be forced to lend, and will require a higher
rate when lending to banks that are worse relative to others. To capture this idea, we also define
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a relative credit risk measure (RCRM). It is computed by first ranking banks based on their core
capital ratio, result/weighted-assets, writedowns/core capital and deposit-to-asset ratio (that is,
we compute a ranking for each variable) each quarter. We then scale the ranking from 0 to 1 (1
being worst), and finally take a simple average of the scaled rankings.
As controls we include a number of time series variables. One such variable is the aggregate
payment volume, and we include not only the current value, but also that of the past and following
day. The logic is that if there are many payments, there is also more liquidity which needs to be
distributed among banks. Since this distribution may happen with some time lag, we include
the value of the previous day’s payments; and since banks may borrow or lend in anticipation of
tomorrow’s payment activity, it is likewise of relevance. We also control for government payment
flows. The government’s money is held in an account of the central bank, and so a flow to the
government represents a drain of liquidity from the banks. Finally, we include the aggregate
current account balance of all banks at the beginning of the day and the aggregate net position
of the banks. These are again narrow and broad measures of liquidity, only at the aggregate level
rather than at the bank-specific level. All payment variables are quoted in billions unless otherwise
stated.
We also employ as controls log loan size (in billions) and bank size, defined as the log of total
bank assets (in billions). An overview of these descriptive statistics relating to these variables is
provided in Table II.
Finally, we include the CDS premium for the Danish government as a measure of aggregate
credit risk. These are not particularly informative the earliest part of the sample due to stale
CDS-prices.8
2.2.1. Institutional Setting
This section provides some background information on the monetary policy framework and the
payment system as these affect the functioning of the money market.
The Danish central bank is responsible for maintaining a fixed exchange rate against the euro.
In practice, this is done by setting monetary policy interest rates and via interventions in the
foreign exchange rates. The key interest rates are the current-account rate, the (7-day) lending
rate, and the (7-day) certificate-of-deposit rate. In addition, a so-called ”discount rate” akin to
federal funds target rate is published. Before May 2007, the lending and certificate-of-deposit rates
8Subsequent to performing these analysis we also attempted using the time series of CDS premium for Danske
Bank, the largest Danish bank by assets. While there is a longer series of liquid prices for Danske Bank, including
this series does not alter any conclusions. Moreover, the correlation between the two CDS series is about 0.9 so
whether one includes one or the other makes little difference in the period where both are liquid.
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Table II: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics on the interest on loans less a reference rate (references: CA = rate on current account balances, CD
= certificate-of-deposit rate, avg = average daily rate), lender and borrower liquidity variables, bank characteristics such as
financial ratios, and time series variables. The data is from the sample period January 2005 to June 2013. The liquidity
variable, liquidity position (B=borrower/L=lender), is calculated for each loan, and the net position (B=borrower/L=lender)
is calculated daily for each bank. A bank’s liquidity position is defined as its pre-loan current account balance divided by
its current account limit, which is a limit on how much liquidity the bank is permitted to hold at the end of the day. A
bank’s net position is calculated similarly, only with the bank’s net assets with the central bank replacing the current account
balance. The bank characteristics are based on quarterly data. For example, Result/RW-assets refers to the quarterly result
scaled by risk-weighted assets. The write-offs represented changes in a bank’s account of impaired assets. The other data is
based on daily observations. Total payments refer to the total amount of payments in the RTGS-system operated by Danmarks
Nationalbank. Gov’t payments are the net daily payments made from banks to the government. The aggregate current balance
is the sum of all bank’s end-of-day balances with the central bank. The aggregate net position is all banks’ total claims on the
central bank. All data has been obtained from Danmarks Nationalbank.
Mean Median Std. dev. 1st perc. 5th perc. 95th perc. 99th perc.
Loan variables
rloan − rCA [bps] 15 10 28 -45 -15 60 115
rloan − rCD [bps] -4 -5 25 -75 -35 35 70
rloan − ravg [bps] 0 0 17 -53 -25 22 54
Loan size [millions] 297 70 654 1 3 1,500 3,500
Liquidity variables
Liquidity position (B) 0.03 0.01 0.84 -2.31 -1.18 1.23 2.04
Net position (B) 0.88 1.51 14.68 -53.73 -16.68 17 29.02
Liquidity position (L) 0.82 0.52 1.12 0.01 0.02 2.53 5.34
Net position (L) 2.84 4.07 17.55 -97.04 -15.99 19.97 31.02
Bank characteristics
Assets [billions] 10.8 6.7 35.1 0.6 1.1 602 2,307
Tier I capital ratio [percent] 14.5 13.7 8.1 6 7.7 21.8 42.3
Tier II capital ratio [percent] 16.7 15.7 8.1 9.4 10.3 24.1 44.9
Result/RW-assets [percent] 0.3 0.8 4.3 -14.5 -4.2 2.8 8.3
Write-offs/core capital [percent] 2.8 1.0 14.6 -3.2 -0.9 8.5 32.5
Time series variables
Total payments [billions] 130.5 125 42.8 59.4 82.5 195.3 269.3
Gov’t payments [billions] 0.1 0.2 9 -26.1 -12.9 16.6 29.9
Agg. CA balance [billions] 19.6 12 23.1 3.1 4.8 89.4 100
Agg. net position [billions] 88.8 92.6 70.1 -104.9 -29.5 202.9 228.8
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were set on a 14-day basis.
Each day at 3:30 pm banks are required to maintain a positive balance on their current account.
Their balance, however, is subject to a cap. The total amount of current account holdings is capped,
with each bank assigned an individual limit. Exceeding the individual limit does not necessarily
have consequence. The central bank reacts only if the total current account holdings exceed the
cap. In that case current account holdings in excess of the individual limits will be converted
into certificates of deposit. Since banks can have neither too much nor too little liquidity, the
institutional setup gives the banks an incentive to reallocate liquidity from those with a high
supply to those with a demand for liquidity. On Fridays, banks can borrow from the central bank
against a list of eligible collateral or invest funds in certificates of deposit, but within the week they
must source money from other banks (or, to the extent their limit permits it, hold precautionary
reserves). The central bank also maintains an account for the government. On days where there
are large payments to or from the government, banks are typically permitted to either borrow
from the central bank or place funds in certificates of deposits depending on whether liquidity is
drained from or added to the system.
The policy regime facing banks changes during the sample. From the beginning of the sample
period until June 2009 the lending rate and the certificate of deposit rate were the same. In
June 2009, a spread was introduced, strengthening banks’ incentives to reallocate funds among
themselves in the money market instead of using central bank facilities. For most of the sample
period the current account rate is lower than the rate on certificates of deposits. This changed in
July 2012 when negative rates were introduced on certificates of deposits while current account
rates were kept at zero; at the same time the cap on current account holdings was substantially
increased.
Practically all banks maintain their own accounts with the central bank. This contrasts with
the system in some countries (e.g. the UK, see Acharya and Merrouche (2013)) where direct
membership in the payment system is restricted to a small subset of banks. This structure provides
for a richer data set and also lessens concerns that the ultimate beneficiaries of a money market
loan might not be the banks identified by the loan algorithm. In most analyses we exclude the two
largest banks, which lessens concerns about loans made on behalf of others.
The timing pattern of payments in the Danish payment system is noticeably different from
that observed in e.g. the US (Afonso and Lagos, 2012) where most payment activity takes place
at the end of the day. In Denmark, most payments are made in the morning, hours before banks
are required to have a positive account balance. This pattern is perhaps due to intra-day credit
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not bearing interest charge in Denmark, though it must be collateralized. This could make early
payment an equilibrium as long as collateral is not too costly (Bech and Garratt, 2003). Securities
transactions and the previous’ days retail payments are settled during the night and are typically
paid for using intra-day credit obtained from the central bank. Foreign exchange transactions
are settled early in the morning. Some of these payments are known in advance, e.g. securities
transactions which are mostly settled on a T + 2 or T + 3 basis, whereas others, e.g. retail
transactions, cannot be perfectly forecast. The upshot is that banks often experience payment
shocks in the morning. Most money market loans are settled early in the day, some already
when the payment system opens. These can e.g. be overnight loans agreed a day in advance
(”tomorrow/next”) due to predictable payment flows. The data does not permit one to infer when
a loan was agreed.
In the remainder of the paper we report results for subsamples corresponding to different
regimes. We divide the time series into five sub-periods. The first is the pre-crisis period, which
we define to be the period from April 2005 (the beginning of our sample) to July 2007. The
next subsample runs from August 2007 when there were beginning signs of liquidity shortages
to 9 October 2008.9 This end-date is chosen to coincide with the introduction of a government
guarantee on 10 October 2008 which specifically covered money market loans. The government
guarantee expired at the end of September 2010. We therefore refer to the third subsample as
the period of the government guarantee. The fourth subsample runs from October 2010 to 5 July
2012. We refer to this period as the debt crisis period as it coincides with the European sovereign
debt crisis. Finally, on 6 July 2012 the Danish central bank introduced negative interest rates and
the permitted current account holdings of banks also roughly trebled. We refer to this final period
as the negative interest rate regime.
2.3. An Overview of the Money Market
In this section we describe the activity in the Danish money market during the sample period. A
more thorough description of the Danish interbank market before, during, and after the financial
crisis can be found in Abildgren et al. (2015). Here we mainly consider whether the stylized facts
documented in other interbank markets (Bech and Monnet, 2013; Afonso and Lagos, 2012) are
also observed in the Danish market.10 The stylized facts identified by Bech and Monnet (2013)
pertain to the expansion of reserves observed in many countries. Such an expansion also took
9It is not clear how to date the start of the crisis. We rely on the information from ECB’s timeline of the financial
crisis, available at the ECB’s website, which dates the beginning of liquidity shortages in August 2007.
10In this section we use the full data set, i.e before removing transactions with banks for which we do not have
accounting data.
77
place in Denmark, especially following the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, as the central bank
had to print (Danish) currency and purchase foreign currency to maintain a fixed exchange rate.
Bech and Monnet find that as reserves expand, 1) overnight rates tend to the central bank rate,
2) market volume decreases, and 3) the volatility of the overnight volume declines.
We first look at how the average (value-weighted) money market rate compares to central bank
rates over time. Figure 2.2 depicts the central bank rates together with the daily value weighted
average rate from our sample.
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Figure 2.2: Money market versus central bank rates.
This figure shows the evolution of average money market rates (value-weighted) and three central bank rates through the
sample period. The current account rate is the rate at which banks’ current account balances are remunerated. Prior to May
2007 banks could either borrow at the lending rate or place surplus liquidity in certificates-of-deposits for two weeks. After
May 2007 these became weekly operations. The lending and certificate-of-deposit rates were identical until June 2009.
Figure 2.2 shows that the value weighted average interest rate from our sample tracks the
central bank rates. In the early parts of our sample the average rate hovers in the middle of the
corridor between the current-account rate and the lending rate, with occasional spikes outside the
corridor. Most of the spikes above the lending rate occur on Fridays where banks can borrow and
lend from the central bank and money market activity is low. From 2010 and until the introduction
of negative rates on certificates of deposits the value weighted average rate is at the floor of the
corridor and the volatility of the rate decreases, with only few spikes outside the corridor. During
the period of negative rates, the value weighted average rate is below the current account rate,
and we likewise observe many spikes below the certificates of deposit rate.
The daily intraday standard deviation of the rates is shown in Figure 2.3. Volatility peaks
in late 2008 at the height of the financial crisis. Aside from the surge in late 2008, the intraday
standard deviation of the rates have been relatively stable over the sample period. There has
perhaps not be a decline in volatility as observed in other markets, but this likely is certain special
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features of the institutional setup. As in other countries, there was also ample liquidity (central
bank reserves) in Denmark following the crisis and especially towards the end of our sample, but
the requirement that banks cannot have too much liquidity may have contributed to continued
volatility.
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Figure 2.3: Standard deviation of interest rates.
This figure shows the standard deviation of daily interest rates (value-weighted by loan size) during the sample period.
The daily number of loans are given in Figure 2.4. There is a mean of 67 transactions in the
pre-crisis period. For the crisis period (August 2007 - 9 October 2008) the average number of
transactions is slightly higher at 74. After the onset of the government guarantee, we observe a
decline in the daily number of transactions. During the government guarantee period the mean is
57, and during the debt crisis period the figure is 47. The most dramatic decline happens in the
period with negative interest rates when the mean number of daily transactions is 23. This can
be explained by an increase in the cap on current account holdings which decreased the need for
reallocation of liquidity.
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Figure 2.4: The daily number of interbank loans during the sample period.
Looking at the daily number of distinct lenders and borrowers (Figure 2.5) one observes a
declining trend through the sample period. The decline in the number of lenders is even greater.
The market becomes more tight in the sense that there are the ratio of borrowers to lenders
increases. In this sense, the market is least tight during the beginning of 2009 when the number
of unique lenders exceeds the number of borrowers, perhaps because lenders can lend with the
knowledge that their loans are guaranteed by the state.
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Figure 2.5: Unique lenders and borrowers.
The left panel shows the daily number of unique lenders during the sample period and the right panel shows the daily number
of unique borrowers.
Next we look at how many times a bank is lending given that it is lending that particular day.
The mean across the entire sample period is 3.21 times. However, the distribution is skewed, with
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the median between one and two. This finding is similar to what Afonso and Lagos (2012) observe;
they likewise find that a few banks lend many times in the US data. Afonso and Lagos (2012) also
find a decline in the daily total amount of borrowing. This is in line with a decline in the number
of transactions. There is a declining trend in the total amount. However, the trend is less visible
in our data. The drop is in the number of transactions, not as much in the total amount.
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Figure 2.6: Total and average loan amounts.
In the left panel, the daily total amount of overnight loans in our sample and in the right panel the average amount per loan.
Finally, we look at when interbank loans are distributed during the day. Recall, though, that
the timing of the payments may not be the same as to the point in time of when the loan has been
agreed upon. The ”tomorrow/next”-loans are examples of loans which are agreed upon a day in
advance such that the transfer time is notably different from the time the loan was agreed upon.
We see from Figure 2.7 that the majority of the activity happens during the morning. Especially,
most of the loans are repaid at 7.00 AM. This is in contrast to the fed funds market where a
significant part of the activity happens end-of-day (Afonso and Lagos, 2012).
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Figure 2.7: Timing of loan payments.
In the left panel, the distribution over the day of when the loans have been settled. Each bar represents a 5 minutes interval
and the height of the bars is the number of transfers within that 5 minutes period. In the right panel we have the distribution
over the day of when the loans have been repaid.
2.4. Determinants of Interbank Rates
In this section we examine the determinants of the interest rate agreed upon between pairs of
banks. As in other studies (e.g. Afonso et al. (2011); Bra¨uning and Fecht (2012)) the dependent
variable is actually a spread, the rate paid for liquidity less a reference rate. We are interested in
whether money markets funds are expensive relative their alternative use. A lender, for example,
might choose to keep its money at the central bank, or lend to another bank. A common choice
of reference rate is to use the central bank’s policy rate; however, we prefer actual rates since an
actual rate and not a policy rate represents banks’ alternative to exchanging liquidity in the money
market. Our preferred option is to use the rate paid on current account deposits since earning
that rate is an immediate available alternative to not lending funds on all days.
There are other rates which could be relevant alternatives. On Fridays - and other occasions
when the central bank makes this opportunity available - banks can place funds in certificates of
deposit. Another alternative to making a particular money market loan would be to lend surplus
funds to another bank. The average rate on a particular day can therefore also be used as a
reference rate.
Table III shows a comparison of the same baseline regression model with each of the three
reference rates, discussed above, as dependent variable. The baseline model includes the set of
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Table III: Interest rate regressions - different targets
Cross sectional regressions of loan rates minus reference rates on bank liquidity variables, bank characteristics as well as
time-series variables. The columns contain separate regressions for different choices of reference rate, respectively the central
bank current account rate, the certificate-of-deposit rate, and the average rate on money market loans on the particular day.
Excluded from the sample are loans between the two banks involved in the most money market loans. t-statistics, calculated
based on robust standard errors, are in brackets. The dependent variable is quoted in basis points. Details on the computation
and measurement units of the independent variables is provided in section 2.2.
Current account rate Certificate-of-deposit rate Avg. daily rate
Liquidity position (B) -0.70 (3.97) -0.55 (3.32) -0.58 (4.88) -0.43 (3.56) -0.51 (7.71) -0.26 (4.28)
Net position (B) 0.02 (2.77) 0.00 (0.37) 0.02 (2.8) -0.01 (1.03) 0.02 (7.33) 0.02 (4.27)
Size (B) -1.85 (25.00) 1.04 (1.36) -1.83 (28.48) 1.19 (1.35) -2.01 (57.22) 1.35 (3.04)
Basiscap (B) 8.21 (3.94) -11.20 (2.32) 7.54 (3.26) -11.59 (2.39) 11.92 (9.42) -1.58 (0.65)
Liquidity position (L) -0.59 (7.33) -0.47 (5.56) -0.63 (8.06) -0.50 (5.98) -0.42 (9.85) -0.15 (3.60)
Net position (L) -0.02 (2.95) 0.02 (2.46) -0.02 (4.55) 0.01 (1.71) -0.02 (8.02) 0.00 (1.78)
Size (L) -0.06 (1.13) 1.46 (2.09) -0.05 (-0.88) 1.68 (1.96) 0.23 (7.99) 0.10 (0.22)
Basiscap (L) -23.95 (9.10) 11.14 (2.55) -22.86 (8.28) 12.2 (2.51) -34.19 (22.62) 5.56 (2.27)
Loan size -0.86 (7.43) -0.14 (1.14) -0.87 (8.22) -0.16 (1.35) -0.39 (6.76) 0.21 (3.64)
Agg. CA balance -0.45 (14.78) -0.44 (15.33) -0.39 (17.64) -0.38 (18.10) 0.03 (2.74) 0.02 (2.13)
Agg. net position -0.18 (17.01) -0.17 (16.48) -0.12 (14.54) -0.11 (13.89) -0.01 (2.00) 0.00 (0.55)
Friday 10.93 (38.84) 10.67 (38.46) 10.81 (39.65) 10.54 (39.55) 0.31 (2.08) 0.46 (3.44)
Gov’t payment flow 0.08 (4.48) 0.09 (4.86) 0.12 (10.24) 0.13 (11.05) -0.02 (3.64) -0.02 (3.44)
Total payments (t) 0.04 (13.82) 0.04 (13.19) 0.04 (15.5) 0.04 (14.92) 0.01 (7.00) 0.01 (6.93)
Total payments (t-1) 0.02 (9.31) 0.02 (9.05) 0.02 (8.88) 0.02 (8.67) 0.00 (0.97) 0.00 (0.75)
Total payments (t+1) -0.01 (2.44) -0.01 (3.25) 0.00 (1.36) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (5.53) 0.01 (4.19)
CDS (gov’t) 0.05 (1.93) 0.06 (2.06) -0.13 (7.35) -0.12 (7.36) -0.04 (3.93) -0.04 (4.36)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.46 0.50 0.19 0.25 0.20 0.37
N 40103
controls discussed in Section 2.2. The results are qualitatively similar across choices of dependent
variable. The variable of main interest, the borrower liquidity position, has the same sign and is
statistically significant in each case. It appears that we are better able, in terms of R2, to explain
the variation in the dependent variable when we use the current account rather than the certificate
of deposit rate. It would not be fair to make a similar comparison with the case of the average
market rate since we discard much of the information available in the time series variables when
subtracting an average.
Another finding is that controlling for borrower and lender fixed effects mainly affects the
results for bank-specific variables such as the capital ratio and bank size. As an example, the
parameter estimate for the capital ratio decreases when fixed effects are included, meaning that
with fixed effects there is more evidence that better capitalized banks pay lower rates, though the
result in insignificant here. A possible explanation is that unobserved factors related to a bank’s
quality simultaneously permits it to hold less equity and borrow at lower rates.
Our primary interest is in the liquidity position variables, especially the borrower liquidity
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position. While the liquidity positions are statistically significant, the parameter estimates are
small from an economic perspective. Using our preferred reference rate, the parameter estimate is
-0.55. This implies that covering a one standard deviation decrease in the liquidity position would
cost only an additional 0.46 basis points. Such a figure suggests that the money market functions
well in general. With the cost of finding liquidity being low, banks have an incentive to keep their
current account balances low and use money market transactions to absorb liquidity shocks.
The signs of the other regression coefficients are largely as expected. Borrowers with less
liquidity pay higher rates. Larger banks pay substantially lower rates when fixed effects are not
included, but the effect vanishes once included. Curiously, banks with more equity (tier 2 capital)
appear to be paying higher rates when fixed effects are accounted for.
The time series variables likewise behave in accordance with expectations. When aggregate
liquidity is ample, whether in the form of immediately available liquidity (current account balances)
or other assets with the central bank (net position), money market rates are lower. Rates are higher
when liquidity is drained from the system due to the government receiving money from banks. On
Fridays, or other days where lenders can place their money with a central bank for a week at
a higher rate, they also receive a rate that is about 11 basis points higher. In comparison, the
certificate of deposit rate has on average been about 15 basis points above the current account rate
in the sample period. As expected, rates are also higher when current or past payment activity
is large, though the opposite is true in the case of tomorrow’s payment activity. If the time fixed
effects are excluded, the regression coefficients barely change, but the overall fit declines somewhat.
For example, without time fixed effects the R2 in the third column of Table III would drop to 0.35
from 0.50, but the estimate of the liquidity position would be virtually unchanged, decreasing
slightly from -0.55 to -0.58.
In the above we have excluded the two largest banks. Network analyses in the money market
emphasize the presence of different tiers of banks, and the Danish market is no exception. Two
banks in particular play a vital role in the distribution of liquidity. Of the 75,722 loans we analyze,
only 25,738 involve neither one of the banks (either directly or as correspondent for some other
financial institution). We generally exclude these banks from regressions, one reason being that
these banks function as correspondents for other banks which means that many of the loans we
observe between these banks really involve other banks for which we do not have data. In Table
IV, we show results with these banks included.
Table IV shows how the parameter estimates vary for different subsets of banks. One might
expect that the largest banks, due to greater diversification and better ability to forecast liquidity
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Table IV: Interest rate regressions - tiering
Cross sectional regressions of loan rates minus reference rates on bank liquidity variables and characteristics as well as time-
series variables. The columns represent separate regressions depending on the subsample: (1) includes all loans except loans
between the largest two banks, (2) includes only loans to which neither of the largest two banks is a counterparty, (3) includes
loans where one the two largest banks is a borrower, and (4) includes loans where one of the two largest banks is a lender.
t-statistics are in brackets, and are calculated using robust standard errors. The dependent variable is quoted in basis points.
For details on the computation and measurement units of the independent variables, see section 2.2. Bank and month fixed
effects are included in the regressions.
Reference rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Liquidity position (B) -0.55 (3.32) -0.47 (2.86) -2.10 (3.30) 0.37 (0.66)
Net position (B) -0.00 (0.37) 0.00 (0.64) -0.02 (0.27) -0.05 (1.33)
Size (B) 1.04 (1.37) 2.59 (2.73) -3.67 (0.76) 0.28 (0.17)
Basiscap (B) -11.20 (2.33) -6.64 (0.97) 35.59 (1.35) -11.83 (1.64)
Liquidity position (L) -0.47 (5.57) -0.57 (6.02) -0.31 (1.13) 3.01 (6.99)
Net position (L) 0.02 (2.46) 0.01 (2.17) 0.04 (1.25) 0.01 (0.19)
Size (L) 1.46 (2.09) 2.83 (3.59) 4.91 (2.33) 0.45 (0.15)
Basiscap (L) 11.14 (2.55) 7.68 (1.27) 1.53 (0.16) 15.92 (0.98)
Loan size -0.14 (1.15) 0.16 (0.97) -1.15 (3.45) 0.16 (0.49)
Agg. CA balance -0.44 (15.37) -0.33 (8.93) -0.92 (8.74) -0.63 (11.65)
Agg. net position -0.17 (16.53) -0.18 (14.57) -0.19 (5.79) -0.14 (6.66)
Friday 10.67 (38.55) 11.37 (34.69) 11.37 (12.96) 7.39 (12.28)
Gov’t payment flow 0.09 (4.87) 0.09 (4.30) -0.16 (3.15) 0.23 (6.28)
Total payments (t) 0.04 (13.22) 0.04 (10.26) 0.07 (7.76) 0.04 (6.01)
Total payments (t-1) 0.02 (9.07) 0.02 (7.56) 0.01 (1.63) 0.02 (5.53)
Total payments (t+1) -0.01 (3.26) -0.00 (1.15) -0.07 (6.47) -0.01 (1.23)
CDS (gov’t) 0.06 (2.07) 0.06 (1.97) 0.12 (1.87) -0.04 (0.55)
R2 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.53
N 40103 25738 4395 9970
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flows, are less affected by liquidity shocks. In that case the liquidity position should matter more
when small banks are involved. Yet, if one excludes all loans between the two largest banks (column
1), the parameter estimate for the borrower liquidity position drops. It falls even further when the
sample is restricted to loans between smaller banks (column 2).
Another possibility is that results are asymmetric, i.e. that large banks pay low rates as
borrowers, but charge high rates as lenders. Large banks may be able to extract rents due to an
informational advantage. Perhaps they are better at forecasting liquidity flows than smaller banks
and can therefore infer the liquidity positions of other banks and charge accordingly. The results
suggest otherwise, however. The large banks pay more when in need of liquidity (column 3).
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that large banks actually face tighter liquidity
constraints than small banks. While their limits on their current account holdings exceed those of
small banks, the limits are substantially smaller when measured against magnitude of payments
handled by the large banks.11 When the large banks are lenders, a different picture emerges. The
liquidity position of borrowers no longer matters, suggesting that the large banks are not exploiting
superior knowledge about the liquidity position of other banks. However, when the large banks
themselves have ample liquidity, they charge higher, not lower rates. This could be because they
account for such a large share of the market that they know that if they have ample liquidity,
potential counterparties must be in the opposite position.
There are further issues involved in estimating the consequences of banks having a particular
liquidity position. One concern is that some loans are agreed upon a day in advance (so-called
”tomorrow/next”-loans), while others are agreed upon on the day of the loan. We are unable to
identify which are which, but there is a market convention that tomorrow/next loans should be
settled before noon. We therefore introduce a variable which indicates whether a loan has been
settled after noon. Our expectation is that the liquidity position matters more for such loans. It
also seems likely that the liquidity position matters more on days with large payment flows where
there is more liquidity to be exchanged and therefore e.g. greater search costs involved. Likewise,
if aggregate liquidity is scarce - the aggregate current account balance or the aggregate net position
is low - the liquidity position may matter more.
These predictions are borne out by the data. If we repeat the regressions from earlier, but
include interaction terms between the borrower’s liquidity position and these variables, the results
are significant. The parameters of interest are reported in Table V.
To put the estimates in perspective, one must consider the amount of variation in the variables
11This has been suggested to us by a former liquidity manager at a large bank.
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Table V: Liquidity position - interactions
This table provides regression estimates of the borrower’s liquidity position and interactions of other variables with the liquidity
position. The set of other controls (not shown) is the same as in the regressions reported in Table III, i.e. controls related to
borrower and lender characteristics, payment and time series variables, and time and bank fixed effects. Excluded from the
sample are loans between the two banks involved in the most money market loans. t-statistics based on robust standard errors
are in parentheses. The sample size is N = 40,103.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Liquidity position (B) -0.55 (3.32) -0.40 (2.26) 0.35 (0.81) -1.27 (5.36) -1.47 (3.83) -1.33 (3.38) -0.55 (0.99)
. * post-noon (1/0) -0.59 (2.12) -0.44 (1.72)
. * total payments (t) [100 bn] -0.69 (2.03) -0.62 (1.83)
. * agg. CA balances [10 bn] 0.51 (4.32) 0.28 (2.18)
. * agg. Net Position [10 bn] 0.11 (3.39) 0.10 (2.66)
. * Tier 2 capital [%] 0.06 (2.44) -0.03 (2.80)
with which the liquidity position is being interacted. For instance, in the sample period the
aggregate net position changes from less than -100 bn to more than 200 bn, implying a variation
in the borrower liquidity position estimate of about 3 basis points throughout the sample period.
We also observe that the liquidity effect is stronger for loans settled later in the day, indicating,
presumably, more urgency on the part of borrowers. Moreover, when aggregate liquidity is greater,
whether in the form of immediate liquidity (current account balances) or other central bank assets
(the net position), the liquidity effect is weaker. These findings highlight that liquidity premia are
higher when liquidity is needed the most. Nevertheless, the economic magnitudes remain small.
It does not seem too costly, though, as the cost will rarely exceed a few basis points.
2.4.1. Credit Risk and Liquidity
In the preceding section only a single variable directly related to credit risk, the tier 2 capital
ratio, was included as an explanatory variable. In this section we examine the role of credit risk in
more detail. Initially, we consider the inclusion of other credit risk measures. The upshot of that
analysis is that there is no strong evidence of a clear, direct relationship between money market
rates and credit risk measures based on bank balance sheet information.
One possibility is that credit risk simply does not affect money market rates. Perhaps banks
choose which banks they are willing to lend to but, once a bank is considered safe enough to be
a counterparty, there is no further price adjustment. Another possibility is that credit risk does
matter, albeit in a way not captured by our regression. There might be an indirect relationship if
riskier banks choose to hold more liquidity than less risky banks. Or maybe our measures of credit
risk, imperfect as they are, fail to measure credit risk.
To motivate these concerns further, suppose that the interest rate on money market loans is
determined by the following stylized model with both direct and indirect effects of credit risk, the
indirect effect being via the liquidity position:
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ri,t = rf + αi + β1 × Liquidityi,t + β2 ×Riski,t + i,t
Liquidityi,t = Liquidity
EOD
i,t −Borrowingi,t
LiquidityEODi,t = Liquidity
EOD
i,t−1 +Borrowingi,t + Liquidity
Shock
i,t
Borrowingi,t = ρ× (Targeti,t − LiquidityEODi,t−1 − LiquidityShocki,t )
Targeti,t = θ0 + θ1 ∗Riski,t
The stylized model says that the interest rate paid by a bank on a given day is determined
by bank-specific factors, the bank’s liquidity position, and bank credit risk. The second and third
equations are identities. The first links a bank’s liquidity position to its end-of-day-liquidity and the
net borrowing undertaken by the bank. The second links the end-of-day position to the previous
day’s end-of-day position and liquidity flows. The two final equations are behavioral equations,
the first expressing the amount of borrowing as a function of deviations between actual and target
liquidity, the second saying that riskier banks prefer to hold more liquidity.
In the case of ρ = 1, implying that banks fully offset liquidity shocks by borrowing, the
expression for the liquidity position is Liquidityi,t = Targeti,t− θ1×∆Riski,t +LiquidityShocki,t . If
ρ < 1, the expression still includes the current liquidity shock, but also a geometrically weighted
sum of past liquidity targets and shocks.
The above points to some of the econometric difficulties when regressing loan rates - and
suggests solutions. If we have a variable that actually measures credit risk, we will be estimating
β1, the liquidity position coefficient, correctly. We will, however, be overestimating the effect of
credit risk on loan rates. When ρ = 1, for instance, the actual credit risk effect is β2 + β1 ∗ θ1, and
we expect a negative value of β1. In other words, if we are interested in credit risk, the liquidity
position is a bad control, and we would do better by excluding it from our regressions.
A different econometric issue appears if our problem is a failure to measure the credit risk of
banks. In that case, credit risk is part of the error term and correlated with the liquidity position.
We are thus faced with an endogeneity issue, suggesting that we search a valid instrument for the
liquidity position. To be sure, the above model is intended only to illustrate potential econometric
difficulties, and there is no suggestion of it being a an accurate representation of how rates are
set. Indeed, minor variations to the model could change the interpretation of the results: If the
interest rate were to depend directly on the liquidity shock, say, and one estimated the model using
liquidity position and credit risk as covariates, β1 would still be properly estimates, but the credit
risk effect would be underestimated.
We first address the issue of bad controls. Table VI reports the regression results for the full
sample and each of the five subsamples, we examine. It includes estimates of the liquidity position
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Table VI: Credit risk and the liquidity position
This table shows regression estimates of the liquidity position as well as credit risk measures based on balance sheet data.
Estimates are reported for five subsamples. They relate to the borrower in a transaction, not the lender. The set of other
controls includes the same payment and time series variables as in Table III. Time and bank fixed effects are also included. In
the base specification the only credit risk variable included is the tier 2 capital ratio; the set of full controls include the tier 2
capital ratio, write-offs, the deposit-to-assets-ratio and the relative credit risk measure (RCRM). t-statistics based on robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Liq. controls Pre-crisis Crisis Gov’t guarantee Debt crisis Neg. interest rates
Liquidity Position (base spec.) - -0.06 (0.21) -2.30 (5.04) -0.31 (1.43) -0.30 (1.98) -0.41 (0.53)
Liquidity Position (full controls) - -0.07 (0.24) -2.27 (4.90) -0.30 (1.40) -0.30 (2.00) -0.41 (0.52)
Tier 1 capital ratio Yes 28.28 (2.18) -24.39 (1.25) 23.92 (1.49) -29.21 (4.41) 2.18 (0.41)
No 28.09 (2.16) -24.03 (1.23) 27.09 (1.69) -28.19 (4.29) -3.52 (0.15)
Tier 2 capital ratio Yes 36.12 (3.32) -13.26 (0.89) 3.06 (0.22) -30.50 (4.77) 23.93 (1.10)
No 35.67 (3.27) -11.95 (0.81) 5.37 (0.38) -30.78 (4.82) 12.21 (0.59)
Write-offs Yes -30.82 (1.53) -22.66 (0.52) -5.25 (1.96) -7.33 (1.93) 6.31 (0.40)
No -31.96 (1.53) -16.83 (0.39) -5.19 (1.93) -7.22 (1.90) 20.31 (1.31)
Result Yes -7.48 (0.31) 184.53 (3.19) 34.40 (1.49) 14.57 (0.61) 48.30 (1.33)
No -7.07 (0.29) 181.95 (3.16) 37.03 (1.62) 18.71 (0.79) 5.46 (0.16)
RCRM Yes -2.51 (1.13) -9.38 (2.06) -2.12 (0.82) 0.58 (0.49) 0.41 (0.12)
No -2.64 (1.19) -9.40 (2.06) -2.56 (1.00) 0.21 (0.18) 2.74 (0.81)
N 11,800 6,408 11,534 8,299 2,062
with just the tier 2 capital ratio as a control and with a broader set of credit risk controls and
parameter estimates for each of the credit risk controls with and without the liquidity controls.
The liquidity position estimates (here we focus on the borrower) are of the expected sign,
though only statistically significant in the period encompassing the crisis and the period during
which the European debt crisis took place. It does not matter pre-crisis, in the period of government
guarantees, or in the negative interest rate regime when liquidity was generally ample. Moreover,
the estimates do not depend on whether more credit risk controls are included. There is no
evidence of a problem of bad controls. The parameter estimates for the credit controls likewise do
not depend on whether liquidity controls are included.
Table VI shows that the parameter estimates for the credit risk are sometimes insignificant,
inconsistent over time, and in some cases of unexpected sign. For instance, the results indicate
that banks with more write-offs and worse results pay lower rates. Moreover, even the variables
are statistically significant, their economic significance is limited. As an example, consider the
core capital ratio in the fourth subperiod from October 2010 to early July 2012 where we find
a parameter estimate of -29.21. In economic terms, this means that a bank should experience
a decrease in money market rates of 0.3 basis points for a percentage point increase in the core
capital ratio.
If we are faced with an endogeneity problem rather than a problem of bad controls, more
possible solutions present themselves. One solution might be to control for credit risk at a higher
frequency, not by using specific measures of credit risk, but by taking interactions of time (month)
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Table VII: Liquidity position estimates with interactions of fixed effects
This table shows regression estimate of the borrower’s liquidity position when controls, bank fixed effects, time effects and
interactions of bank and time fixed effects are included in the regression. Estimates are reported for the full sample as well as
five subsamples. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Gov’t guarantee Debt crisis Neg. interest rates
Liquidity Position -0.37 (3.01) -0.06 (0.27) -1.29 (3.52) -0.13 (0.39) -0.55 (3.38) 0.41 (0.47)
N 40,103 11,800 6,408 11,534 8,299 2,062
and bank fixed effects. This should be sufficient to the extent that we are not concerned by
even higher frequency variation in unobserved credit risk. This is a real concern, however, and
we attempt to address it in two ways. The first is to identify a direct measure of the liquidity
shock and include that rather than the liquidity position, while the second is to identify a suitable
instrument (or instruments) for the liquidity position.
Table VII shows the estimates of the liquidity position effect when interactions of time and
bank fixed effects are included. We observe the same pattern across subsamples as in Table VI;
however, the estimated magnitudes are even smaller, indicating that banks in need of liquidity do
not pay substantial liquidity premia.
In order to identify a liquidity shock measure, a natural choice seems to be to subtract the target
liquidity position of the bank from its liquidity position since that can be thought of as a shortfall
relative to target. A bank’s target liquidity is not observable, however. As a proxy for the bank’s
target we use the bank’s actual end-of-day-liquidity on the previous day (and examine averages
using more days as well). Incidentally, the difference between the liquidity position and the end-
of-day position of the previous day equals the liquidity shock in the stylized model discussed at the
beginning of the section, though it presumably would not in a more realistic model of the money
market. In the stylized model, for instance, the liquidity shock is identical to the net payment
activity, much of which certainly is predictable and therefore cannot be thought of as a shock, and
banks might obtain longer-term (e.g. central bank) loans to offset predictable outflows. The same
sort of behavior might lead the actual liquidity position to deviate from the target in a systematic
fashion.
Using this differencing approach does not result in markedly different estimates. If we use the
past day’s end-of-day liquidity as a measure of target liquidity, the resulting parameter estimates
for the borrower liquidity position and the lender liquidity position are -0.31 (t = 2.47), close to the
estimate found when including fixed effect interactions, and -0.17 (t = 2.43) respectively. These
estimates are based on the same specification as in Table IV, column 1. The estimates are less
negative than the estimates based on the liquidity position.
If we use the average of the past five days as a measure of the target instead, the estimates are
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Table VIII: Liquidity and interest rates The table shows the interest rate differential between the loan rate and the central
bank current account rate as a function of borrowers’ and lenders’ liquidity position. Results are reported for the full sample,
September 2008, and the period with negative interest rates respectively. The figures are based on all loans except those
between the two most active money market participants.
Full sample September 2008 Neg. interest rates
Rate paid - CA rate (BP) Lender: Liq. pos. > 1 Lender: Liq. pos. < 1 Lender: Liq. pos. > 1 Lender: Liq. pos. < 1 Lender: Liq. pos. > 1 Lender: Liq. pos. < 1
Borrower: Liq. pos. > 0 12.2 20.7 39.4 43.4 -11.5 2.1
Borrower: Liq. pos. < 0 16.9 23.5 37.4 40.0 -6.5 5.1
close to the earlier estimates. Using the liquidity shock, we obtain an estimate of -0.57 (t = 3.73) for
the borrower compared to -0.55 when using the liquidity position. For the lender, the corresponding
estimates are -0.44 (t = 5.26) versus -0.47. Extending the averages based on which the liquidity
shocks are calculated to e.g. 10 or 20 days does not materially change the figures.
A second solution to the endogeneity problem is to use an instrument for the liquidity position.
A possibility is that our credit risk proxies, based on accounting data as they are, simply are
not good measures of credit risk. To provide some further motivation we note that there is some
simple, but suggestive evidence in the data of a link between credit risk and banks’ liquidity
holdings. Specifically, there are indications that riskier banks do choose to hold more liquidity at
the peak of the crisis. This can be seen by comparing the rates paid by banks as a function of
their liquidity position. In general, we would expect that banks with more liquidity to pay lower
rates when they borrow and to require lower rates when they lend.
A means of illustrating this is to compare the rates paid with borrowers for which the liquidity
position variable is either positive or negative and for lenders for which it is either larger or smaller
than one. For a borrower, a negative value of the variable means that the borrower would have
had a negative end-of-day current account balance if the borrower had not obtained the loan. For
a lender, a value of the variable above one indicates that the lender would have exceeded its limit if
it had not. In table VIII we divide the loans into four categories based on borrowers’ and lenders’
liquidity position and compare the interest rates agreed upon by borrowers and loans.
In the full sample the pattern is as expected: Borrowers and lenders with ample liquidity pay
and receive lower rates. That pattern is not reproduced in the September 2008. While all rates are
higher than in the full sample, the more interesting fact is that borrowers who are in less need of
liquidity actually face the highest rates. This pattern is consistent with liquidity hoarding, since
the worst banks may also be those who for precautionary reasons choose to hold the most liquidity.
Interestingly, all banks except the very smallest do borrow occasionally, even at the peak of
the crisis. In the data set on which we perform our regressions, the average number of distinct
borrowers per month in the period from April 2005 to December 2007 is 27.2. In July, August,
and September of 2008 there are 30, 27, and 28 distinct borrowers respectively.
While this pattern is curious, it is not entirely unique to September 2008. In the pre-crisis
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period, when the liquidity position of banks appeared to matter little, it is common to find no
discernible relation between borrowers’ need of liquidity and the rates they pay. In the period
after the expiration of the government guarantee (that ran from October 2008 to October 2010),
however, such a pattern is rarely observed. On average, borrowers with a negative liquidity position
pay 4.3 bps more than those with a positive liquidity position in that period. In only 3 out of 33
months do we observe the opposite sign. This occurs in December 2010 (-1.6 bps), December 2012
(-0.1 bps), and June 2012 (-0.3 bps). This compares to a difference -3.0 bps in September 2008.
Since it might be of interest, we also include results for the period of negative interest. The
qualitative pattern is the same as in the sample as a whole, but we also observe that lenders are
willing to accept lower rates than they would earn by simply keeping money in their account. This
could be because they fear exceeding their current account limit and having their current account
holdings converted to certificates-of-deposits which earn even lower rates.
When looking for instruments we are hoping to find variables which themselves are irrelevant
to the determination of money market rates when other factors have been controlled for, which
are correlated with the liquidity position of banks and uncorrelated with credit risk. Certain
payment flows seem promising candidates. For example, daily variation in retail payments (such
as consumers’ card payments at retail stores) is outside the control of the bank and presumably
unrelated to bank credit risk, at least as long as that consumers do not withdraw funds in a bank
run.12 Unfortunately, retail payments constitute a negligible part of total payments and turns out
to be a weak instrument. The F-statistic from the first-stage regression of the borrower liquidity
position on the instrument is 4.0, while a rule-of-thumb suggests that a value in excess of 10 is
required. The resulting estimate of borrower liquidity position coefficient is about -8.7, but the
figure is not remotely significant (t = 0.08).
An alternative is to use a broader set of payments such as payments resulting from securities
trading. We therefore attempt to use total net payments (excluding interbank payments) as an
instrument. Total net payments is certainly more strongly correlated with the liquidity position
than net retail payments, but its validity as an instrument, however, is also more questionable. For
example, banks both handle securities transaction on behalf of customers and for themselves. One
could imagine a liquidity constrained bank selling securities to raise cash, creating a link between
credit risk and the instrument.
To mitigate concerns about instrument validity, we have collected data on daily total net
12In fairness, there could be sources of correlation between consumer payment behavior and bank risk. As an
example, a regional bank might be located in a region in a decline, which might be associated with both risk to the
bank and particular payment patterns. However, one might correct for trends in net retail payments, if any.
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Table IX: Failed banks and money flows
For 11 banks which failed in the period 2007-2013, the table reports average standardized liquidity flows and the fraction of
days with negative standardized flows in the calendar month preceding the failure of each bank. The standardized liquidity
flows are calculated for each bank and day in the month by taking a bank’s daily net payment, subtracting the average daily
net payment of the bank over the period 2005-failure, and then dividing by the average absolute value of the daily net payment
of the bank over the period 2005-failure.
Bank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total
Avg. liquidity flow -0.96 -0.09 0.31 0.19 0.39 0.41 0.84 -0.06 0.13 -0.89 0.07 0.01
Outflow days (fraction) 0.67 0.72 0.56 0.37 0.29 0.25 0.50 0.48 0.36 0.59 0.65 0.50
payments for 11 failed banks for the calendar month preceding the bank failure. We calculate
the daily total net payments for each bank and day in the month, subtract the average daily
net payment (over the period 2005 until the end of the bank’s life) and then scale by the average
absolute value (over the same period). This produces a standardized score and helps us understand
whether these banks, which were arguably in difficulties, experience unusual payment flows such as
outflows due to customers taking their business elsewhere. No such pattern is observed; the scores
seem quite random, see Table IX. Only on half of all days, 104 of 210, do these banks experience
larger than average outflows.
Unlike retail payments, total net payments turn out to be a strong instrument for borrowers’
and lenders’ liquidity positions. In Table X, we include the output of the first-stage regressions
since they are informative not only about the strength of our instruments, but also show how other
covariates relate to the liquidity position. As an example, we observe a link between the capital
ratio and the liquidity position, especially of lenders. It appears that banks with more capital are
willing to lend from a position of holding less liquidity than banks with less capital. We examine
this further in the next section.
The estimates of main interest are those of the liquidity positions. The estimate for the borrower
liquidity position is -6.00, implying that a borrower with a liquidity position of 1 would pay fully 6
basis points less than a borrower with a liquidity position of 0. Another way of putting the figures
in perspective is to note that a one standard deviation decrease in the liquidity position ”costs”
about 5 bp for a borrower who wants to cover the shortfall in the money market. The estimate is
much larger than the corresponding OLS-estimate. Likewise, the estimate of the lender liquidity
position, at -1.73, is greater than the OLS-estimate. It is in line with expectations that the effect
is greater for borrowers than for lenders since those in need of liquidity face a hard limit while
those with surplus liquidity face a soft limit.
Still, while these figures suggest that finding liquidity is a less than frictionless process, they
seem low enough for the money market to function well. A money market loan will still be an
attractive source of funding relative to alternatives such as e.g. borrowing from the central bank
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Table X: 2SLS-estimates
This table shows the results from a two-stage least squares estimation where the borrower’s and lender’s net payment flows on
the day of the loan are used as instruments for the liquidity positions. Both first- and second-stage result are reported. The
dependent variable in the second-stage regression is quoted in basis points. For details on the computation and measurement
units of the independent variables, see section 2.2. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
1st stage: Liquidity position (B) 1st stage: Liquidity position (L) 2nd stage: interest rate
Liquidity position (B) - fitted . (.) . (.) -6.00 (2.65)
Liquidity position (L) - fitted . (.) . (.) -1.73 (5.39)
Net position (B) [10 bn] 0.02 (4.09) 0.01 (2.70) 0.1 (1.11)
Size (B) 0.27 (6.55) -0.06 (1.33) 2.39 (2.44)
Tier 1 capital (B) -0.42 (-2.34) -0.22 (0.93) -12.71 (2.52)
Net position (L) [10 bn] 0.00 (1.04) 0.03 (4.67) 0.2 (3.24)
Size (L) -0.16 (5.17) 0.68 (14.60) 1.66 (2.05)
Tier 2 capital (L) -0.31 (1.88) -1.73 (6.74) 10.66 (2.34)
Loan size -0.38 (69.13) 0.37 (53.42) -1.70 (1.99)
Friday 0.04 (3.12) -0.02 (1.08) 10.87 (35.69)
Total payments (t) [100 bn] -0.01 (1.15) 0.07 (4.07) 3.6 (12.03)
Total payments (t-1) [100 bn] 0.00 (0.33) 0.00 (0.21) 1.84 (9.11)
Total payments (t+1) [100 bn] 0.02 (1.73) 0.08 (5.57) -1.09 (2.98)
Gov’t payment flow [100 bn] 0.11 (2.83) 0.3 (4.19) 9.70 (5.42)
Agg. CA balance [100 bn] 0.62 (11.59) 2.04 (22.92) -21.01 (7.44)
Agg. net position [100 bn] -0.04 (1.49) 0.17 (3.89) -18.19 (17.52)
CDS (gov’t) -0.00 (2.06) 0.01 (18.77) -0.08 (4.28)
Net payments (B, t) [10 bn] 0.25 (10.29) 0.02 (0.71) ()
Net payments (L, t) [10 bn] -0.04 (2.51) 1.51 (18.31) ()
R2 0.34 0.44 0.44
1st stage F-statistic 58.3 168.1
N 40103
against collateral. In the sample period (2005 to mid-2013) the rate at which banks could borrow
from the central bank was on average 33 bp greater than the current account rate. In comparison,
the average rate paid on money market loans, which do not require the posting of collateral, was
15 bp greater than the current account rate (see Table II).
Finally, we examine estimates across subsamples. As was this case with the OLS-estimates,
the IV-estimation produces results that vary considerably. The estimates are given in Table XI.
As before, the borrower liquidity position is significant in the crisis-period and in the period
encompassing the European debt crisis, and now also in the period of negative interest rates.
The instrumental variables estimates are generally greater in magnitude than the corresponding
OLS-estimates, and especially the estimates found in the financial and debt crises are large from an
economic perspective. The figure for the negative interest rate period is not entirely comparable,
because banks’ current account limits were greatly increased during that period. In terms of actual
liquidity, therefore, a change in the liquidity position during that period corresponds to a much
greater change in liquidity.
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Table XI: 2SLS vs. OLS estimates - subsamples
The table compares parameter estimates of the borrower liquidity position across subsamples when estimated using OLS and
2SLS. The pre-crisis period is dated from January 2005 to June 2007, the crisis period from August 2007- 9 October 2008, the
period of government guarantees from 10 October 2008 to September 2010, the period encompassing the European sovereign
debt crisis from October 2010 to 5 July 2012, and finally the period of negative interest is dated from 6 July 2012 to the
end of the sample in June 2013. The OLS-estimates are based on the same model specification as in Table IV, column 1.
The 2SLS-estimates are based on the same specification as in Table X. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
Pre-crisis Crisis Gov’t guarantee Debt crisis Neg. interest rates
IV-estimates
Liquidity position (B) 1.91 (0.70) -14.11 (3.82) 1.02 (0.17) -11.36 (3.99) -14.27 (4.20)
Liquidity position (L) -0.52 (0.55) -3.83 (2.31) -2.55 (3.42) -0.22 (0.57) 0.39 (0.34)
OLS-estimates
Liquidity position (B) -0.06 (0.21) -2.30 (5.04) -0.31 (1.43) -0.30 (1.98) -0.41 (0.53)
Liquidity position (L) -0.39 (2.41) -1.25 (4.21) -0.26 (1.65) -0.05 (0.66) 0.96 (1.91)
N 11,800 6,408 11,534 8,299 2,062
2.5. The Decision to Borrow or Lend
In our analysis of the interest rate, we did not find evidence that credit risk, or at least regulatory
measures thereof, directly affect rates for banks that are able to borrow, nor that there was an
indirect effect via the liquidity positions. Perhaps, though, credit risk affects the decision to
borrow or lend in the first place. For precautionary motives, riskier banks may choose to hold
more liquidity and therefore have less need to borrow; and perhaps, holding more liquidity, they
are more likely to supply it as lenders. These considerations suggest that we may again face a
potential problem of bad controls if we include both the liquidity position of banks and credit risk
variables.
The analysis in this section indicates that credit risk does influence the decisions to borrow
and lend via the liquidity position. Unlike before our interest is not in the liquidity position itself.
It is self-evident that the liquidity position must be a key determinant of borrowing and lending,
since it is exactly to adjust their liquidity position that banks borrow and lend.
We first analyze probit models for each subsample and for both borrowers and lenders to
get a sense of the determinants of the borrowing and lending decisions. In that analysis we
simultaneously include the liquidity position and the tier II capital ratio of banks in the analysis.
Subsequently, we examine how a broader set of credit risk variables work when the liquidity position
is included and excluded.
One issue is whether to include fixed effects. If included, one can perfectly predict the par-
ticipation decisions of the two largest banks, at least in most subsamples, since they participate
virtually every single day. These banks must therefore be taken out of the analysis. If fixed effects
are excluded, however, the model is likely to be misspecified. Excluding fixed effects may result
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Table XII: The borrowing and lending decisions
This table reports estimates from probit models of the decision to borrow (top panel) and the decision to lend (bottom panel).
For details on the computation and measurement units of the independent variables, see section 2.2. t-statistics based on
robust standard errors are in parentheses. The full sample runs from January 2005 to June 2013. The pre-crisis period is dated
from January 2005 to June 2007, the crisis period from August 2007- 9 October 2008, the period of government guarantees
from 10 October 2008 to September 2010, the period encompassing the European sovereign debt crisis from October 2010 to
5 July 2012, and finally the period of negative interest is dated from 6 July 2012 to the end of the sample.
Panel of borrowers
Full sample Full sample Pre-crisis Crisis Gov’t guarantee Debt Crisis Neg. interest rates
Borrower (t-1) 1.48 (101.71) 1.11 (70.16) 0.80 (27.43) 0.84 (19.02) 1.01 (32.98) 1 (25.56) 0.74 (12.8)
Liquidity position -0.41 (22.18) -0.45 (22.19) -0.83 (14.13) -0.51 (11.49) -0.30 (11.21) -0.78 (10.41) -1.61 (8.32)
Net position 0.23 (4.7) -0.58 (9.19) 0.04 (0.19) -0.55 (2.19) -0.20 (2.45) -0.95 (1.11) -2.58 (0.66)
Size 0.23 (56.88) 0.47 (11.07) -0.25 (1.26) 0.78 (2.25) -0.34 (1.46) 0.43 (1.49) -0.39 (0.75)
Tier II capital -0.91 (6.98) -0.13 (0.61) 1.01 (1.13) -1.37 (1.47) -3.84 (4.47) 1.99 (1.61) -3.86 (1.25)
Agg. CA balance [100 bn] 0.3 (2.34) 0.09 (0.67) -0.22 (0.63) -0.51 (0.77) 0.46 (1.27) 0.73 (1.56) -0.70 (2.37)
Agg. Net position [100 bn] 0.27 (4.94) 0.28 (4.88) 0.16 (1.13) 0.19 (1.1) 0.12 (1.28) 0.72 (5.47) 0.62 (2.84)
Friday -0.48 (26.68) -0.50 (26.16) -0.55 (15.51) -0.68 (12.11) -0.62 (15.8) -0.49 (10.9) 0.21 (2.88)
Gov’t payments [100 bn] 0.62 (7.73) 0.68 (7.92) 0.55 (2.77) 0.31 (1.21) 0.66 (4.2) 0.84 (4.42) 0.33 (1.09)
Total payments (t) [100 bn] -0.03 (1.55) -0.02 (1.28) 0.01 (0.31) 0.06 (0.86) -0.04 (1.06) -0.10 (2.27) 0.15 (2.78)
Total payments (t-1) [100 bn] 0.02 (1.32) 0.01 (0.64) -0.01 (0.2) 0.02 (0.34) -0.04 (1.12) 0.11 (2.17) -0.05 (0.94)
Total payments (t+1) [100 bn] 0.13 (6.71) 0.15 (7.47) 0.22 (4.93) 0.10 (1.49) 0.12 (3.22) 0.23 (4.76) 0.16 (2.35)
CDS (gov’t) 0.00 (0.81) 0.00 (0.83) -0.01 (0.28) 0.01 (1.78) 0 (0.51) 0.00 (0.94) 0.00 (1.24)
Bank fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 71890 67782 16464 7084 16554 11518 2832
Pseudo R2 0.49 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.67
Panel of lenders
Full sample Full sample pre-crisis early crisis bank package I post-BPI neg. interest rates
Lender (t-1) 1.43 (79.53) 0.8 (37.45) 0.71 (18.2) 0.53 (9.08) 0.75 (18.45) 0.58 (12.02) 0.44 (3.92)
Liquidity position 0.18 (19.6) 0.23 (19.92) 0.26 (13.22) 0.32 (17.18) 0.21 (8.3) 0.32 (11.74) 0.91 (9.16)
Net position 0.67 (16.6) -0.23 (4.09) 0.29 (1.49) -0.91 (3.97) -0.05 (0.63) 0.59 (0.95) -2.52 (0.35)
Size 0.33 (80.28) 0.07 (1.06) -0.08 (0.3) 1.79 (3.32) -0.05 (0.18) -1.18 (3.61) -0.19 (0.14)
Tier II capital -0.72 (3.69) 0.72 (2.07) 0.64 (0.42) -0.46 (0.29) -3.53 (3.14) -0.81 (0.52) -10.01 (1.98)
Agg. CA balance/100 -0.94 (6.14) -1.51 (8.02) -2.67 (5.9) -2.57 (3.41) -1.7 (3.58) -3.14 (5.18) -1.15 (2.6)
Agg. Net position/100 -0.16 (2.49) -0.21 (3.01) -0.1 (0.53) -0.38 (1.68) -0.21 (1.95) 0.02 (0.12) -0.76 (2.13)
Friday -0.18 (8.37) -0.19 (7.78) -0.17 (3.76) -0.11 (1.73) -0.28 (5.91) -0.28 (5.25) -0.23 (1.93)
Gov’t payments/100 0.26 (2.69) 0.26 (2.41) -0.14 (0.57) -1.12 (3.57) 0.48 (2.44) 0.95 (4.38) 1.01 (2.28)
Total payments (t)/100 -0.01 (0.56) 0 (0.02) -0.03 (0.64) 0.14 (1.69) 0.01 (0.33) 0.00 (0.10) -0.04 (0.50)
Total payments (t-1)/100 0.02 (1.09) 0.02 (0.71) 0.05 (1.07) 0.18 (2.35) -0.02 (0.39) 0.05 (1.08) 0.05 (0.59)
Total payments (t+1)/100 0.1 (4.93) 0.12 (5.17) 0.15 (2.7) 0.13 (1.58) 0.13 (2.98) 0.16 (3.22) 0.17 (2.09)
Agg. Credit risk 0.00 (1.34) 0.00 (1.56) 0.01 (0.49) 0.01 (1.2) 0.00 (0.7) 0.00 (0.31) -0.02 (4.79)
Bank fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 65728 65728 16464 5790 15486 13290 6372
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.42 0.58 0.57
in a misspecification. In the case of interest rate regressions we saw, for instance, that one would
obtain different estimates for the effect of the capital ratio depending on whether fixed effects were
included or not. This could be explained if some unobservable heterogeneity, e.g. the quality of
bank systems or management, would permit stronger banks to hold less equity. We thus prefer to
include fixed effects, but also show results without fixed effects for comparison.
Table XII shows the results of the probit analysis for the full sample, with and without fixed
effects, and for the subsamples with fixed effects.
The capital ratio does not appear to affect the decision to borrow directly. In fact, it is only
significant in the sub-period where we would not expect credit risk to matter (and the parameter
estimates is negative). Neither is there a clear pattern when we analyze the panel of lenders. If
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Table XIII: Credit risk and the decision to borrow or lend
The table compares parameter estimates from probit models with and without the liquidity position included. The model
specification is the same as in Table XII, but different credit risk measures are included. Estimates are not reported for the
other control variables. The sample period is the full sample (January 2005 to June 2013).
Credit risk measure Liq. position Borrower panel Lender panel
Tier 1 capital Yes -0.132 (0.61) 0.723 (2.07)
No 0.869 (4.07) -0.176 (0.55)
Tier 2 capital Yes -0.211 (0.92) -0.188 (0.53)
No 0.972 (4.39) -0.376 (1.1)
Write-offs Yes 0.123 (0.75) 0.061 (1.73)
No -0.322 (1.91) 0.073 (2.07)
Result Yes 2.491 (3.76) -0.315 (0.33)
No 3.6 (5.65) -0.94 (1.02)
Relative CR measure Yes 0.242 (3.97) 0.298 (3.68)
No -0.079 (1.35) 0.398 (5.12)
we did not include fixed effects, we would even conclude that banks with less capital are more
likely to borrow and lend. The other variables largely behave as expected; we discuss parameter
estimates in more detail later in the context of the linear probability model.
Focusing on the full sample, Table XIII compare how parameter estimates for different measures
of credit risk compare when the liquidity position variable is included and excluded, and a pattern
emerges. In the borrower panel, we observe that the credit risk measures are often insignificant,
and only in the case of the financial result is the sign as expected. When the liquidity position is
not included, in contrast, the variables are generally significant and tell the same story: Healthier
banks are more likely to borrow. Only in the case of the relative credit risk measure is the effect
insignificant.
A qualitatively similar pattern emerges in the case of the panel of lenders. For each credit risk
measure, exclusion of the liquidity position indicates that riskier banks are more likely to be lenders
than their less risky counterparts. However, for only two of five variables is there a statistically
significant relationship between bank health and the lending decision.
Finally, we estimate linear probability models for the borrower and lender panels. While such
models suffer from conceptual problems, such as the possibility of predicting probabilities that are
negative or exceed one, the results are easier to interpret than is the case with probit models. The
results are reported both including and excluding the liquidity position variable in Table XIV.
The linear probability model generally agrees with the probit model about the determinants
of loan decisions, but the quantities are easier to interpret in the linear probability model. Unsur-
prisingly, the liquidity position is significant: After all, banks who borrow generally do so because
they need liquidity, while banks with surplus liquidity are more likely to be lenders. Another key
determinant of the borrowing decision is past borrowing. The probability of a bank borrowing
today is about a 40 percentage point higher if the bank borrowed the day before. This should not
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Table XIV: The borrowing and lending decisions - linear probability model
This table shows estimates of the decision to borrow and lend in a linear probability model. For both borrowers and lenders
the model is estimated without and with bank effects and, in the latter case, with and without the liquidity position included.
For details on the computation and measurement units of the independent variables, see section 2.2. t-statistics based on
robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Borrower panel Lender panel
Borrower (t-1) / Lender (t-1) 0.49 (152.12) 0.38 (79.58) 0.44 (97.42) 0.46 (83.12) 0.26 (39.19) 0.3 (45.61)
Liquidity position -0.06 (72.5) -0.06 (31.85) . (.) 0.03 (30.54) 0.05 (34.19) . (.)
Net position [100 bn] 0.07 (9.17) -0.05 (5.03) -0.07 (7.11) 0.14 (17.17) -0.05 (5.53) -0.03 (3.05)
Size 0.05 (65.28) 0.04 (5.83) 0.02 (3.65) 0.06 (69.78) 0.00 (0.79) 0.02 (2.93)
Tier II capital -0.10 (4.20) 0.02 (0.55) 0.15 (3.3) -0.05 (2.76) -0.11 (4.06) -0.21 (7.22)
Agg. CA balance [100 bn] 0.04 (1.58) 0.02 (0.62) -0.06 (2.59) -0.08 (4.86) -0.12 (7.44) -0.06 (3.45)
Agg. Net position [100 bn] 0.05 (4.58) 0.06 (5.01) 0.07 (5.89) -0.02 (1.87) -0.02 (2.4) -0.02 (3.13)
Friday -0.11 (29.21) -0.10 (29.33) -0.10 (29.14) -0.03 (10.01) -0.02 (10.06) -0.02 (9.69)
Gov’t payments [100 bn] 0.13 (8.05) 0.14 (8.53) 0.17 (10.03) 0.05 (3.94) 0.05 (4.20) 0.03 (2.33)
Total payments (t) [100 bn] -0.01 (1.72) -0.01 (1.94) -0.02 (4.24) -0.01 (2.42) -0.01 (2.46) 0.00 (0.13)
Total payments (t-1) [100 bn] 0.00 (1.26) 0.00 (0.19) 0.00 (0.75) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.35) 0.00 (1.02)
Total payments (t+1) [100 bn] 0.03 (7.39) 0.03 (7.56) 0.02 (5.37) 0.01 (4.4) 0.01 (4.38) 0.02 (5.97)
Agg. Credit risk 0.00 (0.66) 0.00 (0.61) 0.00 (0.8) 0.00 (0.88) 0.00 (1.34) 0.00 (1.19)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 65728 71890
R2 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.53
come as a surprise; if a bank is hit by a negative liquidity shock one day, it will, absent a liquidity
shock in the reverse direction or borrowing from another source, need to borrow the following day
again to remain at the same level of liquidity.
This is also evident when evaluating the ”Friday” variable, i.e. whether banks have access to
central bank facilities on a given day. When banks have such access, they are about 10 percentage
points less likely to borrow from other banks and about 2 percentage points less likely to lend
to other banks. One way to put this figures into perspective is to compare to the unconditional
probability of a bank in our panels borrowing or lending on a given day. Not counting the two
largest money market participants, which borrow and lend essentially every day, the probability
of a bank borrowing is 32.4 percent, while the probability of a bank lending is 10.1 percent.
There does appear to be a relationship between the capital ratio and the decision to borrow or
lend. Consider the case of borrowers. When not including fixed effects, banks with more capital
appear to be less likely to borrow. A possible explanation is the some unobserved feature of the
banks, their ”quality”, say, permits certain ”high quality” banks to hold less capital. At least, the
negative relationship vanishes when fixed effects are included. As in the probit model, the sign
changes when the liquidity position is excluded from the analysis, implying (more in line with prior
expectations) that healthier banks are more likely to borrow. Our interpretation is that this is
due to healthier banks choose, or can afford, to hold less liquidity since they will be able to obtain
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loans when faced with liquidity shocks.
Better capitalized banks tend to be borrowers, and less well-capitalized banks lend more. More-
over, this result is amplified, in the same direction as in the probit model, when the liquidity
position is excluded from the model. A reasonable interpretation is that healthy banks choose, or
can afford, to hold less liquidity. When the liquidity position is included, therefore, there is no
significant relationship between the capital ratio and the decision to borrow.
2.6. Event Study Evidence
In this final section we briefly consider some event study evidence. There were two major events
which seem especially likely to have affected the Danish interbank market during the financial
crisis. The first was the default of Roskilde Bank, the 8th largest bank in Denmark at the time,
and the second was the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. Roskilde
Bank was taken over by the Danish Central Bank and an association of banks on 24 August 200813,
but Roskilde Bank had already begun receiving emergency funding on 10 July 2008.
We consider these three dates as event dates and consider the behavior of the money market
around these dates. When performing regressions considering dates around these events, there are
clear spikes in interest rates only for loans beginning on July 11 and August 26th, perhaps because
many of these loans are agreed a day in advance, corresponding to the actual default dates. There
are no significant effects around Lehman’s default. We therefore focus on the dates following the
two Roskilde events.
We are naturally interested in questions such as whether riskier banks pay premia in times of
stress. However, as we have argued in previous sections, our measures of credit risk based on bank
balance sheet information may not be particularly good measures of credit risk. In this section we
therefore take a slightly different approach. Supposing that banks which are perceived to be riskier
do, in fact, pay higher rates, we should be able to capture this through the estimates of bank fixed
effects. We therefore estimate the bank fixed effects using data from period from March 2007,
roughly corresponding to earliest stage at which problems in the financial system became widely
evident, to February 2008. These estimates are then used a measures of credit risk in regressions
encompassing the period March 2008 to February 2009, placing the event dates of interest close to
the middle of this period.
The results of the event study are reported in Table XV. Banks which pay higher rates before
the event period also pay rater higher in the event period. To put the numbers in perspective, the
13This was during the weekend. We look at the following days.
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Table XV: Event study evidence
This table shows the effects of credit risk and the liquidity position on respectively interest rates and access to the interbank
market on 11 July 2008 and 26 August 2008, the days after news about difficulties and default at Roskilde Bank. The credit
risk of each bank is defined as the individual bank fixed effect found from a regression on interest rates, including other controls,
in the period from March 2007 to February 2008. The results in the ”Interest rates”-column are based on regressions in which
the dependent variable is the money market rate less the central bank current account rate. Also included in the regression, in
addition to the reported variables, are the same controls as in the base specification (except the tier 2 capital ratio) and time
fixed effects. The ”Access”-column shows the result of a panel probit model in which the dependent variable is whether a bank
accesses the money market on a particular day. The control variables are the same as in the base specification of the probit
model (except the tier 2 capital ratio) used elsewhere in the paper. The sample period runs from March 2008 to February
2009. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Interest rates Access
Credit risk 1.12 (17.97) 0.01 (3.11)
Liquidity position -1.72 (2.63)
July 11 21.89 (3.27) 0.92 (1.09)
* Credit risk 0.66 (1.11) 0.07 (1.7)
* Liq. Position -16.18 (1.35)
August 26 50.75 (11.62) -0.64 (1.02)
* Credit risk 0.22 (1.14) -0.03 (1.22)
* Liq. Position -11.38 (2.56)
Time FE Yes Yes
N 7,200 5,580
R2 / pseudo R2 0.48 0.49
standard deviation in the credit risk measure is about 10 basis points, implying that a one standard
deviation change in the credit risk measure changes rates by 11.2 basis points in the event period.
We are more interested in the effects on the particular event dates, however. Average rates are
substantially higher than normal on these dates, especially following the actual takeover of Roskilde
Bank. The interaction effects all go in the expected direction - the credit risk measure and the
effect of being short on liquidity are amplified - but the effects cannot be measured precisely. We
do not observe strong effects on banks’ access to the market. These findings are somewhat similar
to these in Afonso et al. (2011) who find that banks mainly adjust interest rates around the major
event in the US, the Lehman default.
2.7. Conclusion
Banks turn to the overnight interbank market to absorb liquidity shocks. We assess the efficiency
of this market by analyzing how a bank’s liquidity position affects the interest rate it must pay.
Since a liquidity inflow to one bank is an outflow to another bank, a healthy bank faced with a
liquidity need should be able to find liquidity and, due to competition among banks with excess
liquidity, pay a rate equal or close to the opportunity cost of holding liquidity for those with
liquidity to spare.
On average, banks in need of liquidity pay only a small premium relative to those with ample
liquidity. For instance, a bank with a liquidity position of zero, the amount of liquidity the bank
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must hold at a minimum, pays less than a single basis point more than a bank with a liquidity
position of one, the amount it is permitted to hold. Yet, while banks short on liquidity may not
pay higher in many cases, they do so in certain circumstances. When aggregate liquidity scarce,
when liquidity is needed more urgently, and payment activity is large, the effects of having little
liquidity are more pronounced, and the magnitudes are in the order of a few basis points. These
are still relatively low figures when compared to the observed variation in money market rates. To
give some perspective, the standard deviation of the interest paid on a loan less the average rate
paid on the day of the loan is 17 basis points.
A concern is that liquidity and credit effects are being confounded. For instance, riskier banks
may choose to hold more liquidity for precautionary reasons. An implication would be that exclud-
ing the liquidity position from regressions should produce different estimates for variables related
to credit risk. We do not find any evidence of such an effect when using regulatory measures of
credit risk such as bank capital ratios. Another possibility is that we fail to adequately measure
credit risk because capital ratios (and other measures based on financial statements) are imper-
fect and are only sampled on a quarterly basis. To address this concern we take an instrumental
variables approach to estimating the effect of the liquidity position. The IV-estimate of the bor-
rower’s liquidity position is about 9 basis points, substantially higher than a regular OLS-estimate
of less than a single basis point. This estimate further masks differences across sub-samples. The
liquidity position mainly appears to matter in the crisis period and in the period encompassing
the European sovereign debt crisis. Pre-crisis and during the period in which money market loans
were covered by a government guarantee, banks did not pay significantly higher rates when they
were in need of liquidity.
While regulatory measures of credit risk do not affect money market rates, there is some evi-
dence to suggest that they influence participation. At first glance it appears that banks with more
capital are less likely to borrow than those with less capital. If one controls for bank heterogeneity
by including fixed effects, however, this effect vanishes. In that case we show that an increase
in the capital ratio is associated with an increase in the likelihood of being a borrower while a
decrease is associated with an increase in the likelihood of being a lender. This mainly reflects an
indirect effect. Banks with higher capital ratios choose to hold less liquidity and therefore more
frequently need to access market; conversely, banks with less equity capital hold more liquidity
and therefore tend to have liquidity to lend.
Our analysis contributes to an understanding of - and thereby potentially have implications for
- how institutional details such as the monetary policy rules set by the central bank affect money
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market activity. As an example, we observe that money market rates are about 10 basis points
higher on days when lenders can place money in certificates of deposits (which typically yield 10
basis points more than money deposited in a bank’s current account), while borrowing and lending
activity is dampened. Also, we show throughout the paper that aggregate liquidity and payment
activity affects the functioning of the money market, and these are factors over which the central
bank and the government can exert influence.
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Collateralized Lending and Central
Bank Collateral Policy
ABSTRACT
This paper examines a model of collateral-based lending and central bank collateral
policy. Firms cannot pledge their income, but secure credit through collateral. Banks
can become informed about collateral quality prior to lending or lend based on the
expectation of collateral being adequate. Uninformed lending allows firms to use more
capital, but entails fragility. Central banks generally use collateral policy to further
information acquisition. When credit constraints arise, however, central banks support
uninformed lending. The model may help explain features of collateral policy such as
central banks’ use of narrow and broad sets of eligible collateral in good and bad times
respectively.
Keywords: Banking; Collateral policy; Central Banks
JEL-classification: E42; E58; G01; G21
3.1. Introduction
Collateral is important to the provision of credit in the economy. Azariadis et al. (2015) report that
about 55% of non-financial firms’ liabilities are secured1, and households and financial institutions
likewise rely heavily on collateral, for example to finance housing and in repurchase agreements.
The use of collateral, however, does not insulate agents from risks; secured credit too can be subject
to runs (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).
Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) describe one mechanism through which ”collateral crises” arise:
Commonly, the collateral which supports lending is of such quality that lenders face few incentives
to undertake costly information acquisition and determine its exact composition. Some low quality
collateral is therefore pooled with high quality collateral. This increases the availability of credit,
but is a source of fragility. If there is a perception that collateral quality has deteriorated, lenders
1Using earlier data from 1977-1988, Berger and Udell (1990) find that nearly 70% of commercial and industrial
loans were made on a secured basis based on a sample of more than a million bank loans.
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may suddenly want to become informed about actual collateral quality and will no longer provide
funding on the same terms as earlier: Those with bad collateral lose funding, and those with
good collateral must compensate lenders for acquiring information. The collapse of the market for
asset-backed commercial paper was a case in point. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) write: ”Also,
before the financial crisis, most investors believed that commercial paper almost never defaults and
therefore had little incentive to invest in information gathering [...]. However, during the crisis,
investors decided to invest more resources in information-gathering activities because the value of
commercial paper was more sensitive to new information.”
This first part of the paper examines when credit constraints arise under collateralized lending.
The model is based on Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014), which I extend in three ways: First, I relax
an assumption that lenders must be making zero profits due to competition. In fact, borrowers
with highly profitable projects are better off leaving some profits to lenders in order to relax
credit constraints. I also introduce an information externality. Roughly speaking, the idea is that
agents individually face more uncertainty about collateral quality if there is little information being
gathered in aggregate. Third, a central bank is introduced in the second part of the paper.
The central bank uses collateral policy to affect banks’ information-gathering incentives. Banks
need to make payments and can either hoard liquidity, which limits lending, or borrow from
the central bank. The central bank can exploit this by making a certain degree of information
acquisition a prerequisite for collateral eligibility. More information is associated with a lower
probability of shocks occurring, but uninformed lending generally allows agents to use more capital.
When collateral quality is high, central banks use policy to induce information acquisition to limit
risks while preferring uninformed lending when credit constraints arise due to perceptions of low
collateral quality.
These findings are similar to instances of actual policy. There are various cases of central
banks using transparency requirements as a means of limiting systemic risks; for example, some
have made information disclosure requirements (e.g. about the collateral underlying securitized
products) a prerequisite for central bank eligibility (Zorn and Garcia, 2011). On the other hand,
central banks’ crisis responses have encouraged less information-intensive lending. Some of the
Federal Reserve’s crisis facilities, for instance, included non-recourse provisions. Under the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, the Fed made non-recourse loans to holders of newly issued
asset-backed securities, with those particular securities pledged as collateral. The non-recourse
feature insulated the users of the facility from tail risks. They could walk away from the loan and
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hand over the collateral, thus facing weaker incentives to examine collateral quality.2
The setting in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) is a useful starting point for thinking about credit
and collateral policy for at least three reasons. First, it is a model of collateralized lending. Second,
credit constraints, which resemble ”panics”, emerge in the model as small changes in perceptions
of collateral quality can lead to sharp contractions in credit. And third, a distinction is made
between informed and uninformed lending which allows one to think about the consequences of
more or less information acquisition.
In the model, borrowers (”firms”) need capital to finance projects, but cannot pledge income
to lenders (”banks”). They have access to collateral (of uncertain value), which permits them
to secure credit. The value of the collateral is unrelated to their project. The collateral can be
thought of as representing land or real estate. Banks have an informational advantage in that they
can, at a cost, verify the true value of the collateral. If they verify the true collateral quality, they
lend only when the collateral is found to be good.
Since it is costly to verify collateral quality, banks may lend solely based on the expectation of
the collateral being good. This allows firms to obtain more credit, but creates uncertainty about
the true value of the collateral because no one verifies it. A collective lack of information gathering
creates fragility as new information in the form of signals can lead to large revisions in beliefs,
which in turn may cause funding withdrawals.
Interestingly, credit constraints affect less profitable projects the most, even though a) firms
only secure loans because they have collateral and b) project quality is unrelated to collateral
value. Firms would be better off if banks lent solely based on the expectation of their collateral
being good. However, when collateral quality is more uncertain, banks have a strong incentive to
verify it prior to lending. To avoid this, firms may respond by seeking smaller loans, making it less
attractive for banks to incur fixed information costs. Firms become credit constrained in the sense
that they borrow less than is possible given the amount of collateral they have and the technology
available to them. Rather than seeking smaller loans, however, firms with more profitable projects
forgo some profits to ensure that credit is always available to them.
Additional information acquisition entails a positive externality when collateral quality is high,
but a negative externality when credit constraints bind. This reflects a trade-off between fragility
and the amount of capital which can be employed when no shocks materialize. When credit
2When the Fed introduced its first crisis facility, the Term Auction Facility, Greg Ip wrote a post on the Wall
Street Journal’s Real Time Economics blog with the title ”Bye-Bye Bagehot?” (15 January 2008), in reference
to Bagehot’s dictum that a central bank should respond to a panic by lending freely at a high rate against good
collateral. In fact, (Bagehot, 1873, p. 198) emphasized that a central bank should lend against ”what in ordinary
times is reckoned a good security.”
105
constraints are present, the marginal value of additional capital is high, and further risk-taking in
the form of uninformed lending is preferable. These results may help explain why central banks
normally encourage information production, but favor less information-intensive lending in crisis
periods.
Among the key results are the following: 1) there is an optimal degree of information acquisition
which a central bank would like to achieve; 2) in some cases, for example when bank reserves are
ample, the central bank cannot induce as much information acquisition as is optimal; and 3) the
model points to preference for collateral characterized by high information costs, which are less
plagued by asymmetric information (or are ”information-insensitive” in the parlance of Gorton
and Ordon˜ez (2014)). Such a description fits safe debt securities which are typically the preferred
collateral of central banks.
In terms of related literature, the classic reference on collateral policy is Bagehot (1873). More
recent contributions include e.g. Ashcraft et al. (2010) who link haircuts and expected returns and
Cassola and Koulischer (2014) and Koulischer (2015) who discuss the role of collateral policy when
interest rate policy cannot be used to deal with asymmetric shocks such as in a currency union.
Similar to this paper, Koulischer and Struyven (2014) address the issue of why central banks loosen
collateral standards when credit constraints arise. The friction in their paper is moral hazard in
the interbank market. Also related is Bindseil (2013) who discusses the role of collateral policy in
containing asset fire sales. Chailloux et al. (2008), Cheun et al. (2009), and BIS (2013) describe
the collateral frameworks of major central banks. For a recent overview of the literature on central
bank collateral frameworks, see Nyborg (2015). Collateral is also interesting in its own right due
to its role in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
The paper further relates to the literature on information externalities. There idea that the
information-gathering efforts of some affect the outcomes of others has many applications. These
range from how to presence of informed consumers improve terms for uninformed consumers (Sa-
lop and Stiglitz, 1977) to IPOs (Benveniste et al., 2002), bank runs (Nikitin and Smith, 2008),
disclosure of financial information (Kurlat and Veldkamp, 2015), etc. The idea is also central
to the notion of market efficiency (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2016).
Information is important in the paper in another way as well: Collateral is characterized by an
information cost which may be viewed as a measure of information asymmetry or ”information-
sensitivity” (Gorton and Ordon˜ez, 2014; Dang et al., 2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model. Section 3.3
discusses collateralized lending. Central bank collateral policy is examined in Section 3.4. Section
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3.6 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
3.2. Model
The basic model features a unit mass of risk-neutral borrowers (”firms”) and lenders (”bank”).
A central bank is introduced in Section 3.4. Firms have access to a project, but lack capital
(numeraire) to finance it. Each firm is randomly matched with a bank. Banks are competitive and
offer contracts to firms.
3.2.1. Technology, informed and uninformed lending
The description of the technology and possible loan types follows Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014).
Specifically, firms require capital to undertake their projects which generate income according to
a stochastic Leontief technology. Capital K produces:
F (K) = A

min{K,K?} with prob. q
0 with prob. 1− q
(1)
Production only takes place when qA > 1; otherwise, either firms or banks would be making
losses if lending took place. Also, if there were no constraints on the choice of K, the optimum
would be to use as much capital as possible, though at most K?.
Banks have capital K¯ (> K?) which they can lend to firms. Firms’ output cannot be pledged
to banks, and they therefore cannot make promises of repayment based on their income. This
creates a role for collateral. Firms have access to collateral, which pays:
C˜ =

C with prob. p
0 with prob. 1− p
(2)
Collateral quality p is a key state variable in the model. All collateral shares the same p ex
ante, but realizations are independent. It is also assumed that C > K?, implying that collateral
of high quality can sustain the optimal production level.
Prior to lending banks can learn whether the collateral is good or bad by producing information
at cost γ. Information can only be produced at the beginning of the period. Banks can commit to
acquire information and verify collateral quality, but cannot commit not to acquire information.3
3The assumption that banks can commit to verifying the collateral quality can be replaced by an incentive-
compatibility constraint, a point I discuss in the appendix. Banks’ informational advantage also explains why firms
do not sell their collateral to finance projects as banks would also have a strong incentive to verify the collateral
quality prior to a purchase, preventing firms from selling at fair value.
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In summary, banks have three possible actions available to them. They can (1) commit to
verifying the collateral quality prior to lending (”informed lending”); (2) promise to lend without
verifying the collateral quality (”uninformed lending”) and keeping that promise; or (3) promise
to lend without acquiring information, and secretly learn the collateral quality prior to lending (in
which case they only lend if the collateral quality is good). Firms prefer for banks to lend in all
states since their projects are profitable whether or not the collateral is good. They must therefore
incentivize banks not to secretly verify the collateral quality.
Banks offer two types of contracts, one specifying that information is to be acquired, the other
that it should not. Firms choose the loan contract, informed or uninformed, which maximizes
profits. A contract is a treble (K,R, x) specifying a loan amount, K, a promised payoff, R, and a
fraction of collateral, x, to be handed over in case of default.
3.2.2. Information and signals
An outcome of the model is that agents will not gather information for a range of collateral
qualities. They have some belief (p) about collateral quality, but this belief could be erroneous. If
information is not entirely private, banks may learn from the information-gathering effort of others.
It is then natural to think of a more information as corresponding to a more precise estimate of
p. This idea is captured in a reduced-form way through the introduction of a signal, which is
observed by those lenders who do not gather information. Concretely, I define 1− α as a measure
of information in the economy and let η = 1 be the event that a signal is observed. The conditional
probabilities of signals being observed are:
Pr{η = 1|C˜ = 0} = α (3)
Pr{η = 1|C˜ = C} = 0 (4)
If there is full information (α = 0), the signal is never observed. With less than full information,
banks conclude that collateral is bad whenever a signal is observed. On the other hand, if no signal
is observed, agents revise upwards their beliefs about collateral quality. I let p ≡ Pr{η = 0} and
p ≡ Pr{C˜ = C|η = 0} be the respective probabilities of no signal being observed and of the
collateral being good conditional on no signal is observed. Initially, α is treated as an exogenous
parameter. When the central bank is introduced in Section 3.4, it will be defined as the fraction
of uninformed lenders.
The above formulation, while evidently stylized, has some noteworthy features. First, it fits
the idea of agents having a more precise estimate of the collateral quality. A higher α corresponds
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to greater (ex post) dispersion in beliefs about collateral quality, and it does so in a tractable
way: it is simpler to work with the case where p becomes either p or 0 rather than e.g. a whole
distribution of collateral qualities. Second, expected collateral quality is ex ante independent of
α. Third, it captures the idea of a trade-off between fragility and the amount of capital available.
This idea is conveyed e.g. in the dynamic extension to the model in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014)
where the mechanism is pooling of good and bad collateral and in Biais et al. (2015) where a
period of tranquility can spur the entry of agents who are less diligent at managing risks, which
magnifies the effects of shocks.
3.2.3. Timing of events
Firms are initially matched with banks who offer contracts, with firms choosing the best. This
is followed by a period during which banks can become informed about project quality, either
because it has been agreed upon or secretly. If information acquisition has been agreed upon and
the collateral is found to be good, capital is transferred, and nothing further happens until payoffs
are realized. After the period during which information acquisition is possible, there is period
during which investment is still reversible, so banks can withdraw funding at no cost.4 Uninformed
lenders do so whenever they observe the signal. Subsequently, and this is explained more fully
when the central bank is introduced, banks may need to make a payment, which requires them
to have capital at hand. Finally, project payoffs are realized and payment is made or collateral is
transferred. The timing is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Timing of events
One can think of the setting as describing a firm which seeks to finance a new project and
approaches a bank for a loan, offering existing assets such as land or real estate as collateral. They
can agree for the bank to investigate the collateral, for example by physically inspecting it (thus
making the act of information acquisition verifiable). However, the firm has no means of preventing
the bank from performing its own analysis of the collateral, except through incentives. Of course,
whenever the collateral is found to be good, investment can proceed. Uninformed lending, on the
4The assumption that banks can recoup their invested capital could be modified such that withdrawal of financing
entailed some loss. For our purposes it suffices that withdrawal of funding is costly for firms because some profitable
investments are not being undertaken.
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other hand, is potentially affected by the arrival of new information. The implicit assumption is
that debt is short-term which creates refinancing risk as debt needs to be rolled over. If bad news
arrive at a later stage, though before investments become irreversible, banks withdraw funding
early, leaving good projects unfinanced. Finally, at a later stage, banks may face a temporary need
for money due to an unrelated payment shock. In that case it is helpful if they are able to borrow
from the central bank, using the secured loan as collateral.
3.2.4. Equilibrium
I formally define an equilibrium once a central bank is introduced (in Section 3.4). For now
and more informally, an equilibrium is defined as a pair of contracts (K,R, x), one representing
informed and the other uninformed lending, of which firms choose the one maximizing profits.
These contracts must satisfy a number of constraints. First, the amount of collateral a firm can
promise away is limited by the amount of collateral it has:
x ≤ 1 (5)
Second, the borrower cannot use more capital than the first-best level capital:
K ≤ K? (6)
Third, there is a participation constraint. A bank must at least break even in expectation when
lending. Fourth, there is an incentive-compatibility constraint, which applies only to uninformed
lenders. A bank must not have an incentive to deviate by verifying the true collateral value and
lending only when the collateral is found to be good. The participation and incentive-compatibility
constraints are described in the following sections.
3.3. Collateralized lending: loan contracts and welfare
In this section, I examine when credit constraints arise under collateralized lending. By credit
constraints, I refer to a situation in which firms borrow less than would be the case if there were
no incentive problems. The analysis proceeds by first characterizing the optimal contracts with
and without information acquisition. The preferred contract can then be found by comparing
firm expected profits under each of these contracts. Thereafter the welfare effects of more or less
information are analyzed. In this first part of the paper, the central bank plays no role, and α, the
parameter representing the intensity of the information externality, is treated as exogenous.
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3.3.1. Contract with information acquisition
The contract with information acquisition is the same is in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) as neither
the signal nor incentive problems affect this contract, but for completeness it is also described
here. If agents agree to information acquisition, they already know whether the collateral is good
or bad when the signal arrives, and their choices are thus independent of the signal. Profits from
informed lending are given by:
E[ΠI ] = p [q(AK −R) + (1− q)(−xC)] (7)
Projects are only undertaken when collateral is found to be good (with probability p), and the
project is successful with probability q in which case the payoff is AK. Banks receive either R or
xC depending on whether the project is successful or not. Banks’ participation constraint is:
p(qR+ (1− q)xC −K) ≥ γ (8)
The left-hand side tells us that projects are financed with probability p in which case capital is
always provided while agents are paid when the project succeeds (with probability q) and receive
collateral otherwise (with probability 1 − q). The expected payoff must be sufficient to cover the
information cost γ. There are no incentive problems since information acquisition is verifiable, and
so the participation constraint must always bind.5
To solve for the optimal contract, one can first impose the restriction R = xC. If it were the
case that xC > R , the firm would always prefer to sell the collateral in case of project failure at
the end of the period and repay R instead of handing over part of the collateral at the end of the
period. Conversely, if xC < R, it would always be advantageous to simply hand over the promised
share of the collateral. One can then use this restriction and the binding participation constraint
to see that E[ΠI ] is maximized by choosing K as large as possible subject to the constraint x ≤ 1.
No contract is possible when the collateral quality (p) is very low (p ≤ γ(qA−1)C ) because firms
cannot compensate banks for the fixed information cost. When the collateral quality is not too
low, the optimal contract is given by
(
K = min{K?, C − γp}, R = K + γp , x = pK+γpC
)
. The choice
of capital reveals that lending can either be limited by K? or the amount of collateral available.
If information costs are high or collateral is limited (low C or p), collateral is the limiting factor.
Specifically, as long as p ≥ γC−K? , the first-best level of capital is feasible. The collateral share,
5Since the optimal contract leaves banks with zero profits when collateral is good, the banks would clearly be
making a loss if they claimed the collateral to be good when, in fact, they had found it to be bad.
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x, is set such that banks make zero profits. If information costs are high, they must therefore be
promised more collateral.
The case of a binding collateral constraint occurs if p < γC−K? . Moreover, if the collateral
constraint is binding, it must be the case that γC(qA−1) ≤ p in order for the contract to be profitable
for firms. To limit the number of cases under consideration, I will assume that C(qA−1) < C−K?:
This ensures that K = K? is chosen whenever informed lending is profitable. In that case the
payoff to banks is R = xC = K? + γp . In words, they are being compensated for the capital they
put into projects and must be paid interest, reflecting the fact that they must pay an information
cost for which they are only compensated a fraction p of the time. Firm profits are then given by:
E[ΠI ] = p(qA− 1)K? − γ (9)
The optimal contract under informed lending is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The optimal contract under informed lending maximizes expected firm profits (7) sub-
ject to (5), (6), and (8). It is given by:
(K,R, x) =
(
K?, K? +
γ
p
,
pK? + γ
pC
)
(10)
provided that p(qA− 1)K? − γ ≥ 0. Otherwise, no contract is possible.
In the appendix I discuss how the assumption that information acquisition, when agreed upon,
is verifiable can be replaced by an incentive-compatibility constraint. For example, one could
imagine banks claiming to have found the collateral to be good without actually learning its value.
(Though, a simple way for firms to avoid this problem would be to always hand over the promised
fraction of the collateral rather than making payment.)
To ascertain whether information acquisition is, in fact, optimal, the profits from a contract
with information acquisition must be compared to those from a contract without information
acquisition.
3.3.2. Contract without information acquisition
Unlike in the above case, the characterization of the contract without information acquisition
differs from that in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014), and it does so for two reasons. First, they impose
a zero-profit condition when it may in fact be optimal for firms to leave some profits for banks when
projects are highly profitable. Second, the effects of the signal must be taken into account when
characterizing the optimal contract. The optimal contract is found by maximizing firm profits
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subject to the collateral constraint, capital use not exceeding the first-best, and the participation
and incentive-compatibility constraints (which are specified in the following).
When a signal is observed, funding is withdrawn and neither banks nor firms make any profits or
suffer losses. On the other hand, with probability p no signal is observed, and agents’ update their
beliefs about the collateral quality to p. This implies that any contract which is not terminated
early should be based on that probability.
The objective of the firm is to maximize expected profits from uninformed lending, and these
are given by:
E[ΠUI ] = p (q(AK −R) + (1− q)(−pxC)) (11)
This equation tells the following: First, profits only occur when the signal is not observed (i.e.
with probability p). In that case, the project succeeds with probability q and fails with probability
1 − q. Since the project is only financed when the signal is not observed, the expected value of
the collateral, conditional on financing taking place, is pxC. Also, using an argument analogous
to that for the contract with information acquisition, we can impose the restriction R = pxC.
Note furthermore that it is optimal for the firm to make payment from output whenever it can.
The reason banks may want to deviate and learn the true collateral is that they obtain excess
profits when firms default and the banks obtain the collateral which they, unlike the firms, know
to be good. If firms were to hand over the collateral rather than making payment, they would be
strengthening banks’ incentive to deviate.
The bank’s participation constraint is (1− p)0 + p(qR + (1− q)pxC −K) ≥ 0, which reduces
to:
pxC ≥ K (12)
while the incentive-compatibility constraint reads:
pxC −K ≥ p(qR+ (1− q)xC −K)− γ (13)
The left-hand side expresses the profits from lending uninformed while the right-hand side are
the profits associated with deviation. Here the critical fact is that at the point in time when
banks can deviate, their belief about the collateral quality is still p. Note also that the state in
which banks can potentially profit from deviating (by learning the collateral value before choosing
whether to hand over the capital) is that in which projects fail. In that case they obtain the
collateral which they, unlike the firms, know to be good.
Finally, we can express the updated probabilities p and p in terms of α. Application of Bayes’
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rule shows that if no information shock occurs, agents revise the probability that collateral is good
to be
p ≡ Pr{C˜ = C|η = 0} = p
p
(14)
where the probability that no shock occurs is given by
p ≡ Pr{η = 0} = p+ (1− α)(1− p) (15)
If α = 0, signals are never observed and there is no updating of beliefs. If, on the other hand,
only some agents gather information, signals are observed with probability Pr{η = 1} = α(1− p).
Note that the collateral is no worse in expected terms ex ante: The unconditional probability that
the collateral is good is the probability that no shock occurs, i.e. Pr{η = 0} = p+ (1− α)(1− p)
multiplied by the updated probability that the collateral is good, Pr{C˜ = C|η = 0}. This product
is p.
Having specified the elements of the problem, the optimal contract can now be derived (see the
appendix). It is described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract under informed lending maximizes expected firm profits
(11) subject to (5), (6), (8), and (13). If either qA − 11−(1−α)(1−q) ≤ 0 or if γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) ≥
min{pC,K?}, the bank’s participation constraint always binds, and the optimal choice of capital
is given by:
K = min
{
pC,
γ
(1− α)(1− p)(1− q) , K
?
}
(16)
while the associated collateral shares and promised repayment amounts are defined by x = KpC and
R = pxC. Otherwise, the incentive-compatibility constraint binds, and the optimal choice of capital
is
K = min
{
pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + γ
1− p, K
?
}
(17)
with collateral shares, x =
{
1,
K?− γ
1−p
(1−(1−α)(1−q))pC
}
, and promised payments, R = pxC.
It is instructive to study the conditions under which the various constraints bind. To do so,
we must understand the economic meaning of the expressions in the proposition. The expression
qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) ≤ 0 relates to the profitability of projects. For example, in the full information
case (α = 0), it reduces to a question of whether q2A − 1 is positive or negative, i.e. whether
projects are highly profitable or merely somewhat profitable. The second parameter restriction,
γ
(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) ≥ min{pC,K?}, describes a set of collateral qualities. This inequality holds if
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either p is low or high, but may not hold for intermediate values of p when collateral quality is
more uncertain.6
A graphical depiction of when the various constraints bind for the optimal contract without
information acquisition is given in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Constraint regions. The figure depicts which constraints binds depending on project and collateral quality in the
full information case (α = 0). There are five cases of binding constraints: (1) the participation constraint and the collateral
constraint bind; (2) the participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint bind; (3) the participation constraint
and the first-best level of capital is used; (4) the incentive-compatibility constraint and the collateral constraint bind; and (5)
the incentive-compatibility constraint and the first-best level of capital is used.
It is exactly the case of intermediate collateral qualities, which is interesting. If there were no
incentive issues, the optimal contract would entail K(p, α) = min {pC,K?}, but in some cases less
capital is used when the incentive-compatibility constraint binds. If projects are highly profitable
(qA − 11−(1−α)(1−q) ≥ 0), it is feasible to use capital in excess of γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) , which otherwise
represents an upper bound on the amount of capital which can be used. This means that credit
constraints are weaker for highly profitable projects than for less profitable ones. In fact, the
proposition tells us that the first-best level of capital may even be reached for highly profitable
projects when incentive problems are present. This observation is highlighted in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Credit constraints, the use of less capital than would be feasible if there were no
incentive problems, are more pronounced for less profitable projects (for which qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) <
0) than for highly profitable projects.
When projects are not highly profitable, both the participation and the incentive constraints
bind for intermediate collateral qualities. If it were not for incentive problems, borrowers could
feasibly promise away more collateral and obtain a larger loan. This would be socially beneficial
6The optimal contract found in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) emerges in the special case of full information, α = 0,
and moderately profitable projects, qA > 1 > q2A− 1.
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since capital is productive, but it does not happen because promising away more collateral intensi-
fies banks incentive to deviate and secretly check the value of the collateral. Firms react by seeking
smaller loans. In contrast, when projects are more profitable, firms respond not by seeking smaller
loans, but by sharing profits. Since banks obtain these profits in all states and not merely when
the collateral is found to be good, their incentive to learn the true collateral value prior to lending
is diminished as learning would entail a loss of profits whenever collateral is found to be bad.
3.3.3. Information and welfare
In this section I examine the effects of information acquisition on welfare. The degree of informa-
tion, α, is treated as an exogenous parameter. It can be thought of as representing prior knowledge
about the collateral; even though agents do not specifically ascertain the collateral quality, the may
have other information which leads them to have a more robust estimate of p (i.e. an estimate
which is less likely to be revised due to new information). The question I address, then, is the
following: If a social planner could affect the degree of information acquisition at the margin, how
would it like to do so?
A few observations are required before proceeding to the analysis. Whether banks do acquire
information depends on a comparison of their expected profits with and without information ac-
quisition. It is straightforward to verify that information acquisition can only occur when the
incentive-compatibility constraint binds, i.e. for intermediate collateral qualities. It is possible to
identify the region of p for which information acquisition takes place. For example, when projects
are moderately profitable, this region is found by equating profits with and without information
acquisition and then solving the quadratic equation p(qA − 1)K? − γ = (qA − 1) γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) .
We are not particularly interested in the resulting expressions, except perhaps to note that igno-
rance feeds ignorance: The higher the α, the smaller the region of p for which agents will gather
information.
An interesting special case is that of full information, corresponding to the model in Gorton
and Ordon˜ez (2014) except for the inclusion of a participation constraint rather than a zero-profit
condition. In the previous section it was shown that there was a discontinuity in the expected use
of capital when the incentive-compatibility constraint was binding, depending on the profitability
of projects, with highly profitable projects - those for which q2A − 1 > 0 - being less affected by
credit constraints than less profitable ones. Highly profitable projects are not unaffected because
firm profitability, unlike expected capital usage, is a continuous function of q and A. A sudden
drop in expected capital usage can therefore occur if collateral quality declines to such a level that
agents find themselves in the information acquisition region.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates this. It compares welfare and profits under informed and uninformed for
a highly profitable project. If the project were less profitable, profits and welfare would coincide.
The vertical difference between the full and dashed lines in region where p is approximately between
0.80 and 0.87 represents the welfare loss due to firms preferring to seek smaller loans as opposed
sharing profits when projects are not as profitable. The figure also highlights that the credit
constraint begins to bind at a higher collateral quality for less profitable projects.
Figure 3.3: Collateral quality, expected profits and welfare in full information case (α = 0). The figure shows welfare, and
expected profits of firms under informed and uninformed lending respectively. It is based on the case of q = 0.6 and A = 2.8,
implying that projects are highly profitable (q2A−1 = 0.008 > 0). If projects were slightly less profitable (so that q2A−1 < 0),
welfare would coincide with profits. To the right of approximately p = 0.87, welfare and profits under uninformed lending
coincide. To the left of approximately p = 0.80, welfare and profits under informed lending coincide.
I now consider the case where there is less than full information and examine the impact of
changes in α. If p belongs to the region where banks gather information, changing α has no effects
on welfare.7 The more interesting case is therefore that in which p is outside of the information-
acquisition region. If information is not acquired, welfare is proportional to the expected use of
capital, and there are five possible cases depending on which constraints bind: (1) the participation
and collateral constraints bind; (2) the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints bind;
(3) the participation constraint bind and the first-best level of capital is feasible; (4) the incentive-
compatibility and the collateral constraints bind; and (5) the incentive-compatibility constraint
binds and the first-best level of capital is feasible. The parametric constellations corresponding to
these case are depicted in Figure 3.2 and described in Proposition 1.
7At the margin, that is. A large increase in α could lead agents outside of the region.
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The use of capital specified in the optimal contracts is contingent on no signal being observed,
an event that occurs with probability p. To find the expected value of capital used, we must
therefore multiply the capital amount by this probability and then analyze the effects of changing
α. The following proposition details how the effects of information acquisition depend on collateral
and project quality in the five possible cases discussed above.
Proposition 2. When the collateral and participation constraints bind simultaneously (case 1),
the degree of information acquisition has no effect on welfare. When the incentive-compatibility
and participation constraint bind (case 2), more information acquisition is detrimental to welfare.
When the incentive-compatibility and the collateral constraints bind (case 4), more information
acquisition has negative effects whenever p(1−q)C > γ. Finally, more information acquisition has
a positive effect on welfare whenever the capital constraint binds (cases 3 and 5).
In general, additional information acquisition has two effects. It has the welfare-enhancing
effect of decreasing the likelihood of signals: Capital can be employed in more states of the world.
On the other hand, if information about collateral quality is widespread, the absence of shocks
does not lead to large upward revisions of beliefs about collateral quality. A useful way of thinking
about the issue is then to distinguish between collateral quality (values of p) being respectively
low (case 1), intermediate (cases 2, 4, and 5), and high (case 3).8
The proposition tells us that when collateral quality is low, information acquisition does not
affect the expected use of capital as the two effects exactly offset each other. On the other hand,
when collateral quality is high, only the first effect is at work. The limiting factor is capital, and
more information acquisition makes it more likely that this level of capital is used. There is no
countervailing benefit of ignorance as K cannot be increased further.
The more tricky case is that of intermediate levels of collateral quality when incentive problems
are present. When projects are moderately profitable, more information always has negative effects.
Capital usage is a convex function of p in case 2. This implies that the benefit of an increase from
p to p more than exceeds the cost of not being able to finance projects in some states. One arrives
at a different conclusion when projects are highly profitable. First, for high values of p within
the region of a binding incentive-compatibility constraint, the first-best level of capital can be
achieved, and in that case more information acquisition always improves welfare. It is therefore
only for lower values of p that less information acquisition is potentially helpful.
8This terminology is not entirely accurate. It is, in principle, possible for case 1 to occur for high values of p,
for example if C relatively low compared to K? in which case it is collateral rather than capital which becomes the
limiting factor even for high values of p. I have in mind a situation where C is large relative to K? such that the
indicated progression between the cases does indeed occur.
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Taken together, the results of Propositions 1 and 2 tell us the following: If collateral quality
is high, firms can use the optimal level of capital K?. One can think of this as representing the
normal state of affairs. When agents are able to fully utilize their technology, more information
about collateral values entail a positive externality as agents are less prone to be affected by shocks.
If collateral quality deteriorates somewhat, however, agents with moderately profitable projects
face credit constraints. They can suddenly face a sharp decline in the amount of capital to which
they have access, a situation resembling a panic, and are using less capital than is feasible given
the technology available to them. Moreover, when these constraints are present, the return to
using more capital is an increasing and convex function of p (recall that K = γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q)).
While greater ignorance increases risks or fragility, it also allows firms to use more capital when
no signals are observed, and the ability to use more capital in some cases is so valuable that it
outweighs the additional risk.
Finally, I note that the finding that ignorance is beneficial when credit constraints bind is robust
to alternative formulations of the model. In general, any formulation which emphasizes uncertainty
about p will favor such uncertainty in the credit constraint region because capital usage is convex
within that region, but not elsewhere. One could also have modeled the externality by linking
information gathering and the information cost. Information might leak, for example. If a bank
invests heavily in information and develop expertise in valuing collateral, rival banks may benefit as
employees change jobs and use their expertise. A natural formulation of this idea would be let the
information cost, γ, be a decreasing function of the degree of information acquisition, 1−α. Since
K = γ(1−p)(1−q) in the credit constraint region, it would be welfare-improving to reduce information
acquisition in order to increase information costs.
3.4. Central Bank Collateral Policy
The considerations of the previous section show that there is a potential role for a social planner in
trying to coax banks towards becoming more or less informed depending on the circumstances. We
saw that information production entails a positive externality when the first-best level of capital
is feasible and a negative externality when credit constraints bind. At the margin, a central bank
might therefore attempt to induce agents to produce more or less information depending on the
state facing agents. That may be an adequate description of a central bank’s influence in the sense
that many factors outside a central bank’s influence affect the incentives to produce information.
In this section, however, I consider the starker case in which α is endogenous.
I focus attention on the more interesting case which is when uninformed lending dominates
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informed lending and projects are not highly profitable, corresponding to cases 2 and 3. In this
case, welfare is increasing for α as long as the credit constraint binds. At some point, however,
γ
(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) will exceed K
? and at that point expected capital usage begins to decline as a
function of α.9
The degree of information acquisition, α, is now defined as the fraction of banks gathering infor-
mation about collateral. A central bank attempts to control the degree of information acquisition
through collateral policy. Specifically, it is assumed that banks’ occasionally face payment shocks
of magnitude M which either require them to hold ample ”reserves”, i.e. capital (numeraire) not
passed on to firms (K − K), or to use their secured loans as collateral with the central bank.
Capital is thus both an input of production and a means a payment. Banks are assumed never to
want to default, and so will either retain enough capital or be sure that they have access to it via
the central bank.
The assumption that banks sometimes have to borrow from the central bank, or alternatively
must hoard liquidity, has a counterpart in reality. Since the advent of real-time gross settlement
systems for settling interbank payments, banks frequently face substantial intraday payment im-
balances, and there generally is not a functioning intraday money market. Because the timing
of payments is uncertain, intraday liquidity shocks are sometimes viewed as being uninsurable in
the money market (Martin, 2004), and major central banks commonly offer credit at zero interest
rates against collateral during the day.10 Of course, the assumption that banks occasionally need
to resort to central bank borrowing could be justified on other grounds such as imperfections in
the money market.
The central bank’s objective is to maximize the aggregate profits of firms.11 If a fraction 1−α
of banks gather information, aggregative profits are:
(1− α) [p(qA− 1)K? − γ] + αp(qA− 1)K(p, α) (18)
where K(p, α) = min
{
γ
(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) ,K
?
}
.
The central bank sets haircuts, h(p|αˆ), that depend on collateral quality and a target level
9Parametrically, we are guaranteed to be in the ”uninformed” region whenever p exceeds the larger of the two
solutions to the quadratic equation γ
(1−p)(1−q) = p(qA − 1)K? − γ. The requirement that projects not be highly
profitable in the region with credit constraints is that qA − 1
1−(1−α)(1−q) < 0 whenever α is less than the α which
solves the equation γ
(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) = K
?.
10The aim of having real-time settlement systems and interest-free, collateralized intraday credit is to ensure the
smooth functioning of payment systems. That this structure provides a stronger role for central bank collateral
policy can be viewed as an unintended consequence.
11Recall that the participation constraint binds given our parametric assumptions; all of the surplus that is
generated therefore accrues to firms.
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of information acquisition, αˆ. Specifically, it requires banks verify to the collateral quality with
probability 1− αˆ in order to qualify for their collateral to be eligible. This is obviously an abstrac-
tion. It is intended to capture the idea of choosing a random sample of loans for audit. In reality,
eligible central bank collateral is often a securitized product such as a mortgage-backed security
representing a pool of loans. To ascertain the quality of the collateral, one can think of the model
as saying that the bank must choose a sample of a certain size which is to be analyzed in detail
and disclose the information of the detailed investigation.12
If the collateralized loan is eligible as central bank collateral, the bank can make payment
whenever K −K + V (1− h(p|αˆ)) ≥M , where V denotes the central bank’s valuation of the asset
posted as collateral. I assume that the central bank values the loan as: V = K. This is a natural
assumption because, in the case I focus on, banks break-even in expectation and are on average
repaid K. The constraint facing banks then reads:
K − h(p|αˆ)K ≥M (19)
By assumption we are in the region where banks, left to their own devices, would not gather
information. Now, the central bank initially announces that it wants banks to verify the collateral
quality of firms with probability 1 − αˆ in order to qualify for central bank eligibility. For this to
be an equilibrium outcome, it must then be the case that firms, taking αˆ as given are better off
under an eligible contract than one which is not.13 Concretely, this means that the central bank
must be able to choose a haircut such that those pairs chosen for audit would not be better off
not borrowing from the central bank. The harshest ”punishment” the central bank can inflict is
to refuse an asset as collateral, i.e. imposing a 100% haircut, in which case the maximal capital
use is K −M . The requirement is therefore:
p(qA− 1) (K −M) ≤ p(qA− 1)K? − γ (20)
We are now in a position to define an equilibrium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a pair of optimal contracts (K,R, x), one for informed and one
for uninformed lending as defined in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 respectively, with the constraint
K ≤ K? (6) replaced by K ≤ min
{
K?, K−Mh(p|αˆ)
}
. Firms choose the profit-maximizing contract, and
12For a real-life example, in 2011 the Danish central bank permitted banks to post portfolio of loans as collateral,
but required that these portfolios were audited to ensure that the loan quality met certain quality standards.
13To rule out that firms chosen for audit seek financing elsewhere, one can think of the central bank as pre-selecting
a fraction 1− αˆ of firms for audit and requiring banks to perform the audit if they happen to be matched with either
of these firms.
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the central bank selects of a fraction, αˆ, of loans for which banks must acquire information with
the objective of maximizing aggregate profits as defined in (18) subject to the feasibility condition
given by (20).
The timing assumption is that central bank policy is known at the beginning of the period,
while firms and banks are assumed to take the central bank’s target αˆ as given when making
choices. The only other ”reasonable” choice would be α = 1 since agents are identical and are all
in the uninformed region. However, the higher the α, the easier it is for the central bank to choose
a haircut satisfying the feasibility constraint in (20). If agents were to take α = 1 as given, the
central bank would be even less constrained in its ability to attain its target.
3.4.1. Optimal collateral policy
A few initial observations are helpful when trying to understand collateral policy. First, the optimal
haircut level is not unique. The central bank either wants a bank to gather information or it does
not, and the only question is whether there exists a sufficiently large haircut to induce information
acquisition. One can therefore restrict attention to haircuts of 0% and 100%. The description,
incidentally, is consistent with actual collateral policy. Central banks typically set low haircuts
for a narrow set of eligible assets while entirely excluding others. Second, the results from Section
3.3 can readily be applied without having to re-solve the problem: If the central bank does not
accept a loan as collateral, the new constraint K ≤ K −M is, from a mathematical point of view,
completely analogous to the constraint K ≤ K? and so simply replaces it whenever K −M ≤ K?.
Third, we can either think of a certain fraction αˆ as having been pre-selected for audit or assume
that a random audit taking place immediately after the contracting stage with identical results.
In the latter case, firms would be comparing profits under information-based lending E[Π]I with
profits under the random audit which would be αˆE[Π]I + (1− αˆ)E[Π]UI , and that clearly results
in exactly the same contract choices.
Observe also that the central bank will never want to target an αˆ s.th. K(p, αˆ) is in the credit
constraint region (i.e. where K(p, αˆ) = γ(1−αˆ)(1−p)(1−q)). The objective function is increasing in
that region because p(qA − 1)K(p, α) is increasing in α by Proposition 2 and is larger than the
payoff from uninformed lending, p(qA − 1)K? − γ. Therefore, we can conclude that an optimal
degree of information acquisition must be such that K(p, αˆ) = K?. Second, once the first-best
level of capital is reached, the expected use of capital is declining so there is potentially scope for
an ”active”, i.e. information-inducing, collateral policy.
An illustration of situation from the perspective of a firm is provided in Figure 3.4. The figure
shows the expected profits of firms with and without information acquisition for different values
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of p, in the latter case for different values of α (0.2 and 0.5 respectively). As α increases, the
firm (which takes α as given) finds it less attractive to choose a contract which entails information
acquisition. When p is in the region with credit constraints, the firm benefits from ignorance as
credit constraints are weakened. Agents with higher quality collateral, however, find their profits
reduced when ignorance is more widespread.
Figure 3.4: Collateral quality and expected profits. The figure depicts how expected firm profits vary with collateral quality
depending on whether banks acquire information or not. The sold line shows profits when information is acquired. The two
dashed lines show profits when information is not being acquired when α, the degree of information acquisition in the economy,
is respectively 0.2 (corresponding to more information acquisition) and 0.5 (corresponding to less information acquisition).
An alternative perspective is provided by fixing collateral quality and varying the degree of
information acquisition (treating it as exogenous to the choice of an individual bank). Figure
3.5 shows the effects of more ignorance (higher α) for different levels of collateral quality. When
collateral quality is high, specifically so high that K(p, α) = K? is feasible for any α, more ignorance
is always harmful. On the other hand, some ignorance is beneficial when collateral quality is
lower. The flat portions of the lines correspond to the region in which a bank will want to acquire
information and is therefore unaffected by the level of ignorance. At some α it becomes optimal
for a bank not to gather information and lend uninformed. In that region the credit constraint
binds, and expected profits are increasing. When the credit constraint no longer binds, however,
ignorance only increases risks and becomes detrimental.
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Figure 3.5: Ignorance and expected profits. The figure shows expected profits as a function of α for three different values of
collateral quality: p = 0.6, p = 0.8, and p = 0.9. α is the degree of information acquisition in the economy, with higher values
of α correspond to less information acquisition. The flat parts of the lower two lines correspond to regions in which banks
acquire information, the increasing parts to regions when the credit constraint binds, and the decreasing parts to regions in
which the first-best level of capital is attainable. When collateral quality is adequately high, as illustrated with the top line,
the first-best level of capital is always attainable, and profits are everywhere a decreasing function of α.
To identify an optimal collateral policy, one must first ask whether the central bank is even able
to induce some measure of information acquisition on the part of agents. As noted, the strictest
requirement a central bank can impose is a haircut of 100 percent in which case K ≤ K −M and
comparing profits under this restriction with profits under informed lending leads to the central
bank’s feasibility constraint in (20). We can solve that for α to find:
α ≥ αfeas = 1
1− p
(
1−
pK? − γqA−1
K −M
)
(21)
Whenever αfeas > 1, no information inducing collateral policy is possible. The condition for
the central bank to be able to affect the information acquisition at least somewhat is therefore as
given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. A central bank can use collateral policy to induce information acquisition provided that
K −K? ≤M − γ
p(qA− 1) (22)
The above result tells us that central banks have more influence when payment flows are large,
or at least when agents cannot easily obtain liquidity from other sources such as the money market.
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One can interpret K −K? as reserves with the central bank as these are funds, which the bank
cannot lend.14 An implication of the model is therefore that if K is large, central bank collateral
policy becomes impotent. Thus, other central bank policies such as large-scale asset purchases,
which increase aggregate reserves, limit the potency of collateral policy.15
If the central bank can induce information acquisition, the next question is what degree of in-
formation acquisition it should target. First, one can proceed by first identifying the unconstrained
optimal α. Maximizing the objective function w.r.t. α produces:
αopt =
1
2
+
γ
2(1− p)(qA− 1)K? (23)
In order for an active collateral policy to make sense, it must be the case that αopt < 1, which
implies γ < (1− p)(qA− 1)K?. This tells us that collateral policy is a more attractive tool when
the cost of information is low relative to the marginal payoff from being able to use extra capital
in expectation.
However, a further factor must also be taken into consideration. For any α to be optimal, it
must be the case that K(p, α) = K?. This means that any target α must exceed the following:
αmin = 1− γ
(1− p)(1− q)K? (24)
Taken together, the above observations imply the following: Ideally, the central bank would
like to choose αˆ = αopt, provided that this quantity is less than one; otherwise there is no scope for
collateral policy. The central bank may, however, be constrained by any αˆ having to exceed both
αmin and αfeas. If αopt < 1, welfare is decreasing in α in the region [αopt, 1], and the optimal choice
is therefore to choose the smallest possible αˆ which must therefore equal max {αmin, αfeas, αopt}.
This finding is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. An optimal collateral policy entails inducing information acquisition on the part
of a fraction 1− αˆ of agents, with αˆ given by:
αˆ = min {max {αmin, αfeas, αopt} , 1} (25)
14In aggregate, bank reserves with the central are primarily determined by central bank actions and do not reflect
the lending decisions on the part of banks, as explained in e.g. Keister and McAndrews (2009), contrary to the
common conception that banks are sometimes ”sitting” on reserves.
15As an aside, there are other, positive side effects of such policies. An interesting example is provided by Bech
et al. (2012) who show that payment systems started functioning more smoothly in the US following the introduction
of emergency liquidity measures because, with reserves being ample, banks’ opportunity cost of holding these reserves
became very small.
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with αmin, αfeas and αopt defined in (24), (21), and (23) respectively.
Since agents, left to their own devices, would all lend uninformed, an immediate corollary
is that a central bank generally wants more information than is privately produced when p is
relatively high. The opposite may be the case when p is low enough for agents to be in the
information-acquisition region for some α, as will be discussed in the following section.
The model can also be applied to thinking about the characteristics of the assets which central
banks prefer as collateral. As we are concerned with situations in which a central bank may want
to induce information acquisition by refusing to accept certain assets as collateral, a natural way
to address this issue is to identify the assets for which the cost of inducing information acquisition
is the lowest. If more information acquisition is desirable, then the central bank should leave these
assets out of the set of eligible assets to induce information acquisition in the cheapest possible
way.
We must first define what is meant by the cost of a given collateral policy. I focus on the
difference in profits with and without information acquisition: E[ΠI − ΠUI ] = (p(qA − 1)K? −
γ) − p(qA − 1)K(p, α). A ”high” cost then corresponds to a large negative value. This is the
loss to those agents who are forced to gather information when they would have preferred not
to. One could imagine an extension of the model in which agents were heterogeneous along some
dimensions, in which the central bank first should attempt to induce information acquisition in the
lower cost cases. Since central banks will only induce information acquisition when K(p, α) = K?,
the cost can be expressed as:
E[ΠI −ΠUI ] = −(1− α)(1− p)(qA− 1)K? − γ (26)
Now, if there were heterogeneity, it might also be the case that K(p, α) = γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) for
some assets. For these, the cost would be:
(qA− 1)
(
pK? − γ
(1− p)(1− q)
)
− γ (27)
Two implications follow in Proposition 4:
Proposition 4. A central bank prefers collateral characterized by high information costs. The
central bank gives the most preferential treatment to the highest quality (p) assets for which the
credit constraint still binds.
It is straightforward to see that the cost of an active collateral policy is higher if γ is large.
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One can think of the model as one of asymmetric information. If information costs are high,
banks have less incentive to exploit their potential informational advantage. Effectively, there is
less asymmetric information. One can think of high information cost assets as being information-
insensitive (Gorton and Ordon˜ez, 2014; Dang et al., 2015). Under that interpretation it makes
sense to equate high information cost asset with e.g. safe debt securities as these are among the
securities least plagued by informational asymmetries. Such an interpretation is consistent with
the behavior of central banks who tend prefer highly liquid debt securities.16
The second statement in Proposition 4 follows from the fact that cost is decreasing (i.e. less
negative) in p whenever K(p, α) = K? and increasing whenever K(p, α) = γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) . Col-
lateral just on the border of being credit constrained rather than the very best collateral should
therefore receive the most preferential treatment.
Project quality also matters for collateral quality and mostly, at least as long as p is fairly large
(and always when K(p, α) = K?), such that loans involving higher quality projects are preferred as
collateral. The logic is that agents who prefer not to acquire information can, in expectation, use
more capital when information is not acquired. Since welfare is proportional to both the amount
of capital and its profitability, it is preferable that agents with higher quality capital do not gather
information.
3.4.2. Informed lending and panics
In the preceding, it was assumed that p was in the region with no information acquisition. Suppose
instead that p is such that agents would gather information assuming other agents also gathered
information. In that case the economy might be ”stuck” in an undesirable full information equi-
librium with welfare equaling p(qA− 1)K? − γ. On the other hand, if each agent believed that no
other agent would gather information, there would be no credit constraint, and welfare would be
p(qA− 1)K?, an improvement over the case with full information. This highlights the possibility
of multiple equilibria depending on beliefs and that there can be too much information acquisition
when collateral quality is low.
It is outside the scope of the model to say how agents might form their beliefs, but it is possible
to say something about whether a particular equilibrium is more or less ”likely” in the sense of
occurring for a wider range beliefs. There must exist some α above which agents no longer find it
optimal to gather information. Since information-acquisition can only ever be optimal when the
16Central banks also tend to give preference to traded over non-traded assets which likely also reflects concerns
about asymmetric information. As an example, the ECB has much stricter collateral requirements when ”non-
marketable” assets are used as collateral. Of course, central banks may also be wary of accepting assets plagued by
asymmetric information because of lemons problems. There is empirical evidence to suggest that banks do, in fact,
post their worst collateral with central banks, see Fecht et al. (2015).
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incentive-compatibility constraint binds, this threshold value of α is defined setting profits equal
under informed lending and uninformed when this constraint binds, i.e.:
p(qA− 1)K? − γ = (qA− 1) γ
(1− p)(1− q) (28)
The right-hand side of expression is increasing in α, as p is an increasing function of α, and
tends to infinity as α approaches one. It follows that there is a unique α for which that expression
is equal to the left-hand side of the above equation. This indirectly defines a threshold value of α
below which an agent would want to gather information.
One can then derive comparative statics results by implicit differentiation. The key findings
are provided in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Assume p is such that banks would acquire information if other banks did as well.
In that case there exists a unique threshold value of α such that a bank will gather information if
it believes that a fraction 1− α or more of other banks also gather information. This threshold is
increasing in project quality (A) and the first-best level of capital (K?) and decreasing in informa-
tion costs (γ) and collateral quality (p). Welfare is higher if no banks gather information than if
all banks gather information.
The above suggests that banks might collectively ”panic”, for instance because of a deterio-
ration in collateral quality, and decide to gather information, leading to a sharp contraction in
credit. One can think of multiple real-life situations resembling such a panic. For example, a drop
in house prices might lead banks to evaluate housing collateral more critically and tighten lending
standards, leading to less credit (and there may be a feedback loop as house prices drop further,
exacerbating the riskiness of the collateral). It also highlights the role of beliefs. Some types of
funding are based on trust rather than thorough analysis: It is difficult to ascertain, for example,
whether a bank or a sovereign is really solvent, and it may be optimal for one agent to withdraw
funding simply because the agent believes that other agents are likely to do the same. In that
sense, sudden information production can be interpreted as a run-like phenomenon.
A central bank will want to halt run-like behavior, and one could imagine it using collateral
policy to counter sudden information production. To engineer a move away from information
production, a literal interpretation of the model might be that it should worsen the terms for
collateral known to be good, thus making information acquisition less attractive. More realistically,
though, banks are likely in general need of liquidity in a panic-like situation, and the best response
of the central bank could be to provide especially favorable terms for collateral of lower quality.
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Since many central banks normally only accept a narrow set of assets a eligible collateral, their
extensions of the set of eligible collateral to include more assets can also be viewed as making low
quality collateral more attractive in relative terms.
A concrete way of modeling a ”panic” might be to assume that an aggregate shock has occurred.
An aggregate shock, following Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014), is defined as an event which transforms
fraction (1 − η) of good collateral into bad collateral. One might then use the model to consider
the following hypothetical: Suppose a crisis (an aggregate shock) is believed to be imminent, with
everyone sharing the belief that others will begin producing information upon the occurrence of a
shock. Would welfare then be higher if agents had acquired full knowledge in advance of the crisis,
or would they be better off acquiring information once the crisis occurs? Proposition 6 suggests
that more information is generally associated with a more robust economy.
Proposition 6. Faced with an aggregate shock that is sufficiently large to induce information
acquisition, welfare is larger if information has been acquired in advance of shocks, except for the
region of aggregate shocks (η) satisfying γqA−1 ≥ ηK? − γ(1−η)(1−q) ≥ 0.
This result tells us that, in many cases, having information makes agents more robust to shock.
This is reminiscent of the findings from the dynamic version of Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) who
find that less information acquisition is generally associated with larger effects of shocks.
3.5. Extensions
In this section I consider some extensions to the model. In the preceding, the central bank would
induce information acquisition by restricting the amount of capital available for lending. If loan
capital were scarce, however, it seems plausible that bargaining power might shift from firms to
banks. In the following section I examine the consequences of letting banks rather firms dictate
loan terms and show that a shift in bargaining power does not alter the conclusions of the previous
section.
The introduction of the information externality in the static setting can be viewed as a means
capturing a trade-off where uninformed lending allows agents to use more capital at the expense of
fragility. In another extension I consider a dynamic version of the model where the central bank’s
options are more limited: If it is to induce information acquisition, it cannot select a fraction of
agents, but must force all uninformed agents to gather information. Finally, another externality
arises in a dynamic (OLG) setting because agents do not internalize the future effects of their
information choices. A social planner will generally want more information than is produced, and
I discuss how collateral policy can be used to reach the social optimum.
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3.5.1. Bargaining power with banks
Earlier we saw that central banks only use collateral policy to actively encourage information
acquisition when the first-best level of capital, K?, is feasible, i.e. when p is large and K? <
γ
(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) . To show that shifting bargaining power from firms to banks does not alter earlier
conclusions about collateral policy, two shortcuts are helpful in simplifying exposition. First,
since p is large, the collateral constraint can be ignored. Second, I consider only the case where
incentive-problems are the most pronounced, which is when α = 0.
Now, suppose that banks have all of the bargaining power. With uninformed lending their
problem is to choose K and R in order to maximize their payoff R subject to a participation
constraint on the part of firms and an incentive-compatibility constraint on their own part. When
α = 0, these constraints become:
qAK −R ≥ 0 (29)
qR−K + γ
1− p ≥ 0 (30)
Together, these constraints imply that:
qAK ≥ R ≥ 1
q
(
K − γ
1− p
)
(31)
Whenever projects are highly profitable (q2A−1 ≥ 0) the expression to the left exceeds that to
the right, and bank profits are therefore maximized by choosing K as large as possible and setting
R = qAK. Consider on the other hand somewhat profitable projects for which (q2A− 1 < 0). In
order for uninformed lending to be feasible, it follows from (31) that the use of capital can be at
most K ≤ γ
(1−p)(1−q2A) , and - if K could be chosen freely - the profit-maximizing choice would be
to choose exactly K ≤ γ
(1−p)(1−q2A) and R = qAK. However, capital is restricted to be less than
K −M when central banks refuse assets as collateral, and this constraint can only have an effect
if K −M < K?. We observed earlier that K? < γ(1−p)(1−q) and clearly γ(1−p)(1−q) ≤ γ(1−p)(1−q2A) .
It follows that the optimal choice is again to choose the largest possible K which in this case is
K −M (and firms’ participation constraint will again bind).
These considerations imply that bank profits under uninformed lending are (qA− 1)(K −M).
With informed lending, the bank would earn p(qA− 1)K? − γ. Hence, the central bank would be
able to induce information acquisition whenever:
p(qA− 1)K? − γ ≥ (qA− 1)(K −M) (32)
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But the above feasibility condition is exactly identical to the condition found when firms have
all of the bargaining power, see Lemma 2. It therefore follows that changing assumptions about
bargaining power neither affects welfare, since the amount of capital used is the same, nor the
ability of central banks to affect outcomes; it only changes the distribution of profits.
3.5.2. Dynamics with information externality
In this section I consider the implications for collateral policy when the central bank’s options are
more limited: It cannot require a fraction of banks to gather information, but must either require
all or none of the uninformed to gather information. The purpose of this section is therefore to
function as a sort of robustness check. I use the dynamic, overlapping generations model found
in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) in which the static setting is repeated period after period. What
changes over time is the distribution of knowledge about collateral quality.
Initially, there is assumed to be full knowledge of collateral quality, but in each period some
knowledge is lost. Specifically, information decays in such a way that each period a fraction λ
of agents lose knowledge of whether their collateral is good or bad. If no information is being
reacquired - and whether information is reacquired will depend on p and α - the collateral is
perceived to be of average quality. With reacquisition of information each period, the level of
consumption is constant through time as there is always full knowledge. Without reacquisition of
information and starting from a state of full knowledge, the distribution of probabilities therefore
evolves as f(1) = p(1−λ)t, f(p) = 1− (1−λ)tand f(0) = (1−p)(1−λ)t. For further details about
the dynamic model, see Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014). Finally, I assume that informational shocks
which affect uninformed agents of one generation are not known to future generations so only the
measure of informed agents evolves through time.
When information evolves through time, one can also think about the evolution of credit and
beliefs. Consider starting from a case of full information (α = 0). If p is in the information-
acquisition region, it always stays there as information is continually reacquired. If, on the other
hand, p is outside that region, information will gradually decay, and credit constraints must at some
point vanish, as γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) will eventually exceed K
?. From such a point onwards, however,
the effects of agents becoming less and less uninformed are negative as signals become more and
more likely to be observed.
It might seem that policy of inducing information acquisition for all agents should never be
optimal in this setting. After all, uninformed agents use more capital in expectation than informed
ones. However, along the path from being fully informed to less informed there is a period in which
more capital is used. One could therefore pose the question of whether there is what essentially
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amounts to a stopping time, a point at which the central bank should enforce a strict collateral
policy. The determinants of that stopping time could then be viewed as the factors influencing
the strictness of collateral policy. It turns out that rephrasing the problem in these terms leads to
essentially the same qualitative conclusions as detailed in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. In a dynamic setting in which the central bank can only force all banks to gather
information simultaneously, it will enforce a policy which induces information acquisition sooner
when (a) information costs are low, (b) information decays slowly, (c) collateral quality is relatively
low, and (d) projects are more profitable.
These findings are essentially identical to those in Proposition 3, only with the difference that
said result describes an optimal information level whereas this proposition describes whether a
central bank should tighten sooner rather than later. In their own way, both therefore describe the
factors that enter into thinking about the ”leniency” of collateral policy. It is also straightforward
to find an unconstrained optimal α in a dynamic setting. Suppose that an information level
(1− α) is to be maintained, and let V (α) be the value function associated with maintaining that
information level. Then V (α) is described by:
V (α) = αp(qA− 1)K? + (1− α)(qA− 1)pK? − (1− α)λγ + βV (α) (33)
It follows that:
V ′(αopt) = 0⇒ αopt = 1
2
+
λγ
2(1− p)(qA− 1)K? (34)
This is the same as in the static case, only with lower information costs, λγ rather than γ.
Now, the above takes as given a situation in which agents are uninformed and p is such that agents
will not reacquire information on their own. An alternative is that p belongs to the region where
information is being reacquired each period. In that case there is perfect information each period,
and the per period welfare is p(qA−1)K?−λγ. Agents would collectively be better off in the long
term if there information were not reacquired, and more agents decided to lend uninformed.
3.5.3. Dynamics without information externality
The dynamic model in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) also features an externality of its own. The
overlapping-generations framework effectively makes agents impatient relative to a social planner
as agents do not take into account the effect of their actions on all future generations. In essence,
where a bank’s calculation involves comparing whether the gain from gathering information exceeds
the cost of doing so, the social planner consider all discounted future gains. A simple way of
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showing this is as follows: Let ∆pi denote the one-period difference in profits between gathering
and not gathering information (exclusive of the information cost). With probability λ, the gain
from information gathering lasts for one period and is ∆pi, with probability λ(1−λ) the gain lasts
for two periods and is ∆pi + β∆pi, and so forth. It is then straightforward to that the expected
discounted value of future gains exceed the cost when:
∆pi ≥ γ(1− β(1− λ)) (35)
It follows that a social planner effectively faces a lower information cost than banks and there-
fore wants information production for a wider range of collateral values than is being produced.
Gorton and Ordon˜ez suggest the use of lump sum taxes on individuals. Here I describe how central
bank collateral policy can achieve the social optimum.
The need for intervention arises because of the difference in information costs facing agents
and a social planner, who takes into account the future. A social planner would want information
production whenever17:
(1− β(1− λ)) γ
qA− 1 ≤ pK
? −K(p) (36)
whereas banks produce information when:
γ
qA− 1 ≤ pK
? −K(p) (37)
The right-hand sides of the above inequalities are only positive in the region where the incentive-
compatibility constraint binds, i.e. when K(p) = γ(1−p)(1−q) . Hence, a collateral policy that aims
at changing incentives for information gathering will only affect that region. In order to implement
the collateral policy, the central bank must apply the following the logic. Uninformed lending is
preferred to informed lending whenever:
p(qA− 1)K? − γ ≤ (qA− 1)K (38)
Hence, the smallest K for which uninformed lending could still be an outcome is pK? − γqA−1 .
In order to prevent an agent from borrowing more than K, the central bank must set a haircut
s.th. K − h(p)K < M . It follows that a haircut policy must satisfy the following requirement:
17See Proposition 7 in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014). Note a minor difference in notation, though. What they call
λ, I call 1− λ.
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h(p) >
K −M
pK? − γqA−1
(39)
An haircut of at least this magnitude must therefore be applied to all collateral which supports
uninformed lending and has p satisfies equation (36).
The above, to summarize, describes the collateral for which the central bank will want infor-
mation acquisition. This is the lowest quality collateral for which information acquisition does not
already take place. It then sets haircuts based on the following logic. It first calculates the lowest
level of capital for which an agent would prefer uninformed to informed lending. Having found
this level of capital, it then asks which haircut is sufficient to ensure that agents prefer informed
to uninformed lending. Of course, since haircuts cannot exceed 100 percent a particular haircut
policy may not be feasible, as also discussed in Lemma 2. A corollary is also a lower haircut suffices
for a larger p.
Finally, we can consider some effects of a stricter collateral policy as relates to aggregate shocks.
Recall from earlier that we defined an aggregate shock as on that transformed a fraction (1− η) of
good collateral into bad collateral. Now, the analysis in the static setting suggested the benefits
of pursuing a more lenient collateral policy when agents were credit constrained. However, the
following proposition suggests that such leniency may slow down a recovery.
Proposition 8. If p is such that K(p) = K? and a sufficiently large aggregate shock occurs, then
an optimal collateral policy results in a faster recovery than would a more lenient collateral policy.
The analysis in the static setting implied that central banks should attempt to support un-
informed lending when collateral quality declines, but the preceding suggests that there may be
costs associated with such a policy.
3.6. Conclusion
This paper examines a model of collateralized lending and central bank collateral policy. Borrowers
have unpledgeable income, but can nevertheless secure credit because of access to collateral. The
key friction in the model is that lenders have an informational advantage in valuing collateral. They
can, at a cost, verify the true value of the collateral and only lend when the collateral is good.
If there were no incentive problems, uninformed lending - lending based solely on the expected
value of the collateral - would always dominate informed lending. Lenders, however, have strong
incentives to learn collateral quality prior to lending. To avoid this, borrowers may prefer to obtain
smaller loans. They are, in a sense, credit constrained. An interesting outcome of the model is that
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credit constraints aﬄict lower quality projects more, even though project and collateral quality
are unrelated.
A central bank is introduced in the second part of the paper. It attempts to affect agents’ in-
centives to produce information. Actual central banks have on more occasions made e.g. disclosure
requirements about risks a prerequisite for eligibility of assets with the central bank. This feature
is reproduced in the model as the central bank attempts to induce information acquisition on the
part of banks to limit the risk of shocks as long as collateral is perceived to be of relatively high
quality. If a collateral crisis materializes, however, the central bank reverts course and attempts
to support uninformed lending. Thus, the model may help explain features of actual collateral
policy such as the use of narrow and broad sets of collateral with the latter only being introduced
in times of crisis.
At a more general level, the model points to a link between two seemingly disparate activities
of banks, their lending or investment decisions and their role as providers of payment services,
through central bank collateral policy. In the terminology of Chapman et al. (2011), the paper
considers the ”payments-system liquidity channel” of collateral policy. In reality, policy operates
through other channels as well, for example by affecting liquidity and risk-taking incentives. If
central banks set low haircuts on assets, those assets may become more liquid which in turn affects
asset allocation decisions, while inadequate haircuts may also produce moral hazard problems.
The key elements of the model can be thought of as a stylized description of e.g. an individual
or a firm applying for a loan using real estate as collateral. Individuals or firms may not be able
to pledge future income, and it is plausible that banks have superior information about the value
of the real estate. The model is less suited as a description of e.g. an entrepreneur (perhaps
with inadequate collateral) applying for a loan to finance an investment. In that case asymmetric
information about project quality is likely to be a relevant financing friction. However, the general
setup can easily be altered to accommodate other frictions. A simple, but interesting model of
unsecured bank lending emerges if one ignores the collateral and focus on asymmetries related to
project quality, q. A sketch of such a model is given in the appendix. For example, if one considers
a model where output is pledgeable and banks can learn the true project quality, one can show
that three quality-regions emerge: The best projects get financing without any information being
acquired, projects of intermediate quality are subject to information acquisition and are financed
if good, while the worst projects do not receive financing.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
A derivation of the optimal contract is given in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014). In their exposition it
appears to be an unstated assumption that information acquisition, once agreed upon, is verifiable
(say, because the firm can require the bank to document its findings), and I have made that
assumption explicit.
This assumption could, however, be relaxed. Here I will focus on the case where K = K? is
feasible. In that case the optimal contract is
(
R = K? + γp , x =
K?+ γ
p
C , K = K
?
)
. Deviating is
potentially profitable because R > K? so the bank can make profits in default states (i.e. states
where the project fails). On the other hand, the collateral is on average insufficient in default
states because the contract is predicated on banks actually verifying the collateral quality. The no
deviation condition can be written as:
p[qR+ (1− q)xC −K]− γ ≥ qR+ (1− q)(pxC)−K (40)
Inserting the optimal contract and rearranging, the condition becomes:
(
q
p
+ (1− q)
)
γ ≤ (1− q)(1− p)K? (41)
K? is conceived of as being large relative to γ, and (as will be apparent from later results)
information gathering only occurs for intermediate values of p. Hence, the parametric restriction
is likely to satisfied as long as q is not very close to 1.
Another resolution to the incentive problem might be for the firm to always hand over the
collateral at the end of the period rather than making payment out of income (when the project
is successful) since that would remove any incentive to deviate. Incidentally, when information
acquisition has not been agreed upon, the converse is true: it clearly is in the interest of the firms
to make payments out of output whenever possible. Banks’ incentive to deviate arises exactly
because they have superior information about collateral value, and so firms would be worsening
incentive-compatibility problems by handing over collateral. Mathematically, when firms make
payments out of output, they face a constraint of the type K ≤ γ(1−p)(1−q) whereas the constraint
would be K ≤ γ1−p if firms always handed over collateral.
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Proof of Proposition 1
The firm is faced with the following maximization problem:
max p [q(AK −R)− (1− q)pxC] (42)
or simplified slightly,
max pqAK − pxC (43)
Any contract must satisfy banks’ participation constraint which, as shown in the main text, is
given by:
pxC −K ≥ 0 (44)
Using R = pxC, the incentive-compatibility constraint can be written as:
(1− (1− α)(1− q)) pxC −K + γ
1− p ≥ 0 (45)
The remaining constraints are:
1− x ≥ 0 (46)
K? −K ≥ 0 (47)
Observe that either the participation constraint or the incentive-compatibility constraint (or
possibly both) must bind: If they did not, reducing x would always increase profits. Suppose first
that the participation constraint is binding. In that case, profits are
p(qA− 1)K (48)
The maximum is therefore found by choose K as large as possible subject to the other con-
straints. This implies that
K = min{pC, γ
(1− α)(1− p)(1− q) ,K
?} (49)
The first of these instances corresponds to a binding collateral constraint, the second to a
binding incentive-compatibility constraint, and the third to the first-best capital allocation.
Next, suppose in contrast that the incentive-compatibility constraint is binding. In that case
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profits can be written as:
p
(
qA− 1
1− (1− α)(1− q)
)
K +
pγ
1− pq − p(1− q) (50)
It follows that the optimal choice is again to choose K as large as possible, provided that
qA − 11−(1−α)(1−q) > 0. If, on the other hand, qA − 11−(1−α)(1−q) ≤ 0, the optimal solution must
involve a binding participation constraint. Note that this parametric restriction is also consistent
with both the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints binding, as in that case the
optimal choice is to choose K as small as possible, corresponding to K = γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) - see the
constraint expressions immediately below.
When the incentive-compatibility constraint binds, the remaining constraints can be written
as:
K ≥ γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q) (51)
pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + γ
1− p ≥ K (52)
K? ≥ K (53)
It also follows that the participation and incentive-compatibility constraints cannot simultane-
ously bind when qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) > 0 since that would involve a contradiction: We have already
shown that if qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) > 0 and the incentive-compatibility constraint binds, the choice is
to choose K as large as possible, and K = γ(1−p)(1−q) is the smallest possible capital level consistent
with a binding incentive-compatibility constraint.
To summarize the findings thus far, we have found that the participation constraint must bind
if either qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) ≤ 0 or if γ(1−α)(1−p)(1−q) ≥ min{pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + γ1−p ,K?}.
Conversely, a solution with a binding incentive-compatibility constraint and a non-binding
participation constraint is feasible only if qA− 11−(1−α)(1−q) > 0 and:
min{pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + γ
1− p,K
?} > γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q) (54)
The first of these cases corresponds to a binding collateral constraint (x = 1 ), the second to
the first-best level of capital being achieved. The expression can further be simplified to read:
min{pC,K?} > γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q) (55)
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because:
pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + γ
1− p >
γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q)
=⇒ pC > γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q)
(56)
Suppose therefore that the two conditions for a binding incentive-compatibility constraint are
satisfied. Is it then the case that the incentive-compatibility constraint will, in fact, bind? In
general, there are five possible cases: (1) the participation constraint and the collateral constraint
bind; (2) the participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint bind; (3) the
participation constraint and the first-best level of capital is used; (4) the incentive-compatibility
constraint and the collateral constraint bind; and (5) the incentive-compatibility constraint and
the first-best level of capital is used.
I have already argued that (2) cannot be solution in this case, but can we also be sure that
(1) and (3) are not solutions? Clearly, (1) and (3) also cannot be solutions as either of these cases
would violate our second parametric assumption which, as shown above, could be written as:
min{pC,K?} > γ
(1− α) (1− p) (1− q) (57)
Hence, the requirements imposed are also sufficient to guarantee a binding incentive-compatibility
constraint, and (4) or (5) will be optimal depending on which is smaller of pC and K?.
Proof of Proposition 2
We are interested in the effects of α on E[K]. E[K] is found by multiplying the expressions for
capital from Proposition 1 by p. We can summarize E[K] case by case:
1. The participation and collateral constraints bind. Since p = pp: E[K] = pC
2. The participation and incentive-compatibility constraints bind. The use of capital can be
written as K = γ
(p−p)(1−q) , and via a few manipulations: E[K] =
γ
(1−p)(1−q)
3. The participation constraint binds, and K = K?: E[K] = pK?
4. The incentive-comp. and collateral constraints bind: pC [1− (1− α)(1− q)] + pγ1−p
5. The incentive-compatibility constraint binds, and K = K?: E[K] = pK?
It is evident that α has no influence on capital use in case 1. In cases 3 and 5, more ignorance
(higher α) is detrimental to welfare as p = p+ (1− α)(1− p). In case 2, more ignorance is always
beneficial as a higher α leads to an increase in p and therefore also to an increase in the expression
as a whole. In case 4, the partial derivate w.r.t. α equals p(1− p)C − γ, and the effect is unclear.
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Generally, though, we think of C as being large relative γ, in which case the effect is positive.
Proof of Lemma 2
See the main text.
Proof of Proposition 3
See the main text.
Proof of Proposition 4
See the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5
As noted in the main text, the threshold value of α below which information acquisition is optimal
is implicitly defined by the following equation:
p(qA− 1)K? − γ = (qA− 1) γ
(1− p)(1− q) (58)
where 11−p is an increasing function of α. It is then straightforward to find the claimed effects by
implicit differentiation. Here I show the case of project quality (A) - the effects relating to the
other parameters can be derived similarly.
Implicit differentiation of the above equation w.r.t. A gives:
pqK? = q
γ
(1− p)(1− q) + (qA− 1)
γ
1− q
d
dα
(
1
1− p
)
dA
dα
(59)
Rearranging,
q
(
pK? − pγ
(1− p)(1− q)
)
= (qA− 1) γ
1− q
d
dα
(
p
1− p
)
dα
dA
(60)
From the equation defining the threshold value, it follows that:
pK? − γ
(1− p)(1− q) =
γ
qA− 1 > 0 (61)
Hence, the left-hand side of (60) is positive, and it therefore must be the case that dαdA > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
The assumption is that either all agents have full information in advance or will gather it as
a consequence of the imminent crisis, which takes place at the beginning of the period. The
hypothetical we consider is then: Would agents have been better off if agents had been gathered
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prior to the shock? Here the signal and information cost can be ignored as the same amount of
information acquisition takes place whether information is acquired early or upon the occurrence
of the shock. (Note: The information cost could be higher with early information acquisition if
the shock were large enough for p = η to be in the information-acquisition region.)
If agents had full information in advance of the shock, the initial distribution of beliefs would
be f(0) = 1 − p and f(1) = p. Upon the occurrence of the shock, a fraction 1 − η of collateral
turns bad, but agents do not know which is bad. The ex post distribution is therefore f(0) = 1−p
and f(η) = p. Welfare is proportional to capital usage, which is pK(η).
This must be compared to the case where information is gathered by uninformed agents, of
which there is fraction α, once the shock occurs. In that case the initial distribution is f(0) =
(1 − α)(1 − p), f(p) = α, and f(1) = (1 − α)p. Upon the occurrence the shock, the distribution
becomes: f(0) = (1 − α)(1 − p) + α(1 − ηp), f(η) = (1 − α)p, and f(1) = αηp. The associated
capital usage (which, again, is proportional to welfare) is: (1− α)pK(η) + αηpK?.
The difference between waiting for the shock and having information in advance is therefore:
αp (ηK? −K(η)) (62)
For any moderately-sized shock this quantity is negative. Clearly, the expression is negative
whenever η is such that K(η) = K? and also for many values of η when K(η) = γ(1−η)(1−q) . Also, if
the shock is very large, it may cause those agents who are informed in advance to have to reacquire
information. There is, however, one case where waiting for the shock is optimal. If the shock is
very large, but not quite large enough to induce information acquisition, waiting is optimal. This
is the case when:
γ
qA− 1 ≥ ηK
? − γ
(1− η)(1− q) ≥ 0 (63)
Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose the economy starts from a state of full information at time 0, i.e. α(0) = 0, after which
information gradually decays until some stopping time t at which point all uninformed agents are
forced to reacquire information by central bank collateral policy. At that point α(t) = 0 again,
and so the whole process repeats itself in cycles. We can then formulate the problem is one of
finding the highest level of welfare per cycle, scaled by the length of the cycle, i.e. 1
t
multiplied by
the profits attained during the cycle.
It is easier to do the calculations in continuous rather than discrete time since an optimal
stopping time is likely to be placed somewhere between two discrete time values. (And the qual-
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itative features of the solutions, which are the ones we are interested in, are the same.) The
continuous-time equivalent of the discrete-time formulation is that information decays at a rate
dα = λ(1−α)dt with α(0) = 0, hence α(t) = 1− e−λt. Also, to simplify the resulting expressions I
ignore discounting by setting β = 1 and consider the case of K(p, α) = K? since it is in that region
that information acquisition becomes relevant. In that case we are looking to find the stopping
time t which results in the highest average level of welfare, i.e.:
1
t
[∫ t
0
e−λtp(qA− 1)K?dt+
∫ t
0
(
1− e−λt
)(
p+ e−λt(1− p)
)
(qA− 1)K?dt−
(
1− e−λt
)
γ
]
(64)
The first integral expresses is the welfare of informed agents, the second the welfare of uninformed
agents, and finally there is the information cost to be paid, which is proportional to the fraction of
uninformed agents at time t. Solving for he first-order condition w.r.t. t and simplifying produces:
(1− p)(qA− 1)K?
λγ
=
1− e−λt − λte−λt
(1− e−λt − λte−λt)− 12
(
1− e−2λt − 2λte−2λt) (65)
Now, the expression on the right-hand side is a decreasing function of t when t > 0. It therefore
follows by implicit differentiation that:
dt
dγ
> 0 (66)
dt
dλ
> 0 (67)
dt
dp
> 0 (68)
dt
d((qA− 1)K?) < 0 (69)
Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 5 in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) shows that the recovery from a crisis is faster if
information is generated after the shock when ηp < 12 +
√
1
4 − γK?(1−q . We take p to be such that
K(p) = K?. This is therefore a requirement that the shock be adequately large.
It follows - see Corollary 2 of the same paper - that there exists a range of aggregate shocks
η such that ηp ∈
[
ph,
1
2 +
√
1
4 − γK?(1−q
]
, in which agents do not gather information, but the
recovery would be faster if they did. Here ph is defined as the collateral quality at which agents
are indifferent between gathering and not gathering information (parametrically, the larger of the
two solutions to the quadratic equation defined by: p(qA− 1)K? − γ = γ(1−p)(1−q) .
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Finally, note that this region overlaps with the region in which the central bank optimally
applies a strict collateral policy: see the discussion in the main text.
Sketching a model of unsecured bank lending
I the conclusion I alluded to the fact that the setup in Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014) can easily be
adapted to serve as a simple model of e.g. unsecured lending, which might be interesting in own
right. At least it reproduces certain features of real-life bank lending. For example, it explains the
observation that banks typically accept loan applications immediately if borrowers are perceived
to be of high quality, subject loans to further review if they are of intermediate quality, and reject
them immediately if they are of low quality, see e.g. Berg (2015).
To see this, consider a firm with the same technology as in the main text, i.e. a project which
pays AK with probability q and nothing with probability 1− q, but now assume that this income
is pledgeable. Consider first the case where the firm applies for a loan of fixed size, K, promising
to repay a bank an amount, R.
Assume now that the bank can verify the true project quality at cost γ prior to lending at cost
γ. If banks are competitive, their participation constraint binds, informed lending must entail:
q(R−K)− γ = 0 (70)
Hence,
R = K +
γ
q
(71)
Profits for firms under informed lending are then q(AK −R) = (qA− 1)K − γ.
For uninformed lending to take place, it must satisfy both a participation and an incentive-
compatibility constraint. These are:
qR ≥ K (72)
qR−K ≥ q(R−K)− γ ⇒ γ
1− q ≥ K (73)
Clearly, the participation constraint will always bind, so firm profits are (qA − 1)K. Hence,
uninformed lending dominates informed lending whenever it is feasible, which is when q ≥ 1− γK .
For lower q, informed lending takes place as long as it is profitable for firms, which is when q ≥ 1+
γ
K
A .
Hence, the model produces three q-regions: 1) a region with uninformed lending
[
1, 1− γK
]
, a 2)
region with informed lending
[
1− γK ,
1+ γ
K
A
]
(which exists whenever profitability is adequately high
relative to information costs, specifically when A−1A+1 ≥ γK ), and 3) a region in which no lending
takes place
[
1+ γ
K
A , 0
]
.
143
144
Bibliography
Abildgren, Kim, Nicolaj Albrechtsen, Mark S. Kristoffersen, Søren T. Nielsen, and Rasmus Tom-
merup (2015), “The short-term danish interbank market before, during, and after the financial
crisis.” Danmarks National Bank Working Paper, October.
Acharya, Viral V. and Ouarda Merrouche (2013), “Precautionary hoarding of liquidity and inter-
bank markets: Evidence from the subprime crisis.” Review of Finance, 17, 107–160.
Acharya, Viral V. and David Skeie (2011), “A model of liquidity hoarding and term premia in
inter-bank markets.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 58, 436–447.
Afonso, Gara, Anna Kovner, and Antoinette Schoar (2011), “Stressed, not frozen: The federal
funds market in the financial crisis.” Journal of Finance, 66, 1109–1139.
Afonso, Gara, Anna Kovner, and Antoinette Schoar (2013), “Trading partners in the interbank
lending market.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports.
Afonso, Gara and Ricardo Lagos (2012), “An empirical study of trade dynamics in the fed funds
market.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports.
Afonso, Gara and Ricardo Lagos (2015), “Trade dynamics in the market for federal funds.” Forth-
coming Econometrica.
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2000), “Financial contagion.” Journal of Political Economy,
108, 1–33.
Arango, Carlos, Kim P. Huynh, and Leonard Sabetti (2015), “Consumer payment choice: Merchant
acceptance versus pricing incentives.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 55, 130–141.
Arceiro, Luca, Ronald Heijmans, Richard Heuver, Marco Massarenti, Cristina Picillo, and Franceso
Vacirca (2014), “How to measure the unsecured money market? the eurosystem’s implementa-
tion and validation using Target2 data.” Bank of Italy Occasional Paper.
145
Armantier, Olivier and Adam Copeland (2012), “Assessing the quality of ”Furfine-based” algo-
rithms.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports.
Ashcraft, Adam and Darrell Duffie (2007), “Systemic illiquidity in the federal funds market.”
American Economic Review, 97, 221–225.
Ashcraft, Adam, Nicolae Gaˆrleanu, and Lasse H. Pedersen (2010), “Two monetary tools: Interest
rates and haircuts.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2010, 25, 143–180.
Ashcraft, Adam, James McAndrews, and David Skeie (2011), “Precautionary reserves and the
interbank market.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 311–348.
Azariadis, Costas, Leo Kaas, and Yi Wen (2015), “Self-fulfilling credit cycles.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2015-005A.
Bagehot, Walter (1873), Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, third edition. Henry
S. King & Co.
Baxter, William (1983), “Bank interchange of transactional paper: Legal perspectives.” Journal
of Law and Economics, 26, 541–588.
Bech, Morten L., James T.E. Chapman, and Rodney J. Garratt (2010), “Which bank is the
”central” bank?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 57, 352–363.
Bech, Morten L. and Rodney J. Garratt (2003), “The intraday liquidity management game.”
Journal of Economic Theory, 109, 198–219.
Bech, Morten L., Antoine Martin, and James McAndrews (2012), “Settlement liquidity and mone-
tary policy implementation - lessons from the financial crisis.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review,
18.
Bech, Morten L. and Cyril Monnet (2013), “The impact of unconventional monetary policy on the
overnight interbank market.” Reserve Bank of Australia Annual Conference Volume: Liquidity
and Funding Markets (eds. Alexandra Heath, Matthew Lilley and Mark Manning), 147–177.
Bedre-Defolie, O¨zlem and Emilio Calvano (2013), “Pricing payment cards.” American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 5, 206–231.
Benveniste, Lawrence M., Walid Y. Busaba, and William J. Wilhelm (2002), “Information exter-
nalities and the role of underwriters in primary equity markets.” Journal of Financial Interme-
diation, 11, 61–86.
146
Berg, Tobias (2015), “Got rejected? Real effects of not getting a loan.” Working paper.
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell (1990), “Collateral, loan quality and bank risk.” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 25, 21–42.
Bernanke, Ben and Alan S. Blinder (1992), “The federal funds rate and the channels of monetary
transmission.” American Economic Review, 82, 901–921.
Biais, Bruno, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Paul Woolley (2015), “Dynamics of innovation and risk.”
The Review of Financial Studies, 28, 1353–1380.
Bindseil, Ulrich (2013), “Central bank collateral, asset fire sales, regulation and liquidity.” ECB
Working Paper Series, no. 1610.
Bindseil, Ulrich, Kjell G. Nyborg, and Ilya Strebulaev (2009), “Repo auctions and the market for
liquidity.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 41, 1391–1421.
BIS (2013), “Central bank collateral frameworks and practices.” BIS report.
Blasques, Francisco, Falk Bra¨uning, and Iman van Lelyveld (2014), “A dynamic stochastic network
model of the unsecured interbank lending market.” SWIFT Institute Working Paper.
Bolt, Wilko, Nicole Jonker, and Mirjam Plooij (2013), “Tourist test or tourist trap? Unintended
consequences of debit card interchange fee regulation.” DNB Working Paper, No. 405.
Bolt, Wilko, Nicole Jonker, and Corry van Renselaar (2010), “Incentives at the counter: An
empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the netherlands.”
Journal of Banking and Finance, 34, 1738–1744.
Bo¨restam, Ann and Heiko Schmiedel (2011), “Interchange fees in card payments.” ECB Occasional
Paper Series, No. 131.
Borzekowski, Ron, Elizabeth K. Kiser, and Shaista Ahmed (2008), “Consumers’ use of debit cards:
Patterns, preferences, and price response.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 40, 149–172.
Bra¨uning, Falk and Falko Fecht (2012), “Relationship lending in the interbank market and the
price of liquidity.” Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers.
Bruche, Max and Javier Suarez (2010), “Deposit insurance and money market freezes.” Journal
of Monetary Economics, 57, 45–61.
147
Cassola, Nuno and Franc¸ois Koulischer (2014), “The collateral chanel of monetary policy: Evidence
from the European Central Bank.” Working paper.
Chailloux, Alexandre, Simon T. Gray, and Rebecca McCaughrin (2008), “Central bank collateral
frameworks: Principles and policies.” IMF Working Paper, No. 222.
Chakravorti, Sujit (2003), “Theory of credit card networks: A survey of the literature.” Review of
Network Economics, 2, 50–68.
Chakravorti, Sujit and Roberto Roson (2006), “Platform competition in two-sided markets: The
case of payment networks.” Review of Network Economics, 5, 118–142.
Chang, Howard, David S. Evans, and Daniel D. Garcia Swartz (2005), “The effect of regulatory in-
tervention in two-sided markets: An assessment of interchange-fee capping in Australia.” Review
of Network Economics, 4, 328–358.
Chapman, James, Jonathan Chiu, and Miguel Molico (2011), “Liquidity provision and collateral
haircuts in payment systems.” Bank of Canada Review, Autumn, 13–20.
Cheun, Samuel, Isabel von Ko¨ppen-Mertes, and Benedict Weller (2009), “The collateral frame-
works of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England and the financial market
turmoil.” ECB Occasional Paper Series, 107.
Cocco, Joa˜o F., Francisco J. Gomes, and Nuno C. Martins (2009), “Lending relationships in the
interbank market.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18, 24–48.
Craig, Ben and Goetz von Peter (2014), “Interbank tiering and money center banks.” Journal of
Financial Intermediation.
Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmstro¨m (2015), “The information sensitivity of a
security.” Working paper.
Danmarks Nationalbank (2011), “Costs of payments in Denmark.”
DellaVigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier (2006), “Paying not to go to the gym.” American
Economic Review, 96, 694–719.
Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2005), “The economics of interchange fees and their
regulation: An overview.” Proceedings - Payments System Resarch Conferenes, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City,, 73–120.
148
Fecht, Falko, K.G. Nyborg, and Jo¨rg Rocholl (2011), “The price of liquidity: The effects of market
conditions and bank characteristics.” Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 344–362.
Fecht, Falko, Kjell G. Nyborg, Jo¨rg Rocholl, and Jiri Woschitz (2015), “Collateral, central bank
repos, and systemic arbitrage.” Working paper.
Furfine, Craig H. (1999), “The microstructure of the federal funds market.” Financial Markets,
Institutions and Instruments, 46, 535–553.
Furfine, Craig H. (2001), “Banks as monitors of other banks: Evidence from the overnight federal
funds market.” Journal of Business, 74, 33–58.
Furfine, Craig H. (2002), “The interbank market during a crisis.” European Economic Review, 46,
809–8.
Gans, Joshua S. and Stephen P. King (2003), “The neutrality of interchange fees in payment
systems.” Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, 3, Article 1.
Gaˆrleanu, Nicolae and Lasse H. Pedersen (2016), “Efficiently inefficient markets for assets and
asset management.” Working paper.
Gorton, Gary and Andrew Metrick (2012), “Securitized banking and the run on repo.” Journal of
Financial Economics, 104, 425–451.
Gorton, Gary and Guillermo Ordon˜ez (2014), “Collateral crises.” American Economic Review, 104,
343–378.
Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980), “On the impossibility of informationally
efficient markets.” American Economic Review, 70, 393–408.
Guthrie, Graeme and Julian Wright (2007), “Competing payment schemes.” Journal of Industrial
Economics, 55, 37–67.
Hamilton, James D. (1996), “The daily market for federal funds.” Journal of Political Economy,
104, 26–56.
Heffernan, Shelagh A. (2002), “How do UK financial institutions really price their banking prod-
ucts?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 26, 1997–2016.
Heider, Florian, Maria Hoerova, and Cornelia Holthausen (2015), “Liquidity hoarding and inter-
bank market spreads: The role of counterparty risk.” Journal Financial Economics.
149
Iori, Giulia, Guilia De Masi, Ovidiu V. Precup, Giampaolo Gabbi, and G. Caldarelli (2008), “A
network analysis of the Italian overnight money market.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 32, 259–278.
Ivashina, Victoria and David Scharfstein (2010), “Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008.”
Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 319–338.
Jacobsen, Johan G. K. and Anders M. Pedersen (2012), “Cost of card and cash payments in
Denmark.” Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary Review, 2nd Quarter, 109–121.
Jonker, Nicole (2011), “Card acceptance and surcharging: the role of costs and competition.”
Review of Network Economics, 10, Article 4.
Jonker, Nicole (2013), “Social costs of POS payments in the Netherlands 2002-2012: Efficiency
gains from increased debit card usage.” DNB Occasional Studies, 11.
Kacperczyk, Marcin and Philipp Schnabl (2010), “When safe proved risky: Commercial paper
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24, 29–50.
Keister, Todd and Jamie McAndrews (2009), “Why are banks holding so many excess reserves.”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 380.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore (1997), “Credit cycles.” Journal of Political Economy, 105,
211–248.
Klein, Benjamin, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy, and Lacey Plahce (2006), “Competition in
two-sided markets: The antitrust economics of payment card interchange fees.” Antitrust Law
Journal, 73, 571–626.
Koulischer, Franc¸ois (2015), “Asymmetric shocks in a currency union: The role of central bank
collateral policy.” Working paper.
Koulischer, Franc¸ois and Daan Struyven (2014), “Central bank liquidity provision and collateral
quality.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 49, 113–130.
Kurlat, Pablo and Laura Veldkamp (2015), “Should we regulate financial information?” Journal
of Economic Theory, 158, 697–720.
Martin, Antoine (2004), “Optimal pricing of intraday liquidity.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
51, 401–424.
150
McAndrews, James and Zhu Wang (2012), “The economics of two-sided payment card markets:
Pricing, adoption and usage.” FRB Richmond Working Paper Series, No. 12–06.
Nikitin, Maxin and Todd R. Smith (2008), “Information acquisition, coordination, and fundamen-
tals in a financial crisis.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 907–914.
Nyborg, Kjell G. (2015), “Central bank collateral frameworks.” Working paper.
Pedersen, Lasse H. and Markus Brunnermeier (2009), “Market liquidity and funding liquidity.”
Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2201–2238.
Puri, Manja, Jo¨rg Rocholl, and Sascha Steffen (2011), “Global retail lending in the aftermath of
the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects.” Journal of Financial
Economics, 100, 556–578.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2002), “Cooperation among competitors: Some economics
of payment card associations.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 549–570.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2006), “Two-sided markets: A progress report.” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 37, 645–667.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2011), “Must-take cards: Merchant discounts and avoided
costs.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9, 462–495.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Julian Wright (2010), “Credit card interchange fees.” Journal of Banking
and Finance, 34, 1788–1797.
Rysman, Marc (2009), “The economics of two-sided markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
23, 125–143.
Salop, Steven and Joseph Stiglitz (1977), “Bargains and ripoffs: A model of monopolistically
competitive price dispersion.” The Review of Economic Studies, 44, 493–510.
Schmalensee, Richard (2002), “Payment systems and interchange fees.” Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 50, 103–122.
Schmiedel, Heiko, Gergana Kostova, and Wiebe Ruttenberg (2012), “The social and private costs
of retail payment instruments.” ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 137.
Shy, Oz (2014), “Measuring some effects of the 2011 debit card interchange fee reform.” Contem-
porary Economic Policy, 32, 769–783.
151
Shy, Oz and Zhu Wang (2011), “Why do payment networks charge proportional fees.” American
Economic Review, 101, 1575–1590.
Tirole, Jean (2015), “Market failures and public policy.” American Economic Review, 105, 1665–
1682.
Valverde, Santiago C., Sujit Chakravorti, and Francisco R. Ferna´ndez (2016), “The role of in-
terchange fees in two-sided markets: An emprical investigation on payment cards.” Review of
Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming.
Verdier, Marianne (2011), “Interchange fees in payment card systems: A survey of the literature.”
Journal of Economic Surveys, 25, 273–297.
Vickers, John (2005), “Public policy and the invisible price: Competition law, regulation and the
interchange fee.” Competition Law Journal, 4, 5–16.
von Hagen, Ju¨rgen and Tai-Kuang Ho (2007), “Money market pressure and the determinants of
banking crisis.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 1037–1066.
Wang, Zhu (2012), “Debit card interchange fee: Some assessments and considerations.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 98, Third Quarter, 159–183.
Weyl, E. Glen (2010), “A price theory of multi-sided platforms.” American Economic Review, 100,
1642–1672.
Wright, Julian (2003), “Optimal card payment systems.” European Economic Review, 47, 587–621.
Wright, Julian (2004), “The determinants of optimal interchange fees in payment systems.” Journal
of Industrial Economics, 52, 1–26.
Wright, Julian (2012), “Why payment card fees are biased against retailers.” The RAND Journal
of Economics, 43, 761–780.
Zenger, Hans (2011), “Perfect surcharging and the tourist test interchange fee.” Journal of Banking
and Finance, 35, 2544–2546.
Zorn, Lorie and Alejandro Garcia (2011), “Central bank collateral policy: Insights from recent
experience.” Bank of Canada Review, Spring, 37–45.
152
TITLER I PH.D.SERIEN:
2004
1. Martin Grieger
 Internet-based Electronic Marketplaces
 and Supply Chain Management
2. Thomas Basbøll
 LIKENESS
 A Philosophical Investigation
3. Morten Knudsen
 Beslutningens vaklen
 En systemteoretisk analyse of mo-
derniseringen af et amtskommunalt 
sundhedsvæsen 1980-2000
4. Lars Bo Jeppesen
 Organizing Consumer Innovation
 A product development strategy that 
is based on online communities and 
allows some ﬁrms to beneﬁt from a 
distributed process of innovation by 
consumers
5. Barbara Dragsted
 SEGMENTATION IN TRANSLATION 
AND TRANSLATION MEMORY 
 SYSTEMS
 An empirical investigation of cognitive
 segmentation and effects of integra-
ting a TM system into the translation 
process
6. Jeanet Hardis
 Sociale partnerskaber
 Et socialkonstruktivistisk casestudie 
 af partnerskabsaktørers virkeligheds-
opfattelse mellem identitet og 
 legitimitet
7. Henriette Hallberg Thygesen
 System Dynamics in Action
8. Carsten Mejer Plath
 Strategisk Økonomistyring
9. Annemette Kjærgaard
 Knowledge Management as Internal 
 Corporate Venturing
 – a Field Study of the Rise and Fall of a
  Bottom-Up Process
10. Knut Arne Hovdal
 De profesjonelle i endring
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
11. Søren Jeppesen
 Environmental Practices and Greening 
 Strategies in Small Manufacturing 
 Enterprises in South Africa
 – A Critical Realist Approach
12. Lars Frode Frederiksen
 Industriel forskningsledelse
 – på sporet af mønstre og samarbejde 
i danske forskningsintensive virksom-
heder
13. Martin Jes Iversen
 The Governance of GN Great Nordic
 – in an age of strategic and structural
  transitions 1939-1988
14. Lars Pynt Andersen
 The Rhetorical Strategies of Danish TV 
 Advertising 
 A study of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years with 
 special emphasis on genre and irony
15. Jakob Rasmussen
 Business Perspectives on E-learning
16. Sof Thrane
 The Social and Economic Dynamics 
 of Networks 
 – a Weberian Analysis of Three 
 Formalised Horizontal Networks
17. Lene Nielsen
 Engaging Personas and Narrative 
 Scenarios – a study on how a user-
 centered approach inﬂuenced the 
 perception of the design process in 
the e-business group at AstraZeneca
18. S.J Valstad
 Organisationsidentitet
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
19. Thomas Lyse Hansen
 Six Essays on Pricing and Weather risk 
in Energy Markets
20.  Sabine Madsen
 Emerging Methods – An Interpretive
  Study of ISD Methods in Practice
21. Evis Sinani
 The Impact of Foreign Direct Inve-
stment on Efﬁciency, Productivity 
Growth and Trade: An Empirical Inve-
stigation
22. Bent Meier Sørensen
 Making Events Work Or, 
 How to Multiply Your Crisis
23. Pernille Schnoor
 Brand Ethos
 Om troværdige brand- og 
 virksomhedsidentiteter i et retorisk og 
diskursteoretisk perspektiv 
24. Sidsel Fabech
 Von welchem Österreich ist hier die 
Rede?
 Diskursive forhandlinger og magt-
kampe mellem rivaliserende nationale 
identitetskonstruktioner i østrigske 
pressediskurser 
25. Klavs Odgaard Christensen
 Sprogpolitik og identitetsdannelse i
  ﬂersprogede forbundsstater
 Et komparativt studie af Schweiz og 
 Canada
26. Dana B. Minbaeva
 Human Resource Practices and 
 Knowledge Transfer in Multinational 
 Corporations
27. Holger Højlund
 Markedets politiske fornuft
 Et studie af velfærdens organisering i 
 perioden 1990-2003
28. Christine Mølgaard Frandsen
 A.s erfaring
 Om mellemværendets praktik i en 
transformation af mennesket og 
 subjektiviteten
29. Sine Nørholm Just
 The Constitution of Meaning
 – A Meaningful Constitution? 
 Legitimacy, identity, and public opinion 
in the debate on the future of Europe
2005
1. Claus J. Varnes
 Managing product innovation through 
 rules – The role of formal and structu-
red methods in product development
2. Helle Hedegaard Hein
 Mellem konﬂikt og konsensus
 – Dialogudvikling på hospitalsklinikker
3. Axel Rosenø
 Customer Value Driven Product Inno-
vation – A Study of Market Learning in 
New Product Development
4. Søren Buhl Pedersen
 Making space
 An outline of place branding
5. Camilla Funck Ellehave
 Differences that Matter
 An analysis of practices of gender and 
 organizing in contemporary work-
places
6. Rigmor Madeleine Lond
 Styring af kommunale forvaltninger
7. Mette Aagaard Andreassen
 Supply Chain versus Supply Chain
 Benchmarking as a Means to 
 Managing Supply Chains
8. Caroline Aggestam-Pontoppidan
 From an idea to a standard
 The UN and the global governance of 
 accountants’ competence
9. Norsk ph.d. 
10. Vivienne Heng Ker-ni
 An Experimental Field Study on the 
 Effectiveness of Grocer Media 
 Advertising 
 Measuring Ad Recall and Recognition, 
 Purchase Intentions and Short-Term 
Sales
11. Allan Mortensen
 Essays on the Pricing of Corporate 
Bonds and Credit Derivatives
12. Remo Stefano Chiari
 Figure che fanno conoscere
 Itinerario sull’idea del valore cognitivo 
e espressivo della metafora e di altri 
tropi da Aristotele e da Vico ﬁno al 
cognitivismo contemporaneo
13. Anders McIlquham-Schmidt
 Strategic Planning and Corporate 
 Performance
 An integrative research review and a 
 meta-analysis of the strategic planning 
 and corporate performance literature 
 from 1956 to 2003
14. Jens Geersbro
 The TDF – PMI Case
 Making Sense of the Dynamics of 
 Business Relationships and Networks
15 Mette Andersen
 Corporate Social Responsibility in 
 Global Supply Chains
 Understanding the uniqueness of ﬁrm 
 behaviour
16.  Eva Boxenbaum
 Institutional Genesis: Micro – Dynamic
 Foundations of Institutional Change
17. Peter Lund-Thomsen
 Capacity Development, Environmental 
 Justice NGOs, and Governance: The 
Case of South Africa
18. Signe Jarlov
 Konstruktioner af offentlig ledelse
19. Lars Stæhr Jensen
 Vocabulary Knowledge and Listening 
 Comprehension in English as a Foreign 
 Language
 An empirical study employing data 
 elicited from Danish EFL learners
20. Christian Nielsen
 Essays on Business Reporting
 Production and consumption of  
strategic information in the market for 
information
21. Marianne Thejls Fischer
 Egos and Ethics of Management 
 Consultants
22. Annie Bekke Kjær
 Performance management i Proces-
 innovation 
 – belyst i et social-konstruktivistisk
 perspektiv
23. Suzanne Dee Pedersen
 GENTAGELSENS METAMORFOSE
 Om organisering af den kreative gøren 
i den kunstneriske arbejdspraksis
24. Benedikte Dorte Rosenbrink
 Revenue Management
 Økonomiske, konkurrencemæssige & 
 organisatoriske konsekvenser
25. Thomas Riise Johansen
 Written Accounts and Verbal Accounts
 The Danish Case of Accounting and 
 Accountability to Employees
26. Ann Fogelgren-Pedersen
 The Mobile Internet: Pioneering Users’ 
 Adoption Decisions
27. Birgitte Rasmussen
 Ledelse i fællesskab – de tillidsvalgtes 
 fornyende rolle
28. Gitte Thit Nielsen
 Remerger
 – skabende ledelseskræfter i fusion og 
 opkøb
29. Carmine Gioia
 A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
30. Ole Hinz
 Den effektive forandringsleder: pilot, 
 pædagog eller politiker?
 Et studie i arbejdslederes meningstil-
skrivninger i forbindelse med vellykket 
gennemførelse af ledelsesinitierede 
forandringsprojekter
31. Kjell-Åge Gotvassli
 Et praksisbasert perspektiv på dynami-
ske 
 læringsnettverk i toppidretten
 Norsk ph.d., ej til salg gennem 
 Samfundslitteratur
32. Henriette Langstrup Nielsen
 Linking Healthcare
 An inquiry into the changing perfor-
 mances of web-based technology for 
 asthma monitoring
33. Karin Tweddell Levinsen
 Virtuel Uddannelsespraksis
 Master i IKT og Læring – et casestudie 
i hvordan proaktiv proceshåndtering 
kan forbedre praksis i virtuelle lærings-
miljøer
34. Anika Liversage
 Finding a Path
 Labour Market Life Stories of 
 Immigrant Professionals
35. Kasper Elmquist Jørgensen
 Studier i samspillet mellem stat og   
 erhvervsliv i Danmark under 
 1. verdenskrig
36. Finn Janning
 A DIFFERENT STORY
 Seduction, Conquest and Discovery
37. Patricia Ann Plackett
 Strategic Management of the Radical 
 Innovation Process
 Leveraging Social Capital for Market 
 Uncertainty Management
2006
1. Christian Vintergaard
 Early Phases of Corporate Venturing
2. Niels Rom-Poulsen
 Essays in Computational Finance
3. Tina Brandt Husman
 Organisational Capabilities, 
 Competitive Advantage & Project-
Based Organisations
 The Case of Advertising and Creative 
 Good Production
4. Mette Rosenkrands Johansen
 Practice at the top
 – how top managers mobilise and use
 non-ﬁnancial performance measures
5. Eva Parum
 Corporate governance som strategisk
 kommunikations- og ledelsesværktøj
6. Susan Aagaard Petersen
 Culture’s Inﬂuence on Performance 
 Management: The Case of a Danish 
 Company in China
7. Thomas Nicolai Pedersen
 The Discursive Constitution of Organi-
zational Governance – Between unity 
and differentiation
 The Case of the governance of 
 environmental risks by World Bank 
environmental staff
8. Cynthia Selin
 Volatile Visions: Transactons in 
 Anticipatory Knowledge
9. Jesper Banghøj
 Financial Accounting Information and  
 Compensation in Danish Companies
10. Mikkel Lucas Overby
 Strategic Alliances in Emerging High-
Tech Markets: What’s the Difference 
and does it Matter?
11. Tine Aage
 External Information Acquisition of 
 Industrial Districts and the Impact of 
 Different Knowledge Creation Dimen-
sions
 
 A case study of the Fashion and  
Design Branch of the Industrial District 
of Montebelluna, NE Italy
12. Mikkel Flyverbom
 Making the Global Information Society 
 Governable
 On the Governmentality of Multi- 
Stakeholder Networks
13. Anette Grønning
 Personen bag
 Tilstedevær i e-mail som inter-
aktionsform mellem kunde og med-
arbejder i dansk forsikringskontekst
14. Jørn Helder
 One Company – One Language?
 The NN-case
15. Lars Bjerregaard Mikkelsen
 Differing perceptions of customer 
value
 Development and application of a tool 
for mapping perceptions of customer 
value at both ends of customer-suppli-
er dyads in industrial markets
16. Lise Granerud
 Exploring Learning
 Technological learning within small 
 manufacturers in South Africa
17. Esben Rahbek Pedersen
 Between Hopes and Realities: 
 Reﬂections on the Promises and 
 Practices of Corporate Social 
 Responsibility (CSR)
18. Ramona Samson
 The Cultural Integration Model and 
 European Transformation.
 The Case of Romania
2007
1. Jakob Vestergaard
 Discipline in The Global Economy
 Panopticism and the Post-Washington 
 Consensus
2. Heidi Lund Hansen
 Spaces for learning and working
 A qualitative study of change of work, 
 management, vehicles of power and 
 social practices in open ofﬁces
3. Sudhanshu Rai
 Exploring the internal dynamics of 
software development teams during 
user analysis
 A tension enabled Institutionalization 
 Model; ”Where process becomes the 
 objective”
4. Norsk ph.d. 
 Ej til salg gennem Samfundslitteratur
5. Serden Ozcan
 EXPLORING HETEROGENEITY IN 
 ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND 
 OUTCOMES
 A Behavioural Perspective
6. Kim Sundtoft Hald
 Inter-organizational Performance 
 Measurement and Management in 
Action
 – An Ethnography on the Construction 
of Management, Identity and 
 Relationships
7. Tobias Lindeberg
 Evaluative Technologies
 Quality and the Multiplicity of 
 Performance
8. Merete Wedell-Wedellsborg
 Den globale soldat
 Identitetsdannelse og identitetsledelse 
i multinationale militære organisatio-
ner
9. Lars Frederiksen
 Open Innovation Business Models
 Innovation in ﬁrm-hosted online user 
 communities and inter-ﬁrm project 
 ventures in the music industry 
 – A collection of essays
10. Jonas Gabrielsen
 Retorisk toposlære – fra statisk ’sted’ 
til persuasiv aktivitet
11. Christian Moldt-Jørgensen
 Fra meningsløs til meningsfuld  
evaluering.
 Anvendelsen af studentertilfredsheds-
 målinger på de korte og mellemlange  
 videregående uddannelser set fra et 
 psykodynamisk systemperspektiv
12. Ping Gao
 Extending the application of 
 actor-network theory
 Cases of innovation in the tele-
 communications industry
13. Peter Mejlby
 Frihed og fængsel, en del af den 
samme drøm? 
 Et phronetisk baseret casestudie af 
 frigørelsens og kontrollens sam-
eksistens i værdibaseret ledelse! 
 
14. Kristina Birch
 Statistical Modelling in Marketing
15. Signe Poulsen
 Sense and sensibility: 
 The language of emotional appeals in 
insurance marketing
16. Anders Bjerre Trolle
 Essays on derivatives pricing and dyna-
mic asset allocation
17. Peter Feldhütter
 Empirical Studies of Bond and Credit 
Markets
18. Jens Henrik Eggert Christensen
 Default and Recovery Risk Modeling 
and Estimation
19. Maria Theresa Larsen
 Academic Enterprise: A New Mission 
for Universities or a Contradiction in 
Terms?
 Four papers on the long-term impli-
cations of increasing industry involve-
ment and commercialization in acade-
mia
20.  Morten Wellendorf
 Postimplementering af teknologi i den  
 offentlige forvaltning
 Analyser af en organisations konti-
nuerlige arbejde med informations-
teknologi
21.  Ekaterina Mhaanna
 Concept Relations for Terminological 
Process Analysis
22.  Stefan Ring Thorbjørnsen
 Forsvaret i forandring
 Et studie i ofﬁcerers kapabiliteter un-
der påvirkning af omverdenens foran-
dringspres mod øget styring og læring
23.  Christa Breum Amhøj
 Det selvskabte medlemskab om ma-
nagementstaten, dens styringstekno-
logier og indbyggere
24.  Karoline Bromose
 Between Technological Turbulence and 
Operational Stability
 – An empirical case study of corporate 
venturing in TDC
25.  Susanne Justesen
 Navigating the Paradoxes of Diversity 
in Innovation Practice
 – A Longitudinal study of six very 
 different innovation processes – in 
practice
26.  Luise Noring Henler
 Conceptualising successful supply 
chain partnerships
 – Viewing supply chain partnerships 
from an organisational culture per-
spective
27.  Mark Mau
 Kampen om telefonen
 Det danske telefonvæsen under den 
tyske besættelse 1940-45
28.  Jakob Halskov
 The semiautomatic expansion of 
existing terminological ontologies 
using knowledge patterns discovered 
on the WWW – an implementation 
and evaluation
29.  Gergana Koleva
 European Policy Instruments Beyond 
Networks and Structure: The Innova-
tive Medicines Initiative
30.  Christian Geisler Asmussen
 Global Strategy and International 
 Diversity: A Double-Edged Sword?
31.  Christina Holm-Petersen
 Stolthed og fordom
 Kultur- og identitetsarbejde ved ska-
belsen af en ny sengeafdeling gennem 
fusion
32.  Hans Peter Olsen
 Hybrid Governance of Standardized 
States
 Causes and Contours of the Global 
Regulation of Government Auditing
33.  Lars Bøge Sørensen
 Risk Management in the Supply Chain
34.  Peter Aagaard
 Det unikkes dynamikker
 De institutionelle mulighedsbetingel-
ser bag den individuelle udforskning i 
professionelt og frivilligt arbejde
35.  Yun Mi Antorini
 Brand Community Innovation
 An Intrinsic Case Study of the Adult 
Fans of LEGO Community
36.  Joachim Lynggaard Boll
 Labor Related Corporate Social Perfor-
mance in Denmark
 Organizational and Institutional Per-
spectives
2008
1. Frederik Christian Vinten
 Essays on Private Equity
2.  Jesper Clement
 Visual Inﬂuence of Packaging Design 
on In-Store Buying Decisions
3.  Marius Brostrøm Kousgaard
 Tid til kvalitetsmåling?
 – Studier af indrulleringsprocesser i 
forbindelse med introduktionen af 
kliniske kvalitetsdatabaser i speciallæ-
gepraksissektoren
4. Irene Skovgaard Smith
 Management Consulting in Action
 Value creation and ambiguity in 
 client-consultant relations
5.  Anders Rom
 Management accounting and inte-
grated information systems
 How to exploit the potential for ma-
nagement accounting of information 
technology
6.  Marina Candi
 Aesthetic Design as an Element of 
 Service Innovation in New Technology-
based Firms
7.  Morten Schnack
 Teknologi og tværfaglighed
 – en analyse af diskussionen omkring 
 indførelse af EPJ på en hospitalsafde-
ling
8. Helene Balslev Clausen
 Juntos pero no revueltos – un estudio 
sobre emigrantes norteamericanos en 
un pueblo mexicano
9. Lise Justesen
 Kunsten at skrive revisionsrapporter.
 En beretning om forvaltningsrevisio-
nens beretninger
10. Michael E. Hansen
 The politics of corporate responsibility:
 CSR and the governance of child labor 
and core labor rights in the 1990s
11. Anne Roepstorff
 Holdning for handling – en etnologisk 
undersøgelse af Virksomheders Sociale 
Ansvar/CSR
12. Claus Bajlum
 Essays on Credit Risk and 
 Credit Derivatives
13. Anders Bojesen
 The Performative Power of Competen-
ce  – an Inquiry into Subjectivity and 
Social Technologies at Work
14. Satu Reijonen
 Green and Fragile
 A Study on Markets and the Natural  
Environment
15. Ilduara Busta
 Corporate Governance in Banking
 A European Study
16. Kristian Anders Hvass
 A Boolean Analysis Predicting Industry 
Change: Innovation, Imitation & Busi-
ness Models
 The Winning Hybrid: A case study of 
isomorphism in the airline industry
17. Trine Paludan
 De uvidende og de udviklingsparate
 Identitet som mulighed og restriktion 
blandt fabriksarbejdere på det aftaylo-
riserede fabriksgulv
18. Kristian Jakobsen
 Foreign market entry in transition eco-
nomies: Entry timing and mode choice
19. Jakob Elming
 Syntactic reordering in statistical ma-
chine translation
20. Lars Brømsøe Termansen
 Regional Computable General Equili-
brium Models for Denmark
 Three papers laying the foundation for 
regional CGE models with agglomera-
tion characteristics
 
21. Mia Reinholt
 The Motivational Foundations of 
Knowledge Sharing
22.  Frederikke Krogh-Meibom
 The Co-Evolution of Institutions and 
Technology
 – A Neo-Institutional Understanding of 
Change Processes within the Business 
Press – the Case Study of Financial 
Times
23. Peter D. Ørberg Jensen
 OFFSHORING OF ADVANCED AND 
HIGH-VALUE TECHNICAL SERVICES: 
ANTECEDENTS, PROCESS DYNAMICS 
AND FIRMLEVEL IMPACTS
24. Pham Thi Song Hanh
 Functional Upgrading, Relational 
 Capability and Export Performance of 
Vietnamese Wood Furniture Producers
25. Mads Vangkilde
 Why wait?
 An Exploration of ﬁrst-mover advanta-
ges among Danish e-grocers through a 
resource perspective
26.  Hubert Buch-Hansen
 Rethinking the History of European 
Level Merger Control
 A Critical Political Economy Perspective
2009
1. Vivian Lindhardsen
 From Independent Ratings to Commu-
nal Ratings: A Study of CWA Raters’ 
Decision-Making Behaviours
2. Guðrið Weihe
 Public-Private Partnerships: Meaning 
and Practice
3. Chris Nøkkentved
 Enabling Supply Networks with Colla-
borative Information Infrastructures
 An Empirical Investigation of Business 
Model Innovation in Supplier Relation-
ship Management
4.  Sara Louise Muhr
 Wound, Interrupted – On the Vulner-
ability of Diversity Management
5. Christine Sestoft
 Forbrugeradfærd i et Stats- og Livs-
formsteoretisk perspektiv
6. Michael Pedersen
 Tune in, Breakdown, and Reboot: On 
the production of the stress-ﬁt self-
managing employee
7.  Salla Lutz
 Position and Reposition in Networks 
 – Exempliﬁed by the Transformation of 
the Danish Pine Furniture Manu-
 facturers
8. Jens Forssbæck
 Essays on market discipline in 
 commercial and central banking
9. Tine Murphy
 Sense from Silence – A Basis for Orga-
nised Action 
 How do Sensemaking Processes with 
Minimal Sharing Relate to the Repro-
duction of Organised Action?
10. Sara Malou Strandvad
 Inspirations for a new sociology of art: 
A sociomaterial study of development 
processes in the Danish ﬁlm industry
11. Nicolaas Mouton
 On the evolution of social scientiﬁc 
metaphors: 
 A cognitive-historical enquiry into the 
divergent trajectories of the idea that 
collective entities – states and societies, 
cities and corporations – are biological 
organisms.
12. Lars Andreas Knutsen
 Mobile Data Services:
 Shaping of user engagements
13. Nikolaos Theodoros Korﬁatis
 Information Exchange and Behavior
 A Multi-method Inquiry on Online 
Communities
14.  Jens Albæk
 Forestillinger om kvalitet og tværfaglig-
hed på sygehuse
 – skabelse af forestillinger i læge- og 
plejegrupperne angående relevans af 
nye idéer om kvalitetsudvikling gen-
nem tolkningsprocesser
15.  Maja Lotz
 The Business of Co-Creation – and the 
Co-Creation of Business
16. Gitte P. Jakobsen
 Narrative Construction of Leader Iden-
tity in a Leader Development Program 
Context
17. Dorte Hermansen
 ”Living the brand” som en brandorien-
teret dialogisk praxis:
 Om udvikling af medarbejdernes 
brandorienterede dømmekraft
18. Aseem Kinra
 Supply Chain (logistics) Environmental 
Complexity
19. Michael Nørager
 How to manage SMEs through the 
transformation from non innovative to 
innovative? 
20.  Kristin Wallevik
 Corporate Governance in Family Firms
 The Norwegian Maritime Sector
21. Bo Hansen Hansen
 Beyond the Process
 Enriching Software Process Improve-
ment with Knowledge Management
22. Annemette Skot-Hansen
 Franske adjektivisk aﬂedte adverbier, 
der tager præpositionssyntagmer ind-
ledt med præpositionen à som argu-
menter
 En valensgrammatisk undersøgelse
23. Line Gry Knudsen
 Collaborative R&D Capabilities
 In Search of Micro-Foundations
24. Christian Scheuer
 Employers meet employees
 Essays on sorting and globalization
25. Rasmus Johnsen
 The Great Health of Melancholy
 A Study of the Pathologies of Perfor-
mativity
26. Ha Thi Van Pham
 Internationalization, Competitiveness 
Enhancement and Export Performance 
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 Evidence from Vietnam
27. Henriette Balieu
 Kontrolbegrebets betydning for kausa-
tivalternationen i spansk
 En kognitiv-typologisk analyse
2010
1.  Yen Tran
 Organizing Innovationin Turbulent 
Fashion Market
 Four papers on how fashion ﬁrms crea-
te and appropriate innovation value
2. Anders Raastrup Kristensen
 Metaphysical Labour
 Flexibility, Performance and Commit-
ment in Work-Life Management
3. Margrét Sigrún Sigurdardottir
 Dependently independent
 Co-existence of institutional logics in 
the recorded music industry
4.  Ásta Dis Óladóttir
 Internationalization from a small do-
mestic base:
 An empirical analysis of Economics and 
Management
5.  Christine Secher
 E-deltagelse i praksis – politikernes og 
forvaltningens medkonstruktion og 
konsekvenserne heraf
6. Marianne Stang Våland
 What we talk about when we talk 
about space:
 
 End User Participation between Proces-
ses of Organizational and Architectural 
Design
7.  Rex Degnegaard
 Strategic Change Management
 Change Management Challenges in 
the Danish Police Reform
8. Ulrik Schultz Brix
 Værdi i rekruttering – den sikre beslut-
ning
 En pragmatisk analyse af perception 
og synliggørelse af værdi i rekrutte-
rings- og udvælgelsesarbejdet
9. Jan Ole Similä
 Kontraktsledelse
 Relasjonen mellom virksomhetsledelse 
og kontraktshåndtering, belyst via ﬁre 
norske virksomheter
10. Susanne Boch Waldorff
 Emerging Organizations: In between 
local translation, institutional logics 
and discourse
11. Brian Kane
 Performance Talk
 Next Generation Management of  
Organizational Performance
12. Lars Ohnemus
 Brand Thrust: Strategic Branding and 
Shareholder Value
 An Empirical Reconciliation of two 
Critical Concepts
13.  Jesper Schlamovitz
 Håndtering af usikkerhed i ﬁlm- og 
byggeprojekter
14.  Tommy Moesby-Jensen
 Det faktiske livs forbindtlighed
 Førsokratisk informeret, ny-aristotelisk 
τηθος-tænkning hos Martin Heidegger
15. Christian Fich
 Two Nations Divided by Common 
 Values
 French National Habitus and the 
 Rejection of American Power
16. Peter Beyer
 Processer, sammenhængskraft  
og ﬂeksibilitet
 Et empirisk casestudie af omstillings-
forløb i ﬁre virksomheder
17. Adam Buchhorn
 Markets of Good Intentions
 Constructing and Organizing 
 Biogas Markets Amid Fragility  
and Controversy
18. Cecilie K. Moesby-Jensen
 Social læring og fælles praksis
 Et mixed method studie, der belyser 
læringskonsekvenser af et lederkursus 
for et praksisfællesskab af offentlige 
mellemledere
19. Heidi Boye
 Fødevarer og sundhed i sen- 
modernismen
 – En indsigt i hyggefænomenet og  
de relaterede fødevarepraksisser
20. Kristine Munkgård Pedersen
 Flygtige forbindelser og midlertidige 
mobiliseringer
 Om kulturel produktion på Roskilde 
Festival
21. Oliver Jacob Weber
 Causes of Intercompany Harmony in 
Business Markets – An Empirical Inve-
stigation from a Dyad Perspective
22. Susanne Ekman
 Authority and Autonomy
 Paradoxes of Modern Knowledge 
Work
23. Anette Frey Larsen
 Kvalitetsledelse på danske hospitaler
 – Ledelsernes indﬂydelse på introduk-
tion og vedligeholdelse af kvalitetsstra-
tegier i det danske sundhedsvæsen
24.  Toyoko Sato
 Performativity and Discourse: Japanese 
Advertisements on the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Desire
25. Kenneth Brinch Jensen
 Identifying the Last Planner System 
 Lean management in the construction 
industry
26.  Javier Busquets
 Orchestrating Network Behavior  
for Innovation
27. Luke Patey
 The Power of Resistance: India’s Na-
tional Oil Company and International 
Activism in Sudan
28. Mette Vedel
 Value Creation in Triadic Business Rela-
tionships. Interaction, Interconnection 
and Position
29.  Kristian Tørning
 Knowledge Management Systems in 
Practice – A Work Place Study
30. Qingxin Shi
 An Empirical Study of Thinking Aloud 
Usability Testing from a Cultural 
Perspective
31.  Tanja Juul Christiansen
 Corporate blogging: Medarbejderes 
kommunikative handlekraft
32.  Malgorzata Ciesielska
 Hybrid Organisations.
 A study of the Open Source – business 
setting
33. Jens Dick-Nielsen
 Three Essays on Corporate Bond  
Market Liquidity
34. Sabrina Speiermann
 Modstandens Politik
 Kampagnestyring i Velfærdsstaten. 
 En diskussion af traﬁkkampagners sty-
ringspotentiale
35. Julie Uldam
 Fickle Commitment. Fostering political 
engagement in 'the ﬂighty world of 
online activism’
36. Annegrete Juul Nielsen
 Traveling technologies and 
transformations in health care
37. Athur Mühlen-Schulte
 Organising Development
 Power and Organisational Reform in 
the United Nations Development 
 Programme
38. Louise Rygaard Jonas
 Branding på butiksgulvet
 Et case-studie af kultur- og identitets-
arbejdet i Kvickly
2011
1. Stefan Fraenkel
 Key Success Factors for Sales Force 
Readiness during New Product Launch
 A Study of Product Launches in the 
Swedish Pharmaceutical Industry
2. Christian Plesner Rossing
 International Transfer Pricing in Theory 
and Practice
3.  Tobias Dam Hede
 Samtalekunst og ledelsesdisciplin
 – en analyse af coachingsdiskursens 
genealogi og governmentality
4. Kim Pettersson
 Essays on Audit Quality, Auditor Choi-
ce, and Equity Valuation
5. Henrik Merkelsen
 The expert-lay controversy in risk 
research and management. Effects of 
institutional distances. Studies of risk 
deﬁnitions, perceptions, management 
and communication
6. Simon S. Torp
 Employee Stock Ownership: 
 Effect on Strategic Management and 
Performance
7. Mie Harder
 Internal Antecedents of Management 
Innovation
8. Ole Helby Petersen
 Public-Private Partnerships: Policy and 
Regulation – With Comparative and 
Multi-level Case Studies from Denmark 
and Ireland
9. Morten Krogh Petersen
 ’Good’ Outcomes. Handling Multipli-
city in Government Communication
10. Kristian Tangsgaard Hvelplund
 Allocation of cognitive resources in 
translation - an eye-tracking and key-
logging study
11. Moshe Yonatany
 The Internationalization Process of 
Digital Service Providers
12. Anne Vestergaard
 Distance and Suffering
 Humanitarian Discourse in the age of 
Mediatization
13. Thorsten Mikkelsen
 Personligsheds indﬂydelse på forret-
ningsrelationer
14. Jane Thostrup Jagd
 Hvorfor fortsætter fusionsbølgen ud-
over ”the tipping point”?
 – en empirisk analyse af information 
og kognitioner om fusioner
15. Gregory Gimpel
 Value-driven Adoption and Consump-
tion of Technology: Understanding 
Technology Decision Making
16. Thomas Stengade Sønderskov
 Den nye mulighed
 Social innovation i en forretningsmæs-
sig kontekst
17.  Jeppe Christoffersen
 Donor supported strategic alliances in 
developing countries
18. Vibeke Vad Baunsgaard
 Dominant Ideological Modes of  
Rationality: Cross functional 
 integration in the process of product
 innovation
19.  Throstur Olaf Sigurjonsson
 Governance Failure and Icelands’s
 Financial Collapse
20.  Allan Sall Tang Andersen
 Essays on the modeling of risks in
 interest-rate and inﬂation markets
21.  Heidi Tscherning
 Mobile Devices in Social Contexts
22.  Birgitte Gorm Hansen
 Adapting in the Knowledge Economy
  Lateral Strategies for Scientists and 
Those Who Study Them
23.  Kristina Vaarst Andersen
 Optimal Levels of Embeddedness
  The Contingent Value of Networked 
Collaboration
24.  Justine Grønbæk Pors
 Noisy Management
  A History of Danish School Governing 
from 1970-2010
25.  Stefan Linder
  Micro-foundations of Strategic  
Entrepreneurship
  Essays on Autonomous Strategic Action
26.  Xin Li
  Toward an Integrative Framework of 
National Competitiveness
 An application to China
27.  Rune Thorbjørn Clausen
 Værdifuld arkitektur 
  Et eksplorativt studie af bygningers 
rolle i virksomheders værdiskabelse
28.  Monica Viken
  Markedsundersøkelser som bevis i 
varemerke- og markedsføringsrett
29.  Christian Wymann
  Tattooing 
  The Economic and Artistic Constitution 
of a Social Phenomenon
30.  Sanne Frandsen
 Productive Incoherence 
  A Case Study of Branding and  
Identity Struggles in a Low-Prestige 
Organization
31.  Mads Stenbo Nielsen
 Essays on Correlation Modelling
32.  Ivan Häuser
 Følelse og sprog
  Etablering af en ekspressiv kategori, 
eksempliﬁceret på russisk
33.  Sebastian Schwenen
 Security of Supply in Electricity Markets
2012
1.  Peter Holm Andreasen
  The Dynamics of Procurement  
Management
 - A Complexity Approach
2.  Martin Haulrich
  Data-Driven Bitext Dependency 
 Parsing and Alignment
3.  Line Kirkegaard
  Konsulenten i den anden nat 
  En undersøgelse af det intense  
arbejdsliv
4.  Tonny Stenheim
  Decision usefulness of goodwill  
under IFRS
5.  Morten Lind Larsen
  Produktivitet, vækst og velfærd
  Industrirådet og efterkrigstidens  
Danmark 1945 - 1958
6.  Petter Berg
  Cartel Damages and Cost Asymmetries 
7.  Lynn Kahle
 Experiential Discourse in Marketing 
  A methodical inquiry into practice  
and theory
8.  Anne Roelsgaard Obling
  Management of Emotions  
in Accelerated Medical Relationships
9.  Thomas Frandsen
  Managing Modularity of  
Service Processes Architecture
10.  Carina Christine Skovmøller
  CSR som noget særligt
  Et casestudie om styring og menings-
skabelse i relation til CSR ud fra en 
intern optik
11.  Michael Tell
  Fradragsbeskæring af selskabers  
ﬁnansieringsudgifter
  En skatteretlig analyse af SEL §§ 11, 
11B og 11C
12.  Morten Holm
  Customer Proﬁtability Measurement 
Models
  Their Merits and Sophistication  
across Contexts
13.  Katja Joo Dyppel
  Beskatning af derivater 
 En analyse af dansk skatteret
14.  Esben Anton Schultz
  Essays in Labor Economics 
 Evidence from Danish Micro Data
15.  Carina Risvig Hansen
  ”Contracts not covered, or not fully 
covered, by the Public Sector Directive”
16.  Anja Svejgaard Pors
 Iværksættelse af kommunikation
  - patientﬁgurer i hospitalets strategiske 
kommunikation
17.  Frans Bévort
  Making sense of management with 
logics
  An ethnographic study of accountants 
who become managers
18.  René Kallestrup
  The Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign 
Credit Risk
19.  Brett Crawford
  Revisiting the Phenomenon of Interests 
in Organizational Institutionalism
  The Case of U.S. Chambers of  
Commerce
20.  Mario Daniele Amore
  Essays on Empirical Corporate Finance
21.  Arne Stjernholm Madsen
  The evolution of innovation strategy 
  Studied in the context of medical 
device activities at the pharmaceutical 
company Novo Nordisk A/S in the 
period 1980-2008
22.  Jacob Holm Hansen
  Is Social Integration Necessary for  
Corporate Branding?
  A study of corporate branding  
strategies at Novo Nordisk
23.  Stuart Webber
  Corporate Proﬁt Shifting and the  
Multinational Enterprise
24.  Helene Ratner
  Promises of Reﬂexivity
  Managing and Researching  
Inclusive Schools
25.  Therese Strand
  The Owners and the Power: Insights 
from Annual General Meetings
26.  Robert Gavin Strand
  In Praise of Corporate Social  
Responsibility Bureaucracy
27.  Nina Sormunen
 Auditor’s going-concern reporting
  Reporting decision and content of the 
report
28.  John Bang Mathiasen
  Learning within a product development 
working practice:
  - an understanding anchored  
in pragmatism
29.  Philip Holst Riis
  Understanding Role-Oriented Enterprise 
Systems: From Vendors to Customers
30.  Marie Lisa Dacanay
 Social Enterprises and the Poor 
  Enhancing Social Entrepreneurship and 
Stakeholder Theory
31.  Fumiko Kano Glückstad
  Bridging Remote Cultures: Cross-lingual 
concept mapping based on the  
information receiver’s prior-knowledge
32.  Henrik Barslund Fosse
  Empirical Essays in International Trade
33.  Peter Alexander Albrecht
  Foundational hybridity and its  
reproduction 
 Security sector reform in Sierra Leone
34.  Maja Rosenstock
 CSR  - hvor svært kan det være? 
  Kulturanalytisk casestudie om  
udfordringer og dilemmaer med at 
forankre Coops CSR-strategi
35.  Jeanette Rasmussen
 Tweens, medier og forbrug
  Et studie af 10-12 årige danske børns 
brug af internettet, opfattelse og for-
ståelse af markedsføring og forbrug
36.  Ib Tunby Gulbrandsen
  ‘This page is not intended for a  
US Audience’
  A ﬁve-act spectacle on online  
communication, collaboration  
& organization.
37.  Kasper Aalling Teilmann
  Interactive Approaches to  
Rural Development
38.  Mette Mogensen
  The Organization(s) of Well-being  
and Productivity
  (Re)assembling work in the Danish Post
39.  Søren Friis Møller
  From Disinterestedness to Engagement 
  Towards Relational Leadership In the 
Cultural Sector
40.  Nico Peter Berhausen
  Management Control, Innovation and 
Strategic Objectives – Interactions and 
Convergence in Product Development 
Networks
41.  Balder Onarheim
 Creativity under Constraints
  Creativity as Balancing  
‘Constrainedness’
42.  Haoyong Zhou
 Essays on Family Firms
43.  Elisabeth Naima Mikkelsen
 Making sense of organisational conﬂict
  An empirical study of enacted sense-
making in everyday conﬂict at work
2013
1.  Jacob Lyngsie
  Entrepreneurship in an Organizational 
Context
2.  Signe Groth-Brodersen
 Fra ledelse til selvet
  En socialpsykologisk analyse af  
forholdet imellem selvledelse, ledelse 
og stress i det moderne arbejdsliv
3.  Nis Høyrup Christensen
  Shaping Markets: A Neoinstitutional 
Analysis of the Emerging  
Organizational Field of Renewable 
Energy in China
4.  Christian Edelvold Berg
 As a matter of size 
  THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL  
MASS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS 
5.  Christine D. Isakson
  Coworker Inﬂuence and Labor Mobility  
Essays on Turnover, Entrepreneurship 
and Location Choice in the Danish 
Maritime Industry
6.  Niels Joseph Jerne Lennon
  Accounting Qualities in Practice  
Rhizomatic stories of representational 
faithfulness, decision making and  
control
7.  Shannon O’Donnell
 Making Ensemble Possible
  How special groups organize for  
collaborative creativity in conditions  
of spatial variability and distance
8.  Robert W. D. Veitch
  Access Decisions in a  
Partly-Digital World 
Comparing Digital Piracy and Legal 
Modes for Film and Music
9.  Marie Mathiesen
 Making Strategy Work 
 An Organizational Ethnography
10.  Arisa Shollo
 The role of business intelligence in   
 organizational decision-making 
11.  Mia Kaspersen
  The construction of social and  
environmental reporting
12. Marcus Møller Larsen
 The organizational design of offshoring
13. Mette Ohm Rørdam
 EU Law on Food Naming
 The prohibition against misleading   
 names in an internal market context
14. Hans Peter Rasmussen 
 GIV EN GED!
 Kan giver-idealtyper forklare støtte 
 til velgørenhed og understøtte 
 relationsopbygning?
15. Ruben Schachtenhaufen 
 Fonetisk reduktion i dansk
16. Peter Koerver Schmidt
 Dansk CFC-beskatning
  I et internationalt og komparativt  
perspektiv
17. Morten Froholdt
 Strategi i den offentlige sektor 
 En kortlægning af styringsmæssig   
 kontekst, strategisk tilgang, samt 
 anvendte redskaber og teknologier for  
 udvalgte danske statslige styrelser
18. Annette Camilla Sjørup
 Cognitive effort in metaphor translation
 An eye-tracking and key-logging study
19. Tamara Stucchi
  The Internationalization  
of Emerging Market Firms: 
 A Context-Speciﬁc Study
20. Thomas Lopdrup-Hjorth
 “Let’s Go Outside”:
 The Value of Co-Creation
21. Ana Alaovska
 Genre and Autonomy in Cultural 
 Production
 The case of travel guidebook 
 production
22. Marius Gudmand-Høyer
  Stemningssindssygdommenes historie  
i det 19. århundrede
  Omtydningen af melankolien og 
manien som bipolære stemningslidelser 
i dansk sammenhæng under hensyn til 
dannelsen af det moderne følelseslivs 
relative autonomi. 
  En problematiserings- og erfarings-
analytisk undersøgelse
23. Lichen Alex Yu
 Fabricating an S&OP Process
  Circulating References and Matters  
of Concern
24. Esben Alfort
 The Expression of a Need
 Understanding search
25. Trine Pallesen
 Assembling Markets for Wind Power  
 An Inquiry into the Making of 
 Market Devices
26. Anders Koed Madsen
 Web-Visions
 Repurposing digital traces to organize  
 social attention
27. Lærke Højgaard Christiansen
 BREWING ORGANIZATIONAL 
 RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
28. Tommy Kjær Lassen
 EGENTLIG SELVLEDELSE
  En ledelsesﬁlosoﬁsk afhandling om 
selvledelsens paradoksale dynamik og 
eksistentielle engagement
29. Morten Rossing
 Local Adaption and Meaning Creation  
 in Performance Appraisal
30. Søren Obed Madsen
 Lederen som oversætter
 Et oversættelsesteoretisk perspektiv 
 på strategisk arbejde
31. Thomas Høgenhaven
 Open Government Communities
 Does Design Affect Participation?
32. Kirstine Zinck Pedersen 
 Failsafe Organizing? 
 A Pragmatic Stance on Patient Safety
33. Anne Petersen
 Hverdagslogikker i psykiatrisk arbejde
 En institutionsetnograﬁsk undersøgelse  
 af hverdagen i psykiatriske 
 organisationer
34. Didde Maria Humle
 Fortællinger om arbejde
35. Mark Holst-Mikkelsen
 Strategieksekvering i praksis 
 – barrierer og muligheder! 
36. Malek Maalouf
 Sustaining lean
 Strategies for dealing with
 organizational paradoxes
37. Nicolaj Tofte Brenneche
 Systemic Innovation In The Making
 The Social Productivity of 
 Cartographic Crisis and Transitions 
 in the Case of SEEIT
38. Morten Gylling
 The Structure of Discourse
 A Corpus-Based Cross-Linguistic Study
39. Binzhang YANG
 Urban Green Spaces for Quality Life
  - Case Study: the landscape  
architecture for people in Copenhagen
40. Michael Friis Pedersen
 Finance and Organization:  
 The Implications for Whole Farm 
 Risk Management
41. Even Fallan
 Issues on supply and demand for 
 environmental accounting information
42. Ather Nawaz
 Website user experience
 A cross-cultural study of the relation  
 between users´ cognitive style, context  
 of use, and information architecture 
 of local websites
43. Karin Beukel
 The Determinants for Creating 
 Valuable Inventions
44. Arjan Markus
 External Knowledge Sourcing 
 and Firm Innovation 
 Essays on the Micro-Foundations 
 of Firms’ Search for Innovation
2014
1.  Solon Moreira
  Four Essays on Technology Licensing 
and Firm Innovation
2.  Karin Strzeletz Ivertsen
 Partnership Drift in Innovation 
 Processes
 A study of the Think City electric 
 car development
3.  Kathrine Hoffmann Pii
 Responsibility Flows in Patient-centred  
 Prevention
4.  Jane Bjørn Vedel
 Managing Strategic Research
 An empirical analysis of 
 science-industry collaboration in a   
 pharmaceutical company
5.  Martin Gylling
 Processuel strategi i organisationer   
 Monograﬁ om dobbeltheden i 
 tænkning af strategi, dels som 
 vidensfelt i organisationsteori, dels 
 som kunstnerisk tilgang til at skabe 
 i erhvervsmæssig innovation
6.  Linne Marie Lauesen
 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 in the Water Sector: 
 How Material Practices and their 
 Symbolic and Physical Meanings Form 
 a Colonising Logic
7.  Maggie Qiuzhu Mei
 LEARNING TO INNOVATE: 
 The role of ambidexterity, standard,  
 and decision process
8.  Inger Høedt-Rasmussen
 Developing Identity for Lawyers
 Towards Sustainable Lawyering
9.  Sebastian Fux
 Essays on Return Predictability and   
 Term Structure Modelling
10.  Thorbjørn N. M. Lund-Poulsen
 Essays on Value Based Management
11.  Oana Brindusa Albu
 Transparency in Organizing: 
 A Performative Approach
12.  Lena Olaison
 Entrepreneurship at the limits
13.  Hanne Sørum
 DRESSED FOR WEB SUCCESS?
  An Empirical Study of Website Quality 
in the Public Sector
14.  Lasse Folke Henriksen
 Knowing networks
 How experts shape transnational 
 governance
15.  Maria Halbinger
 Entrepreneurial Individuals
 Empirical Investigations into 
 Entrepreneurial Activities of 
 Hackers and Makers
16.  Robert Spliid
 Kapitalfondenes metoder 
 og kompetencer
17.  Christiane Stelling
 Public-private partnerships & the need,  
 development and management 
 of trusting 
 A processual and embedded 
 exploration
18.  Marta Gasparin
 Management of design as a translation  
 process
19.  Kåre Moberg
 Assessing the Impact of 
 Entrepreneurship Education
 From ABC to PhD
20.  Alexander Cole
 Distant neighbors
 Collective learning beyond the cluster
21.  Martin Møller Boje Rasmussen
 Is Competitiveness a Question of 
 Being Alike?
 How the United Kingdom, Germany  
 and Denmark Came to Compete   
 through their Knowledge Regimes 
 from 1993 to 2007
22.  Anders Ravn Sørensen
 Studies in central bank legitimacy, 
 currency and national identity
 Four cases from Danish monetary 
 history
23.  Nina Bellak
  Can Language be Managed in  
International Business?
 Insights into Language Choice from a  
 Case Study of Danish and Austrian  
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
24.  Rikke Kristine Nielsen
 Global Mindset as Managerial 
 Meta-competence and Organizational  
 Capability: Boundary-crossing 
 Leadership Cooperation in the MNC
  The Case of ‘Group Mindset’ in 
 Solar A/S.
25.  Rasmus Koss Hartmann
 User Innovation inside government  
 Towards a critically performative 
 foundation for inquiry
26.  Kristian Gylling Olesen
  Flertydig og emergerende ledelse i 
folkeskolen 
  Et aktør-netværksteoretisk ledelses-
studie af politiske evalueringsreformers 
betydning for ledelse i den danske 
folkeskole
27.  Troels Riis Larsen
  Kampen om Danmarks omdømme 
1945-2010
 Omdømmearbejde og omdømmepolitik
28.  Klaus Majgaard
  Jagten på autenticitet i offentlig styring
29.  Ming Hua Li
 Institutional Transition and
 Organizational Diversity:
 Differentiated internationalization
 strategies of emerging market 
 state-owned enterprises
30.  Soﬁe Blinkenberg Federspiel
 IT, organisation og digitalisering: 
 Institutionelt arbejde i den kommunale 
 digitaliseringsproces
31.  Elvi Weinreich
 Hvilke offentlige ledere er der brug for 
 når velfærdstænkningen ﬂytter sig
 – er Diplomuddannelsens lederproﬁl 
 svaret?
32.  Ellen Mølgaard Korsager 
 Self-conception and image of context 
 in the growth of the ﬁrm
 – A Penrosian History of Fiberline 
 Composites
33.  Else Skjold
  The Daily Selection
34.  Marie Louise Conradsen
  The Cancer Centre That Never Was
 The Organisation of Danish Cancer  
 Research 1949-1992
35.  Virgilio Failla
  Three Essays on the Dynamics of  
Entrepreneurs in the Labor Market
36.  Nicky Nedergaard
 Brand-Based Innovation
  Relational Perspectives on Brand Logics 
and Design Innovation Strategies and 
Implementation
37.  Mads Gjedsted Nielsen
 Essays in Real Estate Finance
38.  Kristin Martina Brandl
  Process Perspectives on  
Service Offshoring
39.  Mia Rosa Koss Hartmann
 In the gray zone
 With police in making space  
 for creativity
40.  Karen Ingerslev
  Healthcare Innovation under  
The Microscope
  Framing Boundaries of Wicked  
Problems
41.  Tim Neerup Themsen
  Risk Management in large Danish 
public capital investment programmes
2015
1.  Jakob Ion Wille 
 Film som design 
  Design af levende billeder i  
ﬁlm og tv-serier
2.  Christiane Mossin 
 Interzones of Law and Metaphysics 
  Hierarchies, Logics and Foundations  
of Social Order seen through the Prism 
of EU Social Rights
3.  Thomas Tøth
  TRUSTWORTHINESS: ENABLING 
GLOBAL COLLABORATION
  An Ethnographic Study of Trust,  
Distance, Control, Culture and  
Boundary Spanning within Offshore  
Outsourcing of IT Services
4.  Steven Højlund 
 Evaluation Use in Evaluation Systems –  
 The Case of the European Commission
5.  Julia Kirch Kirkegaard
 AMBIGUOUS WINDS OF CHANGE – OR  
 FIGHTING AGAINST WINDMILLS IN  
 CHINESE WIND POWER
 A CONSTRUCTIVIST INQUIRY INTO   
 CHINA’S PRAGMATICS OF GREEN   
 MARKETISATION MAPPING  
 CONTROVERSIES OVER A POTENTIAL  
 TURN TO QUALITY IN CHINESE WIND  
 POWER
6.  Michelle Carol Antero
  A Multi-case Analysis of the  
Development of Enterprise Resource 
Planning Systems (ERP) Business 
Practices
  Morten Friis-Olivarius
 The Associative Nature of Creativity
7.  Mathew Abraham
 New Cooperativism:
  A study of emerging producer  
organisations in India
8.  Stine Hedegaard
 Sustainability-Focused Identity: Identity  
 work performed to manage, negotiate  
 and resolve barriers and tensions that  
 arise in the process of constructing or 
 ganizational identity in a sustainability  
 context 
9.  Cecilie Glerup
 Organizing Science in Society – the  
 conduct and justiﬁcation of resposible  
 research
10.  Allan Salling Pedersen
 Implementering af ITIL®  IT-governance
 - når best practice konﬂikter med   
 kulturen Løsning af implementerings- 
 problemer gennem anvendelse af   
 kendte CSF i et aktionsforskningsforløb.
11.  Nihat Misir
 A Real Options Approach to 
 Determining Power Prices
12.  Mamdouh Medhat
 MEASURING AND PRICING THE RISK  
 OF CORPORATE FAILURES
13.  Rina Hansen
 Toward a Digital Strategy for 
 Omnichannel Retailing
14.  Eva Pallesen
 In the rhythm of welfare creation
  A relational processual investigation 
moving beyond the conceptual horizon 
of welfare management
15. Gouya Harirchi
 In Search of Opportunities: Three   
 Essays on Global Linkages for Innovation
16. Lotte Holck
 Embedded Diversity: A critical  
 ethnographic study of the structural  
 tensions of organizing diversity
17. Jose Daniel Balarezo
 Learning through Scenario Planning
18. Louise Pram Nielsen
  Knowledge dissemination based on 
terminological ontologies. Using eye 
tracking to further user interface  
design.
19. Soﬁe Dam
  PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INNOVATION AND SUSTAINABILITY 
TRANSFORMATION
  An embedded, comparative case study 
of municipal waste management in 
England and Denmark
20. Ulrik Hartmyer Christiansen 
  Follwoing the Content of Reported Risk 
Across the Organization 
21. Guro Refsum Sanden 
  Language strategies in multinational 
corporations. A cross-sector study  
of ﬁnancial service companies and  
manufacturing companies.  
22. Linn Gevoll 
  Designing performance management 
for operational level
  - A closer look on the role of design 
choices in framing coordination and 
motivation
23.  Frederik Larsen
  Objects and Social Actions
 – on Second-hand Valuation Practices
24.  Thorhildur Hansdottir Jetzek
  The Sustainable Value of Open  
Government Data
  Uncovering the Generative Mechanisms 
of Open Data through a Mixed  
Methods Approach
25.  Gustav Toppenberg
  Innovation-based M&A 
  – Technological-Integration  
Challenges – The Case of  
Digital-Technology Companies
26.  Mie Plotnikof
  Challenges of Collaborative  
Governance
  An Organizational Discourse Study  
of Public Managers’ Struggles  
with Collaboration across the 
 Daycare Area
27.  Christian Garmann Johnsen
  Who Are the Post-Bureaucrats?
  A Philosophical Examination of the 
Creative Manager, the Authentic Leader 
and the Entrepreneur
28.  Jacob Brogaard-Kay
  Constituting Performance Management
  A ﬁeld study of a pharmaceutical  
company
29.  Rasmus Ploug Jenle
  Engineering Markets for Control: 
Integrating Wind Power into the Danish 
Electricity System
30.  Morten Lindholst
  Complex Business Negotiation:  
Understanding Preparation and  
Planning
31. Morten Grynings
 TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY FROM AN  
 ALIGNMENT PERSPECTIVE
32.  Peter Andreas Norn
  Byregimer og styringsevne: Politisk 
lederskab af store byudviklingsprojekter
33.  Milan Miric
  Essays on Competition, Innovation and 
Firm Strategy in Digital Markets
34.  Sanne K. Hjordrup
 The Value of Talent Management 
  Rethinking practice, problems and  
possibilities
35.  Johanna Sax
 Strategic Risk Management 
  – Analyzing Antecedents and  
Contingencies for Value Creation
36.  Pernille Rydén
 Strategic Cognition of Social Media
37.  Mimmi Sjöklint
 The Measurable Me 
 - The Inﬂuence of Self-tracking on the  
 User Experience
38.  Juan Ignacio Staricco
 Towards a Fair Global Economic   
 Regime? A critical assessment of Fair 
 Trade through the examination of the  
 Argentinean wine industry
39.  Marie Henriette Madsen
 Emerging and temporary connections  
 in Quality work
40.  Yangfeng CAO
 Toward a Process Framework of 
 Business Model Innovation in the   
 Global Context
 Entrepreneurship-Enabled Dynamic  
 Capability of Medium-Sized  
 Multinational Enterprises
41.  Carsten Scheibye
  Enactment of the Organizational Cost
 Structure in Value Chain Conﬁguration
 A Contribution to Strategic Cost
 Management
2016
1.  Signe Soﬁe Dyrby
 Enterprise Social Media at Work
2.  Dorte Boesby Dahl
  The making of the public parking  
attendant
  Dirt, aesthetics and inclusion in public 
service work
3.  Verena Girschik
  Realizing Corporate Responsibility 
Positioning and Framing in Nascent 
Institutional Change
4.  Anders Ørding Olsen
  IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS
  Inertia, Knowledge Sources and Diver-
sity in Collaborative Problem-solving
5.  Pernille Steen Pedersen
  Udkast til et nyt copingbegreb
  En kvaliﬁkation af ledelsesmuligheder 
for at forebygge sygefravær ved 
psykiske problemer.
6.  Kerli Kant Hvass
  Weaving a Path from Waste to Value: 
Exploring fashion industry business 
models and the circular economy
7.  Kasper Lindskow
  Exploring Digital News Publishing  
Business Models – a production  
network approach
8.  Mikkel Mouritz Marfelt
  The chameleon workforce:
 Assembling and negotiating the   
 content of a workforce 
9.  Marianne Bertelsen
 Aesthetic encounters
  Rethinking autonomy, space & time  
in today’s world of art
10.  Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen
 EU PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL  
 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
11.  Abid Hussain
  On the Design, Development and  
Use of the Social Data Analytics Tool 
(SODATO):  Design Propositions,  
Patterns, and Principles for Big  
Social Data Analytics
12.  Mark Bruun
  Essays on Earnings Predictability
13.  Tor Bøe-Lillegraven
 BUSINESS PARADOXES, BLACK BOXES,  
 AND BIG DATA: BEYOND 
 ORGANIZATIONAL AMBIDEXTERITY
14.  Hadis Khonsary-Atighi
  ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF  
DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN AN OIL-
BASED ECONOMY: THE CASE OF IRAN 
(1965-2010)
15.  Maj Lervad Grasten
  Rule of Law or Rule by Lawyers?  
On the Politics of Translation in Global 
Governance
16.  Lene Granzau Juel-Jacobsen
 SUPERMARKEDETS MODUS OPERANDI 
 – en hverdagssociologisk undersøgelse  
 af forholdet mellem rum og handlen
 og understøtte relationsopbygning?
17.  Christine Thalsgård Henriques
 In search of entrepreneurial learning 
 – Towards a relational perspective on  
 incubating practices?
18.  Patrick Bennett
 Essays in Education, Crime, and Job
 Displacement
19.  Søren Korsgaard
 Payments and Central Bank Policy
TITLER I ATV PH.D.-SERIEN
1992
1.  Niels Kornum
  Servicesamkørsel – organisation, øko-
nomi og planlægningsmetode
1995
2.  Verner Worm
 Nordiske virksomheder i Kina
 Kulturspeciﬁkke interaktionsrelationer
 ved nordiske virksomhedsetableringer i
 Kina
1999
3.  Mogens Bjerre
 Key Account Management of Complex
 Strategic Relationships
 An Empirical Study of the Fast Moving
 Consumer Goods Industry
2000
4.  Lotte Darsø
 Innovation in the Making
  Interaction Research with heteroge-
neous Groups of Knowledge Workers
 creating new Knowledge and new
 Leads
2001
5.  Peter Hobolt Jensen
 Managing Strategic Design Identities
  The case of the Lego Developer Net-
work
2002
6.  Peter Lohmann
 The Deleuzian Other of Organizational
 Change – Moving Perspectives of the
 Human
7.  Anne Marie Jess Hansen
 To lead from a distance: The dynamic
  interplay between strategy and strate-
gizing – A case study of the strategic
 management process
2003
8.  Lotte Henriksen
 Videndeling
  – om organisatoriske og ledelsesmæs-
sige udfordringer ved videndeling i
 praksis
9.  Niels Christian Nickelsen
  Arrangements of Knowing: Coordi-
nating Procedures Tools and Bodies in
 Industrial Production – a case study of
 the collective making of new products
2005
10.  Carsten Ørts Hansen
  Konstruktion af ledelsesteknologier og
 effektivitet
TITLER I DBA PH.D.-SERIEN
2007
1.  Peter Kastrup-Misir
 Endeavoring to Understand Market
 Orientation – and the concomitant
 co-mutation of the researched, the
 re searcher, the research itself and the
 truth
2009
1.  Torkild Leo Thellefsen
  Fundamental Signs and Signiﬁcance 
effects
 A Semeiotic outline of Fundamental
 Signs, Signiﬁcance-effects, Knowledge
 Proﬁling and their use in Knowledge
 Organization and Branding
2.  Daniel Ronzani
 When Bits Learn to Walk Don’t Make
 Them Trip. Technological Innovation
 and the Role of Regulation by Law
 in Information Systems Research: the
 Case of Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation
 (RFID)
2010
1.  Alexander Carnera
 Magten over livet og livet som magt
 Studier i den biopolitiske ambivalens
